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ABSTRACT
Primary Resources, Secondary Labor: Natural Resources and Immigration Policy
around the World
by
Adrian J. Shin
Co-Chairs: William Roberts Clark and Robert J. Franzese, Jr.
This dissertation seeks to understand why some policymakers open their borders to un-
skilled immigrants while others restrict immigration, by looking at the effects of natural
resource wealth on pro-immigration firms and policymakers. The three empirical chapters
in the dissertation examine the mechanisms through which revenues from capital-intensive
natural resources shape immigration policy toward low-skilled workers from the devel-
oping world. I find that natural resource wealth has differential effects on immigration
policy under different political institutions.
Chapter 3 explores the link between natural resource wealth and immigration policy
formation in wealthy democracies. In this chapter, I find that substantial natural resource
wealth leads to policy restrictions on immigration inflows by reducing the size of the pro-
immigration business coalition. Moreover, trade liberalization exacerbates this negative
effect of natural resource income on immigration policy openness by expediting firm
deaths in the tradable sector. These adverse effects do not materialize in economies
lacking resource income, so firms there seek to remain viable under trade liberalization by
supporting pro-immigration policy. In Chapter 4, I test the hypotheses and find similar
xiv
results by using the data on U.S. senators’ voting behavior on immigration bills from 1964
to 2008.
Finally, Chapter 6 examines the effects of natural resource rents on the immigration
policies of 13 relatively wealthy autocracies after World War II. In contrast to Chapters 3 and
4, I find that the natural resource wealth is positively associated with more open immigration
policy in autocracies. As the distribution of resource rents in rentier autocracies reduces the
incentive of domestic labor to enter the labor force, rentier states rely on migrant workers
to meet the demand for low-skilled labor. Autocrats without resource rents, however,
lack capacity for redistribution, so they use policies that provide people with wages in
exchange for their labor while restricting immigration.
The remaining chapters provide supplementary information such as details on immi-
gration policy index construction and additional evidence from field research. I conclude
the dissertation with future research suggestions and broader implications for political
science research.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
On September 2, 2015, the world woke up to a shocking photo of a drowned Syrian boy on
a beach near a Turkish resort of Bodrum. The 3-year-old toddler, Aylan Kurdi was found
lying face down after a refugee group’s failed attempt to reach the Greek island of Kos. He
was one of the refugee group’s at least 12 Syrians who lost their lives while attempting to
escape from violence (Smith, 2015). Displaced individuals from Syria, Afghanistan, and
African countries seek refuge in geographically proximate European countries. According
to UNHCR (2016), more than one million refugees and migrants arrived in Europe by
sea in 2015. As of June 2016, more than 200,000 have arrived in the year of 2016 alone.
Tragically, more than 3,700 were missing or presumed dead in the Mediterranean Sea in
2015. As of June 17th, 2016, 2,868 are dead or missing in 2016.
The ongoing refugee crisis brings attention to the immigration policies of wealthy
advanced democracies. Some of these wealthy states’ unwillingness to resettle refugees
has been subject to harsh criticisms from the media and non-governmental organizations.
In the meantime, oil-rich autocracies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) area have
hardly welcomed any refugees while relying heavily on foreign labor in almost every
sector. Although high-skilled foreign workers in the GCC countries enjoy higher standards
of living than low-skilled workers from poor countries, the GCC countries’ poor treatment
of low-skilled workers has been an ongoing human rights issue. It is estimated that around
400 to 600 migrant workers die every year in Qatar in preparations for the 2022 World
Cup (Stephenson, 2015). This is an unprecedented death toll for a World Cup, given that
1
only a handful of worker deaths had occurred in preparations for the previous World Cup
tournaments.
The world is disproportionately moving into another age of migration. As of 2013,
the global stock of international migrants was approximately 231 million, representing
only about 3 percent of the world’s total population (Vargas-Silva, 2014). Yet, the share
of international migrants is around 10 percent in many Western European countries with
Germany and the U.K. as the top immigrant destinations. The shares of foreign-born
individuals in Canada and the U.S. also exceeded 21 and 14 percent, respectively in 2015
(World Bank, 2016). In particular, the migrant population shares of the GCC countries
have become unprecedentedly large. As of 2015, migrants make up 73.6 and 75.5 percent
of the Kuwaiti and Qatari populations, respectively.
The significance of these wealthy economies’ role in shaping the new age of migration
cannot be overstated. Their immigration policies have direct consequences for the lives of
countless nationals from the developing world, who seek better economic opportunities by
leaving their families and homelands. In this dissertation project, I seek to understand why
policymakers of these relatively wealthy economies adopt different immigration policies
toward low-skilled immigrants. To explain the variation in LSIP, I address the following
specific questions:
• Which domestic political actors support or oppose low-skill immigration?
• Given these interests, what constraints do policymakers face in immigration policy-
making?
The findings of this project provide insight into how political institutions and contesta-
tion between domestic political actors shape immigration policymaking. My argument
emphasizes that immigration policies reflect the relative influence of pro-immigration
groups vis-a`-vis anti-immigrant groups in democracies. I also show that powerful au-
tocrats can devise their preferred immigration policies without giving much thought to
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the mass public’s preferences. The implication is that short-term macroeconomic and
demographic shifts rarely drive immigration policy if these indicators do not shape the
preferences of influential domestic political actors over immigration. This argument high-
lights that policymakers do not use immigration policies as social planners but simply to
increase their chance of political survival. For instance, policymakers of democracies open
immigration in exchange for pro-immigration firms’ contributions which policymakers
use to increase their re-election chance. Similarly, autocratic leaders use immigration
to maintain regime stability. While this should not be surprising for political scientists,
my arguments elaborate on the specific mechanisms through which policymakers are
compelled to open or close their doors to low-skilled immigrants.
This introductory chapter is divided into two sections. First, I provide a brief literature
review on the political economy of immigration policy and explain why the existing
theories cannot explain much of immigration policy variation. Second, I explain the
argument and state the purpose of each chapter. This section provides a snapshot of the
theoretical framework and how the chapters are inter-related in a larger, coherent project.
1.1 Motivating Literature
The vast majority of scholars studying the politics of immigration focus on some type of
prejudice among native voters against foreigners (Freeman, 1995; Zolberg, 1989). While
different degrees of xenophobia may help explain why some countries are more tolerant
of immigrants than others, immigration policy often shows wide within-country variation
over a short time period. If xenophobia primarily drives national immigration policy, how
does a xenophobic segment of the population gain or lose influence over time? Others have
turned to the role of organized labor, such as labor unions and parties that represent their
economic interests.1 Over the past several decades, the power of labor unions has declined
1For the influence of anti-immigrant right-wing populists, see Messina (2002); Swank and Betz (2003).
For labor unions’ stance on immigration and policy influence, see Haus (2002); Briggs (1984, 2001).
3
significantly. Organized labor has been largely unsuccessful in blocking other policies
that harm their interests, such as an increasing burden of taxation and trade liberalization.
Given the declining influence of labor on these policy issues, the possibility of organized
labor influencing immigration policy is tenuous. Finally, scholars have examined whether
voters’ welfare chauvinism has led to restrictive immigration policy (Razin, Sadka and
Suwankiri, 2011; Peters, 2015). According to this argument, voters in welfare states believe
that immigrants tend to be net consumers of social services and oppose liberal immigration
policy in order to restrict access to welfare provisions to themselves. Although welfare
states tend to limit immigration, gradual developments of welfare state over time cannot
explain drastic changes in immigration policy.
These common explanations for immigration policy formation implicitly focus on lib-
eral democracies by emphasizing a number of cultural, economic, and sociotropic origins of
native opposition to low-skill immigration. While scholars disagree on the extent to which
citizens in democracies influence immigration policy, immigration tends to be a highly
salient issue about which voters have strong opinions. In representative democracies, both
average citizens and special interests play roles in shaping government policy (Grossman
and Helpman, 1994, 2001). Reelection-minded policymakers in democracies must strike a
balance between pro-immigration businesses and voters. Scholars studying immigration
policies of representative democracies have examined whether firms influence immigra-
tion policy by supplying financial resources to policymakers.2 Yet, our understanding of
factors that drive firms’ ability and incentives to lobby for pro-immigration policy remains
limited.
Many of these explanations also fail to provide a theoretical framework for why auto-
crats choose to close or open their borders to low-skill immigrants. Since authoritarian
rulers are largely insulated from mass preferences over government policy, their policy
choices primarily reflect their concern for regime stability. (Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
2See Goldin (1994), Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2008), Freeman (1995),Money (1997) and Peters (2014,
2015, 2017) for discussion of the role of business interests in shaping immigration policy.
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2004). Then, why do some authoritarian governments of fast-growing economies become
increasingly dependent on foreign labor while others limit immigration?3 Moreover, what
explains an authoritarian government’s immigration policy shifts over time? Economic
needs for low-skilled labor do not explain why oil-rich autocracies in the Persian Gulf
have relied on immigration more than the export-oriented economies of East Asia. The
so-called East Asian Tigers experienced exponential growth under dictatorships, driven
by booming labor-intensive manufacturing sectors. The growth rates of these export-
oriented economies often exceeded those of the Persian Gulf fueled by petroleum exports,
a capital-intensive industry that requires relatively little labor. Given the sectoral differ-
ences between the oil industry and manufacturing sectors, economic theories predict that
the East Asian Tigers should have relied on more foreign labor than the oil-rich autocracies
in the Middle East.
In sum, the literature overlooks two important factors of immigration policy forma-
tion. First, the existing theories of immigration policy based on native voters’ opposition
are inadequate to explain why autocracies change their immigration policies over time.
Second, we do not have a good understanding of which firms are more likely to support
immigration and factors that affect their relative power vis-a`-vis native voters under demo-
cratic settings. In addition, the literature lacks comprehensive data on LSIP, making it
impossible to test many of the predictions proposed in the literature.
1.2 Overview of the Argument
In this dissertation, I make the case that the existing literature has overlooked the im-
portance of pro-immigration firms and has held a simplistic view of the role of firms in
immigration policy formation. In addition, the majority of the existing theories cannot
explain the immigration policy variation of authoritarian regimes by placing an exclusive
3Breunig, Cao and Luedtke (2012) find that autocracies are able to absorb more immigrants than democ-
racies but offer no explanation of why some autocracies rely more on foreign labor than others.
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focus on institutional channels through which native voters and organized labor seek to
influence immigration policy. Taking cues from the literatures on special-interest politics
and the politics of authoritarian regimes, I divide the dissertation into two broad sections
by presenting different sets of hypotheses for the political economy of immigration policy
in democracies and autocracies.
Chapter 3 argues that the revenues from capital-intensive natural resources (e.g. oil
and natural gas) lead to restrictions on immigration inflows from the developing world
in wealthy, labor-scarce democracies. This counter-intuitive result is due to an economic
phenomenon known as the Dutch Disease through which pro-immigration firms perish. I
also present and test hypotheses that elaborate the conditions under which trade liberaliza-
tion leads to more restrictive or more liberal immigration policy outcomes. I focus on firm
preferences over immigration policy and present evidence on industry-level lobbying.
To provide a closer look at immigration policymaking, Chapter 4 uses senate roll-
call votes and state-level data to see how petroleum booms have changed U.S. senators’
voting behavior on immigration bills. I find that senators from petroleum-rich states
tend to oppose pro-immigration bills when the level of low-wage import penetration
is high. I also explore the ways through which a petroleum boom in a state affects the
voting behavior of senators from its contiguous states. I find some evidence that that
senators from neighboring states of petroleum-booming states tend to vote in favor of
pro-immigration bills possibly because they lose much of their labor force to neighboring
petroleum-rich states.
In Chapter 5, I elaborate on how immigration policies of the Netherlands and the
Scandinavian countries are formulated and present some of the findings from in-depth
interviews during my five-month field research from January to June 2016. In summary,
as in the case of the U.S., firms in these countries have access to similar political channels
through which they can communicate their preferences for immigration policy to relevant
lawmakers. However, their preferences for immigrant labor depend on the sector, labor
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intensity, and the exposure to foreign competition. The findings from the field research
provide qualitative evidence that the firm-lobbying model of immigration policy formation
is generalizable in the Western European context.
Finally, Chapter 6 examines the link between natural resource rents and immigration
policy in autocracies. In contrast to the previous chapters, I argue that resource wealth
and immigration policy openness is positively correlated in autocracies. I demonstrate
that that authoritarian immigration policy is a consequence of an autocrat’s redistributive
policy. As the distribution of resource rents in rentier autocracies reduces the incentive of
domestic labor to enter the labor force, rentier states rely on migrant workers to meet the
demand for low-skilled labor. Autocrats without resource rents, however, lack capacity for
redistribution, so they use policies that provide people with wages in exchange for their
labor while restricting immigration.
In sum, my dissertation offers explanations to the big question: why do some policy-
makers open their doors to low-skilled workers when others maintain more restrictions?
The theories and findings presented in the dissertation go beyond the statement that says
immigration policies are different because countries are different. The project demon-
strates that macroeconomic indicators and demographic factors cannot explain much of
the immigration policy variation. In Chapter 7, I also offer novel implications for future
research and situate the issue of immigration in the globalization literature.
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CHAPTER 2
Data on Immigration Policy
2.1 Motivation and Data Collection
While many theories of immigration policy formation have emerged across disciplines,
the lack of cross-sectional time-series data on immigration policy has made it difficult to
perform rigorous statistical evaluation of the theories. The existing datasets and ongoing
projects only cover advanced democracies that are members of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for a relatively short time period.1 One
of the main contributions of this dissertation is an expanded dataset on LSIP. Chapters 3
and 6 use this extensive dataset on national immigration policies that target low-skilled
workers from the developing world. In this section, I describe how I augmented the LSIP
dataset constructed by Peters by adding more country-year observations of immigration
policies.2
The original dataset in Peters (2015) includes nineteen democracies and autocracies
from the late eighteenth century to 2010, covering up to 225 years. While the dataset
includes a long time period for some settler states in the New World and former colonial
powers in Europe, many European democracies are missing from the dataset, notably
Austria, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries. Using this original dataset is prob-
lematic because Chapter 3 proposes theories about the immigration policy formation in
1See the International Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA) Database for more information.
http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/impala)
2See Peters (2015) for the original dataset.
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wealthy democracies, which should be generalizable to many Western European democ-
racies. Moreover, the dataset includes a limited number of wealthy autocracies. Chapter
6 explores how an autocrat’s redistributive capacity shapes an autocracy’s immigration
policy toward low-skilled workers. To generate larger samples for empirical analysis, I
have expanded the dataset to include 10 additional countries from 1950 to 2013 by using
Peters’ codebook shown in Appendix A.2.
For data collection, I assembled a team of three international lawyers with specialty
in national and international migration laws. We searched, collected, and coded all
domestic laws, international treaties (i.e. bilateral migration agreements and Schengen)
and secondary sources that illustrate each country’s immigration policy in a given year
from 1950 to 2013. The team is collectively proficient in English, French, German and
Spanish. For the Nordic countries, we used English translations of national immigration
laws and secondary sources written in English. We then cross-checked the indicators with
the countries’ descriptive histories of immigration policy.
Several theoretical and practical grounds justify the collection of additional data from
1950. For instance, Norway was an emigrant-sending country prior to World War I,
experiencing the second highest rate of per-capita emigration just below Ireland during
the Great Famine (Moses, 2011, p. 17). Emigration peaked in Norway and Sweden in the
1890s, sending workers mainly to the New World (Hatton and Williamson, 1998, p. 48). It
was not until the end of World War II when the Nordic states began absorbing refugees
and immigrants from the rest of the war-torn Europe. Although Austria and Belgium have
implemented both immigration and emigration policies prior to 1950, it is unclear which
policies were national policies specific to Austria and Belgium. When Nazi Germany
annexed Austria in 1938, the Nazi regulations replaced many of Austria’s policies toward
immigrants. As a small economy in the highly mobile Be´ne´lux region, Belgium began
designing and implementing enforceable immigration policies only after World War II.
In addition, Chile has become one of the most recent destinations of immigrants, mostly
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Table 2.1: Dimensions of Immigration Policy
Dimension Description
Universality by Nationality Discrimination based on nationality
Universality by Skill or Income Discrimination based on skills or income
Citizenship Ease of naturalization or citizenship acquisition
Immigrant Rights Political, legal or welfare rights
Refugee Number of refugees allowed to enter
Asylum Ease of getting an asylum
Recruitment Visas or government programs
Labor Prohibitions Labor market restrictions for immigrants
Deportation Deportable offenses and administrative processes
Enforcement Border enforcement or employment screening
Family Sponsorship by citizenship and restrictions
Quota Percentage of population allowed to enter annually
from Europe after a period of mass emigration during the Pinochet regime. Moreover, it is
logistically difficult to find historical sources for immigration policy and to assess their
relevance during wars and the inter-war period.3
For each country-year observation, we have coded twelve dimensions and three provi-
sions of immigration policy. Table 2.1 presents the twelve immigration policy dimensions
with scores ranging from one to five, with the latter indicating a more liberal policy stance
on immigrants. The three immigration policy provisions are binary indicators for whether
a country’s immigration policy mentions refugee, asylum, and family reunion procedures.
Before the first mention of each provision, the variable is coded 0. Afterwards, each provi-
sion is coded 1. Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics for the 10 additional countries’
immigration policy dimensions.
The post-WWII history of immigration policy in the Nordic states shares many similar
temporal patterns with the two-century-long history of settler states in the New World.
Prior to the 1970s, the Nordic states maintained relatively open immigration policy without
any restrictions on nationality, skill, or quota. Norway and Sweden placed significant
3It is easier to collect and code pre-WWII data on immigration policy for countries in the New World
because these “countries of immigrants” have been destinations for centuries while European countries were
their sending states.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for the 10 Additional Countries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Nationality 3.917 1.521 1 5 624
Skill 3.214 1.342 1.3 5 624
Citizenship 3.843 0.961 1 5 624
Other Rights 3.607 1.118 1 5 624
Refugees 2.777 1.165 1 4.5 624
Refugee Provisions 0.756 0.43 0 1 624
Asylum 2.708 1.126 1 4.1 624
Asylum Provisions 0.747 0.435 0 1 624
Recruitment 2.523 1.255 1 5 624
Work Prohibitions 3.891 1.247 1.6 5 624
Deportation 2.723 0.882 1 4.9 624
Enforcement 3.187 0.861 1.2 5 624
Family 2.559 1.241 1 5 621
Family Provisions 0.853 0.355 0 1 624
Quota 3.679 1.744 1 5 624
The 10 additional countries are Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Chile, Denmark,
Ireland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Venezuela.
restrictions in 1975 and in 1972, respectively, allowing only a small number of immigrants
to become legal residents. Norway’s main justification for its complete ban on labor immi-
gration was based on integration issues concerning existing immigrants. Policymakers in
Norway stated that new effective integration policies must be in place before they could
welcome new immigrants.
Sweden began lifting immigration restrictions in 1995. Sweden’s national immigration
policy took a significant shift toward openness in December, 2008 when the government
allowed employers to recruit for any occupation and started granting renewable permits to
all incoming labor migrants. In addition, Sweden allows immigrants’ access to the national
health and social welfare systems as long as their stay in Sweden exceeds one year. The
Swedish constitution also guarantees immigrants’ right to join trade unions and to form
their own unions. In addition, family reunion is possible without a waiting period and
financial requirements (Cholewinski, 2004, p. 78-79). This substantial opening of policy
places Sweden as the most open industrialized economy in terms of labor mobility in the
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21st century.
Austria and Belgium exhibit very volatile patterns of immigration policy. Nazi Ger-
many’s immigration policy initially shaped Austria’s passport law of 1945, mandating that
foreigners who want to travel to Austria must be endorsed. There was a wide range of
grounds for refusing an endorsement. Migrants were required to demonstrate economic
self-sufficiency and to provide evidence that they will not become a burden to the Austrian
health and medical facilities. This remnant of Nazi Germany persisted in Austrian immi-
gration policy until 1954 when Aliens Police Law replaced the old immigration regime.
Austria then encouraged low-skilled migrants to work in the economy through bilateral
agreements with Spain (1962), Turkey (1964) and Yugoslavia (1966) and placed no skill or
income restrictions until 1975. In 1990, Austria restricted immigration by making require-
ments for employing foreign nationals more stringent and stipulating that migrants are
tied to one type of job. In 1994, Austria extended rights and social benefits to citizens of the
European Economic Area (EEA) as the EEA treaty of freedom of movement came into force.
When Austria passed a series of new immigration laws on July 1, 2011, a criteria-based
system replaced the quota-based immigration model with favorable terms for high-skilled
and seasonal workers.
Prior to 1967, the Belgian immigration policy sought to bring a large number of low-
skilled workers. At the international level, the Belgian government aggressively pursued
bilateral agreements with multiple sending states including Spain (1956), Greece (1957),
Morocco (1964), Turkey (1964), Tunisia (1969), Algeria (1970) and Yugoslavia (1970). In the
early 1960s, the Belgian Ministry of Justice stopped enforcing strict immigration laws. For
instance, a work permit was no longer considered a prerequisite for permanent residence.
Immigration authorities even implicitly tolerated an influx of tourists who would then
get a residence permit upon arrival in the country. Starting with the 1967 law of strict
enforcement, a number of Belgian immigration authorities imposed strict limits on new
immigrants and proposed a cut in the number of work permits. The post-1974 immigration
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regime marks the beginning of immigration policy favoring highly educated foreigners.
In the mid-1980s, the government began to introduce integration policy for the first time.
Although immigrants in general have access to welfare benefits, the rights to which each
immigrant has access depend on the type of immigrant visa and years of residence. In
2006, Belgium passed a ground-breaking immigration law that grants voting rights in
local elections to immigrants from developing countries with at least five years of legal
residence.
While governments of the Western European countries have adopted different policies
toward low-skilled immigrants, they share some common policy developments. Prior to
the mid-1970s, their borders were generally open toward Third-World nationals. Many
of them used bilateral migration treaties to bring foreign workers with an expectation
that they would return to their home countries. Many of these countries placed bans
on labor migration in the 1970s while allowing family reunification. Yet, there are also
striking differences as well. European immigration policies vis-a´-vis non-EU nationals
became restrictive at different times during the 1970s. The current immigration policies
of the Netherlands and Norway are still based on the 1970s bans on labor immigration
while others have changed their stances on immigration with Swedish immigration policy
exhibiting the most drastic policy change. The descriptive histories of these policy changes
in several European countries correspond to the variation in the immigration policy
dimension data.
2.2 Immigration Policy Index Construction
To construct an index of immigration policy openness, I have considered several options.
The most straightforward way is to use some of the observed policy dimensions in the
regression analysis. Policies that govern the entry of immigrants are central to the hy-
potheses in the dissertation. In addition to entry restrictions based on nationality, skill,
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quota and recruitment, labor market policies such as labor prohibitions, deportation and
enforcement are important policy areas in which both firms and native voters exercise
influence.
This method, however, is problematic for two reasons. First, selecting one variable
over another is arbitrary and leaves little variance to be explained in the analysis. Second,
policymakers may favor one type of policy over another in manifesting their stance on
immigration. For instance, consider two hypothetical countries’ immigration policies.
Country A employs a quota and does not place any restriction on nationality. Country B
has restrictions on skill and does not have any immigration quota. Using the quota variable
or discrimination by skill leads to a false conclusion that Country A is more restrictive than
Country B, or vice versa. As seen in Figure 2.1, France and Germany primarily use skill and
nationality restrictions to control immigration inflows while the U.S. maintains a restrictive
quota system. Norway and Sweden have historically used many policy tools to manage
immigration inflows. For all of the 29 countries, see Figure A.1. Since policymakers may
choose one type of restriction over another or may employ all available policy measures
to control immigration, it is appropriate to account for multiple policy dimensions that
regulate immigration flows. For instance, one can compute an average score of relevant
policy dimensions. This method excludes citizenship regime, refugee policy and other
policies that are less relevant to firms’ preferences for foreign labor. Since each dimension
except for provisions is coded to vary from one to five, using the average forces the index
to assign equal weights to all of the policy dimensions. Researchers may choose to assign
different weights to policy dimensions such that one policy dimension has more weight
than another in the final makeup of the immigration policy index. Researchers, however,
need to present a convincing argument to defend their choice of weights. Moreover, some
of these variables are highly correlated to one another. When using the sum or the average
of observed policy scores, the high correlation between the variables overestimates the
variation in immigration policy openness.
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Figure 2.1: Immigration Policy Dimensions in Select Countries, 1945–2013
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1945 1965 1985 2005 1945 1965 1985 2005 1945 1965 1985 2005
Canada France Germany
Norway Sweden United States
Quota Nationality Skill
Year
The main objective of constructing the immigration policy index is two-fold, (1) to
summarize the policy data without losing much information and (2) to remove redundant
information from a set of highly correlated policy variables. I used factor analysis based
on principal component scores to compute factor loadings and factor scores. Using the
principal components is appropriate to construct an immigration policy index for the
following reasons. First, it takes information from a number of highly correlated observed
variables to construct a small number of indicators. Second, principal component scores
also account for most of the variance of the observed policy variables. Finally, it frees the
researcher from making a structural assumption about immigration policy.
The standard rule is to retain factors with eigenvalues equal to or greater than 1 and
disregard factors with eigenvalues smaller than 1 (the Kaiser criterion). Since eigenvalues
are the variances of the factors, factors with higher eigenvalues account for more variance.
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Table 2.3: Factor Analysis and Correlation (Unrotated)
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Factor 1 3.987 1.947 0.332 0.332
Factor 2 2.040 1.013 0.170 0.502
Factor 3 1.027 0.058 0.086 0.588
Factor 4 0.969 0.197 0.081 0.669
Factor 5 0.772 0.010 0.064 0.733
Factor 6 0.762 0.178 0.064 0.796
Factor 7 0.584 0.081 0.049 0.845
Factor 8 0.503 0.059 0.042 0.887
Factor 9 0.444 0.077 0.037 0.924
Factor 10 0.367 0.048 0.031 0.955
Factor 11 0.319 0.093 0.027 0.981
Factor 12 0.226 – 0.019 1.000
LR test: independent vs. saturated: χ2(66) = 1.5× 104 Prob> χ2 = 0
* All values are rounded to three decimal places.
As depicted in Table 2.4, Factor 1 and Factor 2 capture most of the variance of policies that
regulate immigration flows and immigrant rights, respectively. Although Factor 3 satisfies
the Kaiser criterion, the difference in eigenvalues between Factor 3 and Factor 4 is minimal,
0.067 as shown in Table 2.3. Moreover, it is difficult to conceptualize Factor 3 because factor
loadings of similar policy measures appear inconsistent as shown in Table 2.4.
Many researchers use rotation to facilitate the interpretations of retained factors. Ro-
tation is likely to produce a set of more reliable factors than the unrotated ones under
two assumptions (Abdi and Williams, 2010). First, each variable loads on only one factor.
Second, retained factors and disregarded factors show clear differences in intensity. While
the second assumption seems plausible, the first assumption is too restrictive, given the
complexity of immigration policy. Moreover, unrotated factors correspond better with
the descriptive history of immigration policy in each country with a high correlation at
0.945 with a simple average of nationality, skill, quota, recruitment, labor prohibitions,
deportation and enforcement scores. A similar factor retrieved from rotated factor loadings
is correlated at only 0.822 with the average of the seven aforementioned immigration policy
measures. In the end, I decided to extract factors from unrotated factor loadings based on
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Table 2.4: Factor Loadings and Unique Variances
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness
Nationality 0.4669 -0.0577 0.5748 0.4482
Skill 0.7386 0.0416 0.2653 0.3823
Citizenship 0.1810 0.6245 0.2144 0.5313
Other Rights 0.3746 0.7306 -0.2339 0.2712
Refugees -0.6701 0.4318 0.1632 0.3379
Asylum -0.5480 0.4378 0.0929 0.4994
Recruitment 0.5508 0.0867 0.5358 0.4021
Work Prohibitions 0.4687 0.5447 -0.2563 0.4180
Deportation 0.6026 0.4603 -0.1602 0.3993
Enforcement 0.7594 -0.0215 -0.1640 0.3959
Family Reunification -0.6815 0.3654 0.2904 0.3177
Quota 0.6117 -0.2881 -0.0185 0.5425
the costs and benefits of rotation, the correlation with raw immigration policy measures
and the descriptive history of immigration policy across multiple countries.
The final factor score covers a variety of immigration regulations and laws that seek to
control immigration flows by screening potential immigrants. While most scores come
from actual immigration laws in effect, executive policy discretion over deportation and
enforcement also contributes to the final makeup of the factor score. A factor analysis
based on principal components constructs an immigration policy index by pooling all 29
countries across all years from 1783 to 2013 listed in Table 2.5.
The factor analysis retains two factors with eigenvalues greater than 2. The first factor
primarily incorporates the policy dimensions that control immigration flows by erecting
legal or administrative barriers to potentially new immigrants. On the other hand, the
second factor puts more weight on various social provisions and restrictions to which
immigrants are subjected as residents of receiving states. The factor loadings and scoring
coefficients in Table 2.6 indicate that the conceptualization of Factor 1 as Immigration Policy
and Factor 2 as Immigrant Rights is justifiable. Given that wealthy countries tend to face
some degree of migration pressure, policymakers and capitalists pay more attention to
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Table 2.5: Countries Included in the Factor Analysis
Group No. Country Years Includedin the Factor Analysis
Settler States
1 United States 1790–2010
2 Australia 1787–2010
3 Canada 1783–2010
4 New Zealand 1840–2010
5 South Africa 1806–2010
6 Argentina 1810–2010
7 Brazil 1808–2010
8 Chile* 1950–2013
Western Europe
9 Austria* 1950–2013
10 Belgium* 1950–2013
11 Denmark* 1950–2013
12 Ireland* 1950-2013
13 France 1793–2010
14 Germany 1871–2010
15 Netherlands 1815–2010
16 Norway* 1950–2013
17 Sweden* 1950–2013
18 Spain* 1950–2013
19 Switzerland 1848–2010
20 United Kingdom 1792–2010
Asian Exporters
21 Japan 1868–2010
22 Hong Kong 1843–2010
23 Singapore 1955–2010
24 South Korea 1948–2010
25 Taiwan 1949–2010
Rentier States
26 Botswana* 1966–2013
27 Kuwait 1961–2010
28 Saudi Arabia 1950–2010
29 Venezuela* 1950–2013
* indicates the countries whose immigration policies have been collected and
constructed by the author.
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Table 2.6: Factor Loadings and Scoring Coefficients
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
Immigration Policy Immigrant Rights
Factor Scoring Factor Scoring
Loadings Coefficients Loadings Coefficients
Nationality 0.467 0.117 -0.058 -0.028 0.779
Skill 0.739 0.185 0.042 0.020 0.453
Citizenship 0.181 0.045 0.625 0.306 0.577
Other Rights 0.375 0.094 0.731 0.358 0.326
Refugees -0.670 -0.168 0.432 0.212 0.365
Asylum -0.548 -0.137 0.438 0.215 0.508
Recruitment 0.551 0.138 0.087 0.042 0.689
Work Prohibitions 0.469 0.118 0.545 0.267 0.484
Deportation 0.603 0.151 0.460 0.226 0.425
Enforcement 0.759 0.190 -0.022 -0.011 0.423
Family Reunification -0.682 -0.171 0.365 0.179 0.402
Quota 0.612 0.153 -0.288 -0.141 0.543
* All values are rounded to three decimal places.
immigration policy rather than immigrant rights.4
Across 29 countries and over the two past centuries, the immigration policy score
ranges from -2.88 (most restrictive) to 1.50 (most liberal) with zero mean and unit variance
in the whole sample. The score correlates highly (at 0.945) with a standardized average of
nationality, skill, quota, recruitment, labor prohibitions, deportation, and enforcement. See
Figure A.2 for graphs of Immigration Policy, Immigrant Rights, and a standardized average
of the seven aforementioned immigration policy dimensions.
2.3 Immigration Policy Effectiveness
Peters (2015) finds a positive correlation between immigration policy openness and im-
migration inflows per gross domestic product (GDP) in a sample of 19 countries. In this
section, I use the World Bank data on immigration stocks and flows to examine whether
4Policymakers often use immigrant rights to attract migrants when their open immigration policies are
not effective in increasing immigration inflows. Since wealthy democracies attract immigrants for economic
and political reasons, their primary method of managing immigration inflows is through entry restrictions.
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the immigration policy index I have constructed is correlated with immigration inflows
for the 29 countries in the expanded dataset. Given the limited time coverage of the
World Bank bilateral migration matrix, I can test the relationship between immigration
inflows and immigration policy openness from 1960 to 2013. As both Chapters 3 and 6
only use the immigration policy data after World War II, the results reported in this section
provide confirmatory evidence that the immigration policy index used in the dissertation
is empirically plausible.
Testing the effectiveness of immigration policy generally requires a gravity model.
International migration is driven by both push and pull factors. Civil wars, natural
disasters, and other economic and political instability push people out of the developing
world. Unless we account for both push and pull factors in a regression analysis, we
cannot precisely estimate whether immigration policies are effective. In addition, it is
possible that countries immigration policies sometimes fail because they are not attractive
destinations or due to increasing migration pressure similar to the ongoing migrant crisis
in Europe. Moreover, we need detailed data on low-skill migration. Such data can be very
difficult to locate especially for autocracies. Even though immigration policy effectiveness
deserves more scholarly attention, actual policies with varying degrees of success clearly
show policymakers stances on immigration.
Nonetheless, I run several regressions to see how well immigration inflows respond to
the immigration policy index with the following model.
Non-OECD Migrant Flows/GDP (in Millions)i,t
= β0 + β1Non-OECD Migrant Flows/GDP (in Millions)i,t−1
+β2Immigration Policyi,t−1 +∑
K
k=3
(
βkControl Variable(k−4),it
)
+ αi + µt + eit,
where Non-OECD Migrant Flows/GDP (in Millions)i,t is a receiving state i’s number of
incoming foreign-born individuals from non-OECD countries divided by i’s GDP in year
t, Immigration Policyi.t−1 is the immigration policy openness index of country i in year
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t− 1, and αi and µt indicate country fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively.
I computed the dependent variable for year t by subtracting i’s non-OECD foreign-born
stock in year t− 1 from i’s non-OECD foreign-born stock in year t and dividing this value
by i’s total GDP in U.S. dollars in year t. To decide which sending countries are members
of OECD, I used the OECD’s official accession dates. Then, I retrieved bilateral migration
stock data between countries i and j to compute i’s non-OECD migration stock in year
t. Since the bilateral migration stock is only available at 10-year intervals and generally
follows a linear trend, I used linear interpolation to fill in missing values. I used non-OECD
migration stocks to capture the inflows of low-skilled workers. While this measure likely
includes medium- and high-skilled workers, I believe this is currently the best measure
of low-skilled workers because we do not have access to individual-level migration data
with different skill categories. I divided migration flows by GDP rather than population
because large economies can absorb more immigration. In some models, I include the log
of population as a control to account for population differences.
Throughout the regression models, I include the lagged dependent variable to account
for any time dependency of migration flows. In addition to country i’s macroeconomic
variables, I include migration-weighted variables that capture some of the pull and push
factors between receiving states i’s and sending states j’s. For instance, I include the
distance between i and j. Since i faces migration pressure from multiple sending states,
I weight the distance by each sending state j’s migrant share of i’s total migrant stock in
year t. I use migration weights because migrants tend to move to countries where their
co-ethnics reside.5 More formally,
Migration-Weighted Distancei,t = ∑
n
j=1 Mji,tDistanceij,t,
5This is because migrant networks help decrease the risks of migration and the transaction costs of
relocating to host countries (Portes and Bo¨ro¨cz, 1989; Portes, 1995; Massey et al., 2005). More specifically,
co-ethnic networks facilitate the process of finding work (Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Rex and Josephides,
1987; Hily and Poinard, 1987; Wilpert, 1988), finding housing (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991; Sassen, 1995; Ivan,
Bernard and Kim, 1999), and integrating into society in host states (Boyd, 1989; Eric and Ooka, 2006; Hagan,
1998).
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where Migration-Weighted Distancei,t is the migration-weighted geographic distance be-
tween country i’s capital and country j’s capital in year t, Mji,t is the number of foreign-born
nationals from country j as the percentage of country i’s total immigration stock in year t,
Distanceji,t is the geographic distance between country i’s capital and country j’s capital
for time t. I repeat the same procedure to compute migration-weighted colonial legacy,
common official language, and geographic contiguity. Finally, I use lagged independent
variables to mitigate the endogeneity concern.
Table 2.7: Immigration Inflows and Immigration Policy (1961–2013)
DV: Non-OECD Migrant Flows/GDP (in Millions)i,t Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Non-OECD Migrant Flows/GDP (in Millions)i,t−1 -0.027 -0.034 -0.053
(0.027) (0.027) (0.034)
Immigration Policyi,t−1 0.278∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.040) (0.038)
Log of GDP Per Capita i,t−1 1.131∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.101)
GDP Growthi,t−1 -0.149 0.215
(0.471) (0.489)
Log of Populationi,t−1 0.530∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.130)
Log of Migration-Weighted Distance between i and jt−1 0.622∗∗∗
(0.144)
Migration-Weighted Colonial Legacy after 1945t−1 0.532∗∗
(0.174)
Migration-Weighted Official Common Languaget−1 1.054∗∗∗
(0.237)
Migration-Weighted Geographic Contiguityt−1 -0.139
(0.151)
Constant 0.463∗∗∗ -20.319∗∗∗ -22.674∗∗∗
(0.049) (3.444) (3.706)
Observations 1401 1400 1400
Countries 29 29 29
R2 0.068 0.076 0.094
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of immigration inflows from non-OECD countries in year t. Panel-corrected standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5
and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed effects are included in all models.
Table 2.7 shows that the LSIP index of country i in year t− 1 is positively associated
with non-OECD immigration inflows in i. Additionally, wealthy or populous countries
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attract immigrants from non-OECD countries. Colonial legacy and the use of a common
language are also positively correlated with an increase in immigration inflows from
non-OECD countries. Substantively, a one standard-deviation increase, approximately
0.82, is associated with 205 more immigrants per one billion of GDP.
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CHAPTER 3
Primary Resources, Secondary Labor
Abstract
This chapter explores the link between natural resource wealth and immigration policy
formation in wealthy democracies. I argue that substantial natural resource wealth leads
to policy restrictions on immigration inflows by reducing the size of the pro-immigration
business coalition. When labor-intensive firms in the tradable sector perish due to dein-
dustrialization during a resource boom, they no longer lobby for pro-immigration policy.
Moreover, trade liberalization exacerbates this negative effect of natural resource income
on immigration policy openness by expediting firm deaths in the tradable sector. These
adverse effects do not materialize in economies lacking resource income, so firms there
seek to remain viable under trade liberalization by supporting pro-immigration policy.
Using a sample of 20 wealthy, labor-scarce democracies around the world from 1945 to
2013, I find strong evidence for the theoretical predictions. The chapter contributes to the
literature on the politics of immigration by illustrating the mechanisms through which
natural resource wealth and trade policy shape firms’ support for LSIP.
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3.1 Introduction
Why do some policymakers open their borders to unskilled immigrants while others
restrict immigration? During the post-World War II reconstruction, governments of many
wealthy countries opened their borders to low-skilled immigrants. In the meantime,
these labor-scarce economies began to liberalize trade through a series of bilateral and
multilateral negotiations. Prior to the 1970s, labor from the developing world was relatively
free to move into labor-scarce economies while barriers to international trade started falling.
In the 1970s, the labor-scarce economies of the industrialized world began to diverge in
their immigration policies, with some adopting sharp restrictions on unskilled immigration
even as others remained relatively open. The extant theories do not explain this puzzling
variation very well by overlooking the factors that influence firms’ support for LSIP.
Many existing theories of immigration policy formation focus on the role of native citi-
zens without assessing how citizens gain or lose influence in immigration policy formation.
What is missing from the existing literature is a careful assessment of how pro-immigration
interests can defeat anti-immigration pressure in immigration policy formation and how
pro-immigration interests emerge or disappear in domestic politics. Following the theoret-
ical framework in Peters (2014, 2015, 2017), I diverge from much of the existing literature
by treating labor-intensive firms (henceforth, firms) as a primary driving force behind
immigration policy and assuming that policymakers are only interested in their chances of
re-election. This simple framework tells us how firms respond to trade liberalization under
different circumstances and how policymakers react to business support for immigration
subject to their political constraints.
As the international goods market becomes more integrated, labor-intensive firms face
more competitive pressure from foreign producers of labor-abundant countries (Stolper
and Samuelson, 1941). In theory, firms should seek other forms of compensation, such as
more liberal immigration policy during trade liberalization. Yet many wealthy labor-scarce
economies have placed restrictions on immigration flows. Is it that firms have abandoned
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immigration as a viable strategy for survival? And how can we explain this policy outcome,
given that trade liberalization increases firms’ incentive to lobby for more foreign labor?
I argue that a country’s natural resource wealth, and particularly its expansion in
resource booms, plays a crucial role in shaping the level of business support for increases
in immigration. Revenues from natural resource production can decrease the size of the
pro-immigration coalition through an economic phenomenon known as the Dutch Disease.
Natural resource windfalls increase public and private spending across the economy,
inducing an accompanying boom in the non-tradable sector. As domestic workers seek
higher wages in the non-tradable sector in a resource-rich economy, firms in the tradable
sector face labor shortages while exchange rate appreciation resulting from resource
exports hurts firms even further. I argue that a country’s economic dependence on natural
resource income decreases firms’ chance of survival under trade liberalization. Therefore,
in resource-rich economies, trade liberalization leads to fewer pro-immigration firms.
However, in an economy lacking natural resources, more firms rely on foreign labor in
order to deal with the competitive pressure of trade liberalization. These differences in
business demand for low-skilled labor result in different immigration policy adjustments
in response to trade liberalization.
This argument makes several important contributions. Most importantly, I focus on
the role of special interests in immigration policy formation while treating mass interests
as one of many domestic interest groups. In addition, I propose a novel comprehensive
theory of immigration policy formation by assessing how the two important forces of
the post-World War II (WWII) global economy, natural resource production and trade
liberalization, influence the level of special interests’ support for open immigration policy.
Furthermore, the empirical analysis exploits one of the most comprehensive datasets on
LSIP over a long time period.
This chapter continues as follows. First, I introduce the economic concept of the Dutch
Disease and how it affects firms and the extent to which policymakers are vulnerable to
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firms’ immigration policy preferences. I then suggest testable hypotheses by examining
how trade openness affects firm support for immigration policy under various levels of
resource wealth. Second, I describe how I collected and coded additional country-year
observations, and I justify sample selection. Third, I assess the empirical validity of the
proposed hypotheses. I place my argument under rigorous empirical scrutiny by using
different statistical techniques and providing industry-level evidence on immigration
lobbying. Furthermore, I include several indicators of alternative explanations for immi-
gration policy variation and evaluate their empirical validity. I close this chapter with
research and policy implications for immigration policy around the world.
3.2 Resource Wealth, Trade and Immigration Policy
Government policies of labor-scarce economies in the international goods and labor mar-
kets have intrigued scholars across disciplines. Economists have long argued that im-
porting labor-intensive goods is essentially equivalent to allowing low-skilled labor to
immigrate (Meade, 1957; Mundell, 1957). Policymakers who want to keep prices low can
either import inexpensive goods from labor-abundant countries through free trade or use
immigrant labor to produce labor-intensive goods domestically at lower costs by opening
their borders. From the perspective of a policymaker whose primary goal is to exploit
the benefits of economic openness, trade and immigration policies are at least partial
substitutes. Some scholars have called this inverse policy correlation a dual policy paradox
because low-skilled voters in labor-scarce countries succeeded in securing restrictions on
immigration inflows but failed in maintaining trade protection (Hatton and Williamson,
2005, 2007).
There are three main flaws in this usual approach. First, the logic of factor endowments
does not elaborate on why policymakers choose a particular combination of trade and
immigration policies. Second, the assumption that policymakers open trade or immigration
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in order to achieve economic openness is at odds with our usual assumption of political
survival, that is, policymakers’ desire to stay in power drives their policy choices. Third,
labor-centered arguments of trade and immigration policies cannot explain why native
labor was unable to resist policy trends toward free trade and open immigration prior to
the 1970s but were able to keep their borders closed only to immigration after the 1970s in
some countries. Furthermore, labor-scarce countries have adopted divergent immigration
policies in response to trade liberalization, casting doubt on the pervasiveness of a dual
policy paradox.1 Despite the political saliency of immigration in democracies, existing
theories on the relationship between trade and immigration policies do not elabarate on
various constraints policymakers face while making immigration policy.
I now examine how revenues from capital-intensive natural resource production change
labor-intensive firms’ competitiveness and support for immigration policy in labor-scarce
economies under various degrees of trade protection. I then explore how policymakers
make immigration policies, given firms’ relative influence in domestic politics. I focus on
immigration policy that controls cross-border inflows of low-skilled workers from multiple
countries into a single labor-scarce economy. The concept of immigration policy used
in this project is, therefore, a national policy that seeks to control inflows of low-skilled
foreign individuals from a multitude of sending states. For simplicity, I take trade policy
as exogenous while assessing firms’ immigration policy preferences.2
3.2.1 Firms and the Dutch Disease
I begin by introducing the concept of the Dutch Disease, a term coined by The Economist to
describe the apparent deindustrialization of the Dutch economy after the discovery and
extraction of natural gas reserves in 1959.3 When an economy extracts capital-intensive
1Sweden since 1995 is the most obvious example of free trade and relatively open immigration policy.
2In Appendix B.2, I relax this assumption to elaborate on how resource wealth can affect both trade and
immigration policies.
3See “The Dutch Disease” (November 26, 1977), The Economist, 82–83.
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natural resources, labor-intensive firms in the tradable sector, namely manufacturing and
agriculture face unusual economic circumstances. First, the booming natural resource
industry will attract mobile labor and capital from the tradable sector. This shift of factors
into a booming sector is called the resource movement effect.4 This effect, however, is
negligible for labor-intensive firms because natural resources, especially hydrocarbon and
minerals require very little labor for exploration and extraction.
Second, substantial resource production often generates a sudden wealth windfall,
leading to higher levels of private and public spending. As more wealth circulates in the
economy, individuals seek to consume more goods and services. The domestic prices of
tradable goods are fixed at the world prices plus some domestic import duties. Since the
prices of non-tradable goods, such as services can be adjusted domestically, extra spending
leads to higher prices of non-tradable goods, increasing labor demand in industries that
produce non-tradable goods. Meanwhile, workers in the tradable sector move to the
booming non-tradable sector. This is the spending effect of the Dutch Disease.5 The relative
price increase of non-tradable goods leads to real exchange rate appreciation. The domestic
wage and the prices of non-tradable goods rise relative to the prices of tradable goods.
More units of foreign currency are now necessary to purchase domestic goods and services
that cannot be traded internationally. In other words, imports have become inexpensive
relative to comparable domestic goods and the domestic wage.
In a resource-rich economy, the non-tradable sector expands production while the
tradable sector shrinks. In the absence of trade protection, labor-intensive firms in the
tradable sector face a higher domestic wage and a lower output price. Lobbying for
immigration policy is no longer sufficient to keep their businesses profitable. Firms that
perish do not make contributions for pro-immigration policy or pay taxes to policymakers.
4Labor is likely to be more mobile between sectors than capital because the cost of liquidation and
transition of capital from one sector to another can be high. Most service industries in the non-tradable sector
such as retail and construction do not require specialized skills. For instance, see (Iversen and Rosenbluth,
2010, 35).
5See Corden and Neary (1982). An important assumption in the Dutch Disease literature is a small open
economy where international trade is not completely closed.
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Firms in the non-tradable sector are less likely to lobby for immigration policy than firms
in the tradable sector because the prices of non-tradable goods can be adjusted to wage
fluctuations. As more firms that support pro-immigration policy vanish due to the adverse
effects of resource wealth and trade liberalization, other interest groups gain more influence
on immigration policy formation. In a resource-scarce economy, however, firms are more
likely to stay in business while lobbying for immigration in response to trade liberalization.
This is because firms do not easily die when they do not suffer from the adverse effects of
resource wealth in the labor and currency markets.
While capitalists in labor-intensive industries, tradable or non-tradable, generally prefer
immigration, variation in the aggregate business support for more open immigration pol-
icy depends on labor-market dynamics and the extent to which the global economy affects
firms. The extraction, production and sale of natural resources lead to a decrease in busi-
ness support for pro-immigration policy when trade is relatively open. In a resource-rich
economy, trade and immigration policies are negatively correlated in terms of openness.
In a resource-scarce economy, trade liberalization is positively correlated with immigration
policy openness.
Given the preferences of firms, how do policymakers behave in immigration policy-
making? Policymakers in democracies must balance between domestic interest groups
who oppose immigration and pro-immigration firms. Native workers dislike migrant
workers for cultural and economic reasons (Freeman, 1995; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007,
2010; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001b; Zolberg, 1989). In addition, immigrants are perceived
to compete against a sub-population of native workers in labor-intensive industries. Fur-
thermore, some argue that immigration increases income inequality because land and
capital owners benefit from immigration-induced labor supply growth while workers lose
(Hatton and Williamson, 2005, 2007). Therefore, workers oppose immigration while rising
inequality can exert substantial pressure for redistribution on policymakers when more
immigrants arrive. Without the support of labor-intensive firms for open immigration
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policy, policymakers respond to voters’ various concerns over low-skill immigration by
implementing restrictive immigration policy.
How do firms influence immigration policy formation? There are multiple channels
of firms’ influence in policymaking. First, more support from firms implies more tax
revenues which policymakers can use to increase their re-election chance. In the context of
U.S. politics, firms also exert influence through campaign contributions during elections.
More broadly, firms’ contributions allow incumbents to provide public and private goods
to their constituencies. In this respect, policymakers seek to prevent firm deaths for
taxes firms pay. Second, policymakers and firms may have close government-business
relations through which policymakers internalize the policy preferences of firms subject to
their electoral constraints. When pro-immigration firms perish, policymakers no longer
have interests in opening immigration. Then policymakers restrict immigration in order
to appease other interest groups that oppose immigration. This is why firms’ lack of
support or indifference toward open immigration leads to restrictions in representative
democracies but not under other institutional settings. Similarly, if policymakers know
that more immigration cannot keep firms alive, they do not implement open immigration
policy. As long as firms can remain viable in the tradable sector with an influx of foreign
labor, policymakers make immigration policy more open.
Hypothesis 1: An increase in resource wealth reduces immigration policy openness when trade
is relatively open.
Hypothesis 1 states that resource wealth leads to restrictions on immigration inflows
and that increasing trade openness exacerbate this relationship. In theory, when trade
is completely closed, the effect of resource wealth on immigration policy openness
should be null. In practice, all economies maintain some exposure to international
trade. The degree of trade openness then conditions the extent to which natural resource
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wealth decreases immigration policy openness. This implications emphasizes the
important role of firms in immigration policy formation and how their support for open
immigration policy depends on factor intensity and tradability of their products or services.
Hypothesis 2: In a resource-rich economy, trade and immigration policy-openness are negatively
correlated.
Hypothesis 3: In a resource-scarce economy, trade and immigration policy-openness are
positively correlated.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 state that the size of resource wealth modifies the direction and the
magnitude of the effect of trade liberalization on immigration policy openness. Note that
Hypotheses 1 and 2 make predictions about immigration policy variation in countries that
have experienced natural resource booms while Hypothesis 3 makes a prediction about
the relationship between trade and immigration policies in countries with little or zero
natural resource wealth. In sum, the hypotheses offer how trade liberalization, natural
resource wealth, or the interaction of both affects immigration policies in resource-rich and
resource-scarce economies.
3.2.2 Natural Resources, Tax Base and Inter-sectoral Labor Mobility
Natural resource abundance also changes two other constraints that policymakers face.
First, it changes policymakers’ revenue sources. As the resource industry and the non-
tradable sector expand production, policymakers become less fiscally reliant on labor-
intensive firms in the tradable sector. Since these emerging sectors provide less support
for pro-immigration policy than firms in the tradable sector, policymakers are more likely
to accommodate anti-immigrant interest groups in the presence of substantial resource
wealth. Second, resource wealth frees native labor from the tradable sector by providing
32
jobs in the non-tradable sector. As domestic labor becomes less tied to firms in the tradable
sector, it becomes easier for policymakers to ignore the political demand of these firms.
More firm deaths imply lower business support for open immigration. In the absence of
resource wealth, however, domestic labor is tied to firms in the tradable sector, making
these firms more influential in policymaking. Therefore, trade liberalization induces
policymakers in resource-scarce economies to open immigration in order to help firms that
employ labor while depressing the wage.
Firms with access to foreign labor then concentrate immigrant workers in labor-
intensive, low-skilled divisions of production. In the meantime, firms reassign native
workers to more communication-intensive tasks (D’Amuri and Peri, 2014). The comple-
mentarity between immigrant and native workers may explain why it is politically feasible
for policymakers to open immigration in response to trade liberalization. Workers that
are tied to a certain industry may not oppose their employers’ use of foreign labor as
long as immigrant workers help their firms stay in business, providing them with jobs,
especially new jobs that are physically less demanding and more communication-oriented.
The Japanese government’s recent efforts to supply temporary migrant workers into labor-
intensive divisions of manufacturing sectors exemplify this dual labor market structure
under which migrant workers and native workers complement each other.6
6Japanese firms in the car, electronics, and food-manufacturing sectors have started relying on migrant
workers, most of whom are descendants of Japanese immigrants who migrated to Latin America before
World War II. Most migrant workers to Japan use recruiting agencies to find work. Agencies send them to
labor contractors in Japan and dispatch them to Japanese factories. The Japanese government has relaxed
controls on immigration flows as Japan became more integrated into the global goods market. See Higuchi
(2005, pp. 1) for more information.
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3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Sample Selection
For immigration policy, I use the LSIP dataset described in Chapter 2. I restrict my analysis
to democracies by using a binary regime classification.7 Since Hong Kong’s political
regime is not classified, I exclude the country from empirical analysis. In addition, I
exclude some observations of Switzerland since popular referenda started dictating Swiss
national immigration policy almost exclusively since 1991 in a direct democracy setting.
Reducing the dataset to a sample of democracies meets the core assumptions of the
argument. First, the policymaker balances between special interests and voters to maximize
her utility. Second, I have deduced firm preferences over immigration policy under the
assumption of efficient market competition. Due to these two assumptions, the hypotheses
are not suitable to evaluate immigration policy in autocracies where market competition
and voter influence over immigration policy are severely limited. Furthermore, oil-rich
autocracies use their discretion over resource income to distribute rents to the masses,
which distorts the labor market by affecting citizens’ incentive to work, which in turn
leads to heavy reliance on foreign workers.8 While most Western European countries
became popular destinations for immigrants since the end of World War II, Spain and
Ireland became new destinations for immigrants in the mid-1980s and 1990s, respectively.
The immigration policies of these emerging immigrant destinations became much more
dynamic after the mid-1980s and 1990s when these countries started receiving migration
pressure from the developing world. Therefore, I only include years after 1985 and 1990 for
Spain and Ireland, respectively.9 I also restrict the sample to the post-WWII era in which
democracies in the West became consolidated, stable and more inclusive. In a sample that
meets these criteria, the immigration policy variable ranges from −2.86 (most restrictive)
7Przeworski et al. (2000) provide the original dataset on regime types. Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland
(2010) have updated this regime indicator to 2013.
8See Chapter 6 for the effect of natural resource rents on immigration policy in autocracies.
9Including all years of Ireland and Spain does not change the central results of the analysis.
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Table 3.1: Democracies Included in the Sample
Group No. Country Years Included Resource Income
Settler States
1 United States 1946-2010 High
2 Canada 1946-2010 High
3 Australia 1946-2010 High
4 New Zealand 1946-2010 High
5 South Africa 1994-2010 High
Asian Exporters
6 Japan 1946–2010 Low
7 South Korea 1988–2010 Low
8 Taiwan 1996-2010 Low
Western Europe
9 Austria 1950–2013 Low
10 Belgium 1950–2013 Very Low
11 Denmark 1950–2013 High
12 France 1946–2010 Middle
13 Germany 1946–2010 Middle
14 Ireland 1991–2013 Middle
15 Netherlands 1946–2010 High
16 Norway 1950–2013 Very High
17 Spain 1986–2013 Low
18 Sweden 1950–2013 Middle
19 Switzerland 1946–1990 Very Low
20 United Kingdom 1946–2010 High
to most liberal (.42) with a mean of −.84 and standard deviation of .73.
In the factor analysis, I pool both democracies and autocracies to uncover a latent
structure from the 12 dimensions of immigration policy over the past two centuries. One
may suggest that I should restrict the factor analysis to a set of democracies after 1945 since
I am only using a sample of democracies in the analysis. I propose three counterarguments
against this suggestion. First and most importantly, my sample choice should not affect
how immigration policy scores are generated. I have chosen a particular sample based
on the theoretical assumptions of the argument. These theoretical concerns are irrelevant
to the factor analysis and should not decide which observations should be included in
the factor analysis. Second, I am interested in using as many observations as possible
to uncover a representative latent structure of the data. Since my sample choice should
not drive how factors are retrieved, I take advantage of the full dataset in constructing
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an immigration policy score. Third, I do not see any fundamental differences between
the factor analyses of immigration policies of democracies and autocracies based on the
coding scheme.
It is conventional wisdom that migrants coming to democracies seek to settle perma-
nently while temporary migrants tend to flow into autocracies. However, this is not always
true. Even immigrants in the U.S. during the nineteenth century often returned to their
home countries.10 Moreover, many of the guest worker programs in Western Europe
after the Second World War were intended to be temporary (Castles, 1986). Furthermore,
the ethnic Chinese intended to settle permanently in the autocratic South Korea prior
to the persecution of the Park regime. Since I do not see any compelling theoretical or
empirical grounds for running separate factor analyses for democracies and autocracies or
across different time periods, I utilize the full dataset in order to compute a representative
immigration policy score. Moreover, the coding scheme is designed to compare multiple
countries’ immigration policies over different time periods. Excluding autocracies or coun-
tries from a certain time period ignores this comparative function of the coding scheme
and sacrifices a large number of observations in the factor analysis.
3.3.2 Data on Explanatory Variables
The end of World War II marks the beginning of a large-scale resource boom on a global
scale, showing a wide cross-national variation of resource income over time. Although a
series of gold rushes and other mineral booms occurred in the 19th century, we currently
do not have reliable data on gold production during that period. The most comprehensive
dataset on resource income collected by Haber and Menaldo (2011) provides gold data
from 1900. Furthermore, the assumptions of efficient market competition and electoral
10Although it is true that the high transportation cost discouraged return migration during most of the
nineteenth century, return migration began to rise due to decreasing transportation costs across the Atlantic.
Hatton and Williamson (1998, 9) report that about 30 to 47 percent of Italian and Spanish immigrants returned
home from the New World in the late nineteenth century while most Russians, Irish and Scandinavians
settled permanently.
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accountability between native voters and policymakers are unlikely to hold for many
“democracies” prior to 1946. For these reasons, the analysis begins in 1946. I have expanded
the resource income dataset to cover years up to 2013 by using growth rates of resource
income from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.11 Resource income includes
fuel (i.e. oil, gas and coal) as well as valuable minerals (i.e. gold, diamonds, silver and
copper). The production quantity of each resource is multiplied by the real world price,
expressed in thousands of 2007 U.S. dollars. To measure the size of a boom in each
economy, the total income from all resources is divided by population in a given year
and logarithmized. I use this resource income measure, ln(Resource Income) because the
theory of this project focuses on the spending effect of the Dutch Disease as a primary
mechanism of immigration policy formation.
For trade openness, I use Tariff Level from the tariff dataset compiled by Clemens
and Williamson (2004), measuring the total value of import duties divided by the total
value of imports.12 For years after 1999, Peters (2015) collected tariff data for most of the
countries included in her immigration policy dataset. I updated the tariff data for the
new countries for missing years. For instance, since Sweden joined the European Union
Customs Union (EUCU) in 1995, the country has been subjected to the common European
Union (EU)-wide tariff levels. Norway, however, has not participated in the EUCU, so I
use the World Bank’s World Development Indicators to measure Norway’s trade openness.
Austria and Belgium have been members of the EUCU for decades, so they take identical
values for many years. For certain country-year observations, the trade openness indicator
is a policy variable, not an actual amount of duties collected by governments over an
actual amount of imports. Since numerous factors concerning the supply and demand of
imports drive the actual flows of imports, I use tariff rates instead of imports divided by
11Haber and Menaldo used the Penn World Table to retrieve data on resource income and macroeconomic
indicators. To be consistent with their data, I used growth rates of the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators to fill in missing data for most recent years in the dataset.
12For Denmark before 1970, I use Johansen (1985) to compute tariff rates as a share of customs duties
(“told”, pp. 327 and 330) to total merchandise imports (“samlet vareindforsel” pp. 196–7).
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GDP.
3.3.3 Graphical Illustration
Before specifying an empirical model and discussing the results of several multivariate
analyses, I first present some graphical illustrations of the relationship between trade
and immigration policies.13 I focus on resource-rich democracies that have experienced
different degrees of booms to see if there is any visible pattern of a changing policy
correlation over time within each country and any pattern that shows the effect of resource
income on immigration policy under various degrees of trade openness. First, I examine
the Dutch policies over trade and immigration to see if the actual Dutch Disease had any
effect on the policy correlation and immigration policy in the Netherlands. I compare the
Dutch experience with its Scandinavian neighbors, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In
addition, I graphically examine the United States with Canada and Australia with New
Zealand.
Figure 3.1 shows trade and immigration policy trends under various levels of resource
income in the Netherlands and Scandinavia. The y-axis scale on the far left measures trade
policy openness (one minus the tariff rate) while the y-axis scale to the right of the trade
policy scale measures immigration policy openness. Note that although trade policies of
the Netherlands and Norway tend to be volatile, the tariff level never exceeds 6 percent
between 1945 and 2013. Given that these countries are small open economies in terms
of trade, we should expect that a large increase in resource income significantly reduces
immigration policy openness. The negative correlation between the natural log of resource
income per capita and immigration policy openness is striking for the two economies. The
Dutch immigration policy responds to even small changes in the natural gas boom.
The abrupt end of Norwegian open immigration policy in 1975 also completely coin-
cides with an oil boom in the early 1970s. What about the correlation between trade and
13See Appendix A.2 for additional information about the data on immigration policy.
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Figure 3.1: Trade and Immigration Policies in the Netherlands and Scandinavia
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immigration policies? Resource income levels in the two economies peaked during the
1970s. According to Hypothesis 3, an increase in trade openness should reduce immigra-
tion policy openness in the presence of substantial resource wealth. The Dutch trade policy
shows a negative relationship with immigration policy after the 1970s. A similar pattern
characterizes the Norwegian immigration policy after 1970.
The graphs show that the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries introduced
restrictive measures at different times during the 1970s. Denmark and Sweden shut doors
to Third World nationals in 1972, followed by Norway’s complete ban on labor migration in
1975. Only Sweden made significant progress in reforming immigration policy to be more
inclusive in the 1990s while, as of today, the other countries’ immigration policies are still
based on the 1970s immigration ban. Despite the political and cultural similarities, these
welfare states have implemented widely different immigration policies. Only Sweden,
a relatively resource-scarce country in the region, responded to trade liberalization by
welcoming labor immigrants since the mid-1990s.
What about the wealthy democracies in the New World (Figure 3.2)? Prior to 1970,
trade was relatively closed in Canada. According to Hypothesis 2, we should expect that
growing resource income does not reduce immigration policy openness prior to 1970. No
negative relationship between resource wealth and immigration policy openness exists
in Canada prior to the 1970s. The U.S. immigration policy prior to 1970 also shows this
pattern. As trade opens up further and resource wealth continues in the two economies
after the 1970s, we observe a steep downward pattern of immigration policy in North
America as predicted. When the resource boom in the U.S. slowed down in the mid-
1980s, we see that immigration policy is less responsive to increasing trade liberalization.
Finally, I take a look at Australia and New Zealand to see if their experience is similar to
North America and the resource-rich European economies (Figure 3.2). Both economies
show some patterns that provide more illustrative support for some of the predictions.
Most importantly, we observe a strong negative policy correlation between trade and
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Figure 3.2: Trade and Immigration Policies in Neo-Britains
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immigration as resource wealth increases.
3.3.4 Empirical Strategy
A quick look at the figures reveals ample evidence for the predictions. Trade policy and
resource wealth seem to explain most of the variation in immigration policy of countries
in multiple regions across the globe. With these pictures in mind, I use multivariate
analyses to assess the empirical validity of the predictions. The following ordinary least
squares (OLS) specification with clustered standard errors or panel-corrected standard
errors evaluates the hypotheses after 1945. In the sample of 20 countries, I cannot compute
panel-corrected standard errors since no time periods are common to all countries.14
However, when I include additional controls that are specific to early members of the
OECD, the sample shares common time periods. I use panel-corrected standard errors
when possible and report the results in Table 3.3.
Immigration Policyit = β0 + β1Immigration Policyit−1 + β2Tariff Levelit
+β3Log of Resource Income per Capitait
+β4Tariff Levelit × Log of Resource Income per Capitait
+∑Kk=5
(
βkControl Variable(k−4),it
)
+ αi + µt + eit,
where αi and µt indicate country fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively, and
Tariff Level is the total value of import duties divided by the total value of imports, and
multiplied by 100 for straightforward interpretation. When Tariff Level is equal to zero,
trade is completely open. This means that β3 is the effect of resource income on immigration
policy under free trade and that β2 is the effect of trade protection when a country does not
have any resource income. Using the trade protection indicator instead of the openness
indicator facilitates a more straightforward interpretation of the coefficients. The expected
14See Beck and Katz (1995).
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sign of β2 is now negative because Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive correlation between
trade openness and immigration policy openness. The sign of β3 is expected to be negative
because resource income reduces immigration policy openness under free trade according
to Hypothesis 1. The coefficient of the interaction term, β4 is expected to be positive
according to Hypotheses 1 and 3.
I estimate the base model with the first set of control variables. I include ln(Population)
at t − 1, GDP Growth and ln(GDP per capita). I lag the population variable a year to
mitigate the endogeneity concern. Including ln(GDP per capita) addresses the concern that
resource wealth attracts foreign labor or discourages emigration, inducing policymakers
to close their borders in anticipation of increasing population. It is not resource wealth but
economic wealth that attracts immigrants. For instance, both Norway and Switzerland
are popular immigrant destinations although Norway is abundant in oil while Switzer-
land does not have any natural resources. I also control for growth rates since resource
production is often negatively correlated with economic growth which in turn may affect
immigration policy through its effect on unemployment among native citizens.
For the economic controls, I have retrieved the economic data from Haber and
Menaldo’s dataset and updated them using the World Development Indicators (WDI).
To be consistent with Haber and Menaldo’s data source, the Penn World Table, I used
growth rates in the WDI to compute GDP per capita and retrieved resource income as
a share of GDP from the WDI to compute measures of resource income. I also include
Polity Score to control for the level of political development that may drive both trade
openness and immigration policy.15 Since the sample is restricted to democracies with
little cross-national or time-series variation in democracy, Polity Score is unlikely to have
an effect on the dependent variable. Yet I have decided to include the variable in Models 2
through 5 because the sample covers a relatively long time horizon since the end of World
War II.
15Polity data are from Marshall and Gurr (2014).
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Throughout the five models in Table 3.2, the signs of all coefficients are correct and
generally show high statistical significance. In the absence of resource wealth, high values
of Tariff Level are negatively correlated with high values of Immigration Policy. In Model
4, as Tariff Level increases by one unit (e.g. from 3 percent to 4 percent on the total value
of imports), Immigration Policy becomes restrictive by approximately a .015 factor unit. In
other words, as trade opens up by one unit (e.g. from a 4 percent tariff level to a 3 percent
tariff level on imports), Immigration Policy becomes more open by a .015 factor unit.
I replicate the results by computing panel-corrected standard errors instead of clus-
tered standard errors. Table 3.3 reports the results. Models 8, 9 and 10 also in-
clude country-specific time trends in addition to country and year fixed effects. In
Model 9, I use per capita income from capital-intensive natural resources minus coal,
ln(Non− coal Resource Income) to ensure that the relatively high labor intensity of coal
production is not biasing the results. For Model 10, I estimate the error process with a
panel-specific AR1 processes while excluding the lagged dependent variable. Across all
models, resource income is negatively and significantly correlated with Immigration Policy.
Since the coefficient of Resource Income indicates the effect of resource production on
Immigration Policy when trade is completely open, this coefficient shows how a resource
boom in an open economy affects Immigration Policy.
To assess how trade openness modifies how a resource boom affects immigration
policy (Hypotheses 1), one needs to compute the marginal effects of resource production
at various levels of trade openness. Similarly, the empirical assessment of Hypotheses 2
and 3 requires computing the marginal effects of trade openness while holding resource
income at varying levels.16 In Figure 3.3, I use the results from Model 6 report the marginal
effects of Resource Income on Immigration Policy at various levels of trade openness and
the marginal effects of Tariff Level on Immigration Policy at various levels of resource
income.
16See Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006); Berry, Golder and Milton (2012) for more information on how to
interpret the coefficients of constitutive and interaction terms.
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Table 3.2: Determinants of Immigration Policy in Democracies since 1946
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years 1946-
2012
1948–
2007
1950–
1995
1950–
1995
1950–
1995
Immigration Policyt−1 0.900∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019)
Tariff Level -0.009∗∗ -0.011∗ -0.015∗ -0.015+ -0.010+
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
ln(Resource Income) -0.013∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
Tariff Level×ln(Resource Income) 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Non-Coal Resource Income) -0.038∗∗∗
(0.009)
Tariff Level×ln(Non-coal Resource
Income)
0.004∗∗
(0.001)
ln(Population)t−1 -0.006 0.033 0.080 0.017 0.017
(0.048) (0.058) (0.095) (0.092) (0.092)
ln(GDP Per Capita) -0.029 -0.002 -0.038 -0.028 -0.034
(0.050) (0.045) (0.063) (0.040) (0.044)
GDP Growth 0.206 0.162 -0.188 -0.207 -0.191
(0.162) (0.289) (0.332) (0.304) (0.305)
Polity Score -0.002 -0.002 -0.007∗ -0.002 -0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Inequalityt−1 0.139
(0.092)
Welfare Taxation -0.009∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.011∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Personal Income Taxation -0.013∗∗ -0.013∗ -0.010+
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Net Union Density 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Right-wing Populism Vote Share -0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Schengen Membership -0.052 -0.075 -0.064
(0.041) (0.061) (0.071)
OECD Membership -0.025 -0.035∗ -0.060∗∗
(0.023) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 1001 873 619 610 610
Countries 20 20 16 15 15
R2 0.939 0.939 0.943 0.946 0.946
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of immigration policy in year t. All independent variables are taken from year t unless
otherwise noted. Clustered standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate
statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year fixed
effects are included in all models.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of Immigration Policy in Democracies since 1950 (PCSE)
Model (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Years 1950–
1995
1950–
1995
1950–
1995
1950–
1995
1950–
1995
Immigration Policyt−1 0.848∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)
Tariff Level -0.015∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.012∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
ln(Resource Income) -0.041∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.014)
Tariff Level×ln(Resource Income) 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ln(Non-coal Resource Income) -0.042∗∗∗
(0.008)
Tariff Level×ln(Non-coal Resource
Income)
0.004∗∗
(0.001)
ln(Population)t−1 0.017 0.009 -0.138 -0.113 -2.759∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.067) (0.237) (0.232) (0.619)
GDP Growth -0.207 -0.266+ -0.249 -0.286 0.031
(0.166) (0.161) (0.190) (0.191) (0.197)
ln(GDP Per Capita) -0.028+ -0.043+ -0.127∗ -0.121∗ -0.459∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.025) (0.057) (0.059) (0.121)
Polity Score -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.009∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Inequalityt−1 0.012
(0.097)
Welfare Taxation -0.011∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.009∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Personal Income Taxation -0.013∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Net Union Density 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Right-wing Populism Vote Share -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Schengen Membership -0.075∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.026) (0.019) (0.015)
OECD Membership -0.035∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗ 0.004 -0.004 0.139∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020)
Observations 610 585 610 610 610
Countries 15 15 15 15 15
R2 0.973 0.972 0.974 0.974 0.854
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of immigration policy in year t. All independent variables are taken from year t unless
otherwise noted. Panel-corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and +
indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year
fixed effects are included in all models. Country-specific time trends are included in Models 8, 9
and 10.
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As shown in Figure 3.3a, trade openness exacerbates the extent to which resource
wealth leads to restrictive immigration policy. In addition, there is strong evidence that the
level of resource income conditions the policy correlation between trade and immigration
as shown in Figure 3.3b. In the absence of resource wealth, the correlation between Tariff
Level and Immigration Policy is -0.015 suggesting that trade openness and immigration
openness are positively correlated at 0.015 in the absence of revenues from capital-intensive
natural resources. In contrast, an extremely resource-rich economy’s Immigration Policy
becomes more restrictive by about .02 when Tariff Level falls by one percentage point,
implying trade and immigration policies are negatively correlated at 0.02 when ln(Resource
Income) is around 10.
Figure 3.3: Marginal Effects on Immigration Policy with 95% CIs (Model 6)
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3.3.5 Alternative Explanations
Recently, the economics literature has examined the distributional consequences of natural
resource booms with an empirical emphasis on inequality (Golderis and Malone, 2011;
Bhattacharyya and Williamson, 2013). While the literature is more empirically driven,
the theory says that because some factors are less mobile across sectors, resource booms
tend to benefit the most mobile factors, usually those who can invest liquid assets in
booming sectors. This tends to benefit the very top end of the income distribution while
hurting those at the bottom who are often tied to the lagging sectors. Moreover, political
economists argue that natural resources exacerbate inequality by reducing the quality of
political institutions (Acemog˘lu and Robinson, 2006, 2012; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2012).
The economic explanation of resource wealth and inequality offers an alternative
mechanism that an increase in resource income causes more restrictive immigration policy
under trade openness. Economists have argued that inequality is linked to restrictions on
immigration flows.17 The institutional explanation, however, is not applicable to countries
of our interest because it is based on theories of the rentier state.18 These theories elaborate
on mechanisms through which natural resources deteriorate the quality of institutions
or exacerbate inequality in transitional democracies or autocracies, not in consolidated
democracies.
Even if it is true that natural resource wealth increases inequality, it is uncertain
how increasing inequality affects immigration policy in a democracy. Supposedly, the
median voter must be concerned about rising inequality in order to draw any policy
response on immigration from the policymaker. Assume that immigration increases
redistributive pressure through inequality. The median voter is less likely to contribute to
tax revenues for future redistribution than economic elites. Since elites would be forced
17For example, Hatton and Williamson (2005, 2007); Timmer and Williamson (1998).
18For the rentier state literature, see Beblawi (1987); Karl (1997); Mahdavy (1970); Ross (2001). The
rentier-state framework is based on the model of bargaining between economic actors and revenue-seeking
governments over taxation and democratization. For instance, see Bates and Lien (1985); Levi (1982); North
(1981); Tilly (1992).
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to fund redistributive concessions from the policymaker, they are most likely to oppose
immigration, not the median voter. In fact, the median voter, a skilled individual in a labor-
scarce economy is likely to gain from immigration as low-skilled immigrants can provide
cheaper services to them. For these reasons, the causal argument between inequality and
immigration policy is more fragile than it seems at first glance.
Regardless, I include Inequality lagged by a year in some models to see if it shows any
association with immigration policy. Data on inequality are extremely scarce, and available
data often have very sparse observations. Moreover, some measures of inequality may not
be relevant for studying immigration policy. Theoretically, immigration inflows benefit
firms while hurting workers. Capitalists benefit from open immigration, increasing the
margin of their profit vis-a`-vis workers in the same industrial sector. For these economic
dynamics between capital and labor in immigration policy making, I use the inequality
indicator measuring the capital share of value added in the industrial sector.19 In Models 2
and 7, the coefficient of Inequality is incorrectly signed as positive. Inequality does not
seem to have any independent correlation with immigration policy in the samples.20
I drop Inequality to maintain more observations in Models 3, 4, and 5. Instead, I
include taxation variables in Model 3 to see if welfare and high-taxation states are more
likely to restrict immigration. I use Cusack (2000)’s taxation indicators measuring taxes
collected as a share of GDP. Consistent with the literature on immigration policy and
welfare states, I find a negative correlation between Welfare Taxation or Personal Income
Taxation, measured as the share of welfare taxation or personal income taxation in GDP,
and Immigration Policy. For instance, a one-percent increase of welfare taxation relative
to GDP makes Immigration Policy more restrictive by a factor-unit of 0.01. Controlling
for Welfare Taxation and Personal Income Taxation, however, does not undermine the
empirical validity of the hypotheses. In fact, the effects are stronger both substantively and
19See Ortega and Rodriguez (2006) for the original data on inequality. Houle (2009) used Amelia II to
include imputed data in missing observations. I use this version of the data in Model 3.
20Using the GINI coefficient in a sample from 1972, there is no evidence of a negative correlation between
immigration policy and inequality in Peters (2015).
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statistically relative to the results of Model 1.21
Models 4 and 5 also test some of the alternative hypotheses in the literature that examine
the role of right-wing populism, the size of the immigrant electorate and the role of labor
unions (Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel, 2012; Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Haus, 2002;
Watts, 2002). Adding Net Union Density assesses the role of labor unions in influencing
immigration policy.22 Historically, labor unions have had both pro- and anti-immigration
stances. In the early 1970s, Belgian unions vehemently opposed a newly adopted immi-
gration policy of deporting unemployed immigrants. The Belgian government eventually
withdrew this deportation policy due to labor unions’ opposition. Theoretically, unions
presumably oppose immigration because immigrants compete with native workers. As the
collective organization of domestic labor grows, we should expect decreasing immigration
policy openness. However, there is no evidence of labor unions influencing immigration
policy in the analysis. Finally, I examine whether the anti-immigrant sentiment among
voters influences immigration policy. I use Right-wing Populist Vote Share, the vote share
of right-wing populist parties, as a crude indicator of anti-immigrant attitudes.23 There
is strong evidence that the emergence of right-wing populism compels policymakers to
restrict low-skilled immigration.
3.3.6 Evidence from Industry-Level Lobbying Data
The theoretical framework is based on two assumptions about firms and their immigration
policy preferences. First, labor-intensive firms in the tradable sector are more likely to favor
low-skill immigration than firms in the non-tradable sector. Second, labor-intensive firms
that face higher trade protection are less likely to support pro-immigration policy than
firms that are more exposed to international trade. These assumptions are based on the
21Compared to Model 1’s 1001 observations and 20 countries, the number of observations and the number
of countries in Model 3 are reduced to 619 and 16, respectively with the taxation indicators.
22Data come from Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (2000). Note that Net Union Density is constructed to
range from 0 to 100.
23Data on right-wing populism come from Swank (2014).
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fact that the prices of tradable goods are somewhat fixed while firms in the non-tradable
sector can adjust their output prices when wages increase. In labor-scarce economies,
labor-intensive firms producing tradable goods are the most pro-immigration groups
because they have to deal with competitive pressure from foreign producers of more
labor-abundant economies.
To provide some evidence for the assumptions, I use the industry-level lobbying data
assembled by Peters (2014).24 The original data on lobbying reports come from the Center
for Responsive Politics. The dataset shows which groups including both 579 firms or
business organizations and about 269 other interest groups lobbied on immigration-related
issues in the United States between 1998 to 2011. The data, however, do not specify whether
the groups lobbied for or against low-skill immigration. Since firms generally prefer more
immigration, I assume that the number of low-skill immigration issues lobbied by an
industry is a proxy for the industry’s pro-immigration stance. This is not the case for other
interest groups because they may be pro-immigrant activist groups or anti-immigrant
nativist groups.
While the dataset does not include a variable for an industry’s factor intensity of
production, it reveals that capital-intensive firms in the tradable sector generally do not
lobby on low-skill immigration issues. For instance, industries in the tradable sector that do
not lobby on low-skill immigration issues are consistently firms that produce chemicals and
metals or manufactures of metals. On the other hand, textile and agricultural industries
are more pro-immigration than more capital-intensive industries in the tradable sector. To
assess the empirical validity of the assumptions more robustly, I present two regression
results in Table 3.4.
The sample of the first regression consists of industry-year observations for all indus-
tries regardless of the tradability of their products. The dependent variable is Lobbying on
Low-Skill Immigration Issues, the number of low-skill immigration issues on which each
24See Peters (2014, pp. 836–837) for how the author assembled the data.
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Table 3.4: Determinants of Lobbying on Low-Skill Immigration Issues
Sample All Sectors Tradable Sector
Years 2000–2010 2000–2006
Tradable Dummy 6.861∗∗
(2.644)
Tariff Ratet−1 -14.205∗∗∗
(3.976)
# of Total Issues 0.024 0.064∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.014)
# of Firms 0.340 0.534∗∗∗
(0.547) (0.103)
% Foreign-born Employees 1.599+ 0.181
(0.874) (0.833)
Metals -11.850∗∗∗
(3.163)
Agriculture 21.259∗∗
(6.592)
Textiles 120.862∗∗
(40.784)
Fixed Effects Year Year and Industry
Observations 121 22
Industries 12 4
R2 0.725 0.990
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares
(OLS) analysis of lobbying on low-skill immigration issues in year t. All independent
variables are taken from year t unless otherwise noted. Panel-corrected standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels
of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Year fixed effects are included in all models.
industry lobbies in a given year. I include a binary variable to indicate whether an industry
is in the tradable sector, Tradable Dummy. Since firms that lobby on all issues are more
likely to lobby on immigration issues, I include # of Total Issues, the total number of issues
lobbied by the industry. In addition, since the data are not at the firm-level, I also control
for the number of firms in the industry, # of Firms. It is plausible that industries with
more firms may lobby on more immigration issues. In addition, I also include the share of
foreign-born employees, % Foreign-born Employees, to see if top immigrant employers are
more likely to lobby on immigration issues. I also control for year dummies to account for
common shocks. The results in the first column of Table 3.4 show that, on average, firms in
52
the tradable sector lobby on about seven more low-skill immigration issues than firms in
the non-tradable sector. This is consistent with the first assumption of the theory in this
chapter.
The sample of the second regression only includes firms that produce tradable goods.
While the dependent variable remains the same, I use the industry-level tariff rate to see
how exposure to international trade affects industries’ lobbying intensity. In addition to the
covariates in the first regression, I include industry fixed effects (i.e. Metals, Agriculture,
and Textiles) to capture within-industry variation in lobbying. The baseline industry is
Chemicals in the second column of Table 3.4. I lag the tariff rate by a year because some
industries with substantial financial resources may lobby on both trade and immigration.
Including industry fixed effects may not account for this possibility because industries’
financial resources may change over time. Lagging the tariff rate by a year helps ameliorate
this endogeneity concern. The results in the second column of Table 3.4 provide confirma-
tory evidence that industries are more likely to lobby on low-skill immigration issues when
their protective tariff rates have decreased in the previous year. A one-unit decrease in
the tariff rate in the previous year is associated with 14 more low-skill immigration issues
lobbied by the industry. The fixed-effects coefficients also confirm that industries that are
more labor-intensive on average such as agriculture and textiles are more pro-immigration
than metal and chemical industries.
3.4 Conclusion
The chapter was empirically and theoretically motivated by divergent correlations between
trade and immigration policies across a multitude of wealthy labor-scarce economies over
several decades of the post-WWII era. The theoretical predictions of the chapter and
rigorous empirical analyses with a new dataset pose a serious challenge to the conventional
wisdom that trade and immigration policies have always moved in the opposite direction,
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that is, the openness in the goods market leads to restrictions on immigration and vice
versa. The policy correlation is sometimes negative not because policymakers regard them
as policy substitutes for achieving economic openness, but because firm preferences over
immigration policy change radically, depending on the openness of trade in resource-
booming economies.
Trade liberalization in a resource-rich economy makes the tradable sector unattrac-
tive for owners of capital. Direct and indirect deindustrialization through the resource
movement and the spending effects of natural resource extraction and production have vir-
tually eliminated business support for pro-immigration policy in many open resource-rich
economies. Trade liberalization, however, provokes firms to demand more open immigra-
tion policy in resource-scarce countries. Without the adverse effects of natural resource
wealth, firms can fight one aspect of globalization (free trade) with another (open immi-
gration). Policymakers in resource-scarce economies respond to firms’ demand because
they primarily rely on firms’ tax revenues. This seemingly ironic political strategy of firms
toward globalization leads to a conjoint opening of trade and immigration. An important
lesson from this chapter is that economic integration in the international goods market
causes disintegration of the international labor market for resource-booming economies.
In contrast, resource-scarce economies tend to open trade and immigration at the same
time due to increasing firm support for immigration under trade liberalization.
The state’s dependence on capital implies that firm preferences over immigration policy
directly translate into policies through multiple channels of influence on policymakers in
representative democracies. Whether pro-immigration firms make campaign contributions
or provide tax revenues to the state, most legislations, executive policy and actual enforce-
ment of immigration policy honestly reflect firms’ explicit and implicit preferences over
immigration policy and their intimate relationship with the state. A remaining question
is why firms have failed to stop trade liberalization while having been able to influence
immigration policy for so long. In trade politics, labor-intensive firms meet their most
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formidable opponents, other firms who favor free trade due to the presence of reciprocity
through bilateral trade agreements. Labor-intensive firms do not face other firms that
oppose immigration in immigration policymaking. Capital-intensive firms are indifferent
to immigration policy that concerns low-skilled labor. As only labor-intensive firms domi-
nate in immigration policymaking, changes in immigration policy accurately reflect their
dynamic preferences.
The most interesting finding is that natural resource booms tend to lead to restrictive im-
migration policy. This result is counter-intuitive because natural resource booms increase
the domestic wage. Based on the labor-market concern alone, native workers’ opposition
to low-skill immigration should be lower during a natural resource boom. Nonetheless,
policymakers restrict immigration when pro-immigration firms perish, suggesting that
policymakers close immigration based on native workers’ non-material concerns over low-
skill immigration, such as xenophobic and sociotropic attitudes. This is largely consistent
with the literature on attitudes toward immigration, which emphasizes voters’ concerns for
the impact of immigration on various aspects of society, including economic performance,
welfare and national identity.25
This chapter makes several important contributions. First, it presents a novel theory
of firm preferences over immigration policy and emphasizes firms’ important role in
shaping immigration policy in wealthy, labor-scarce democracies. Second, the empirical
analysis demonstrates that some of the popular theories of immigration policy have
limitations without accounting for firms’ role in immigration policy making. Finally,
the chapter is part of an emerging scholarly trend of linking trade, capital or migration
from a comprehensive perspective of International Political Economy (IPE). Scholars
have explored how unfavorable exchange rate appreciation provokes firms to demand
trade protection (Broz and Werfel, 2014), and how exchange rate regime choice and trade
policy influence each other (Copelovitch and Pevehouse, 2013). Focusing on international
25See Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) for an excellent review of the literature.
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migration, others have examined the role of migrant networks in bringing portfolio capital
and foreign direct investment from host states to home countries, how remittances serve
as an alternative source of capital and are an important determinant of an exchange rate
regime choice, and how trade, capital and immigration policies are all intertwined in a
way that affects firm preferences over immigration policy (Leblang, 2010; Singer, 2010;
Peters, 2014, 2015).
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CHAPTER 4
Petroleum Wealth and Immigration Policy Voting of U.S.
Senators
Abstract
This chapter examines the empirical validity of the hypotheses of Chapter 3. Using the data
on U.S. senators’ voting behavior on immigration bills from 1964 to 2008, I find that senators
from petroleum-rich states are more likely to oppose pro-immigration bills as petroleum-
rich states lack a strong coalition of pro-immigration firms. Moreover, an increase in
import penetration from low-wage countries exacerbates the decline of pro-immigration
firms in petroleum-rich states, causing their senators to oppose pro-immigration bills even
more certainly. By contrast, senators from petroleum-scarce states tend to be in favor of
immigration when their states face a higher level of import penetration. By exploring U.S.
immigration policymaking at the senator level, this chapter reaffirms the plausibility of the
argument in Chapter 3. The results remain robust to a set of controls and various statistical
techniques, including senator and state fixed effects.
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4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 provides ample empirical evidence that an economy’s exposure to international
trade, natural resource wealth, and the interaction of these two factors play important
roles in shaping immigration policy formation. One of the main assumptions of the theory
in Chapter 3 is a small-economy setting under which the effect of petroleum income is
assumed to be national. This assumption is likely to be violated in geographically large
countries like Canada and the U.S. For instance, a petroleum boom in Alaska is unlikely to
affect firms and lawmakers in Pennsylvania. Moreover, since individual lawmakers vote
on immigration bills, looking at senators’ voting behavior on immigration provides a more
clear test of the causal mechanisms outlined in Chapter 3.
The case of U.S. immigration policy is puzzling on its own. The U.S. adopted sharp
restrictions in the 1970s. This is the time when many Republican senators changed their
positions on low-skill immigration while Democrats became more open toward low-skill
immigration in the post-WWII era. In this chapter, I show that differences in petroleum
income as well as changing oil prices help explain this partisan divergence since the 1970s.
The 1970s Oil Crisis also played a role in causing senators to become more anti-immigrant,
as many pro-immigration firms eventually discontinued operations during the crisis. The
crisis created a sharp division over immigration policy in the Senate with senators from
petroleum-rich states opposing pro-immigration bills since the 1980s.
This chapter continues as follows. First, I describe the procedures of immigration
policymaking in the U.S. and emphasize the importance of legislative bills in the U.S.
While senators’ voting behavior on immigration bills does not provide a tool to explain
why the Senate votes on a particular immigration bill, it provides a empirical ground to test
why senators oppose or support low-skill immigration once a bill is introduced. Second, I
assess the validity of the hypotheses by using Senate roll call votes on immigration bills
from 1964 to 2008. I find evidence for the hypothesized effects of natural resource wealth,
and the findings remain robust to the inclusion of various controls. Then, I consider
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whether there is a diffusion mechanism through which a state’s resource wealth can affect
the voting behavior of senators from its neighboring states. Finally, I conclude this chapter
with implications for the ongoing debate on immigration reform.
4.2 Immigration Policymaking in the U.S. Senate
Historically, U.S. immigration policy has been an amalgam of government practices, laws,
and judicial principles drafted by the three branches of government. For instance, the
executive branch can raid work places that employ undocumented immigrants, create
administrative barriers to public benefits, and strengthen border controls. Congress
can establish statutes by passing laws that increase or restrict immigration inflows. In
addition, the judicial branch can offer interpretations of the constitution and amendments.
Depending on which branch implements policy, the “strength” of immigration policy
also varies. Cox and Posner (2009, p 3.) defines the strength of immigration policy as
“the ease with which the government can change [the policy].” The executive branch
can enact new policies and change them without much constraint as was evident in the
Obama administration’s 2014 executive actions on immigration. Judicial interpretations on
immigration policy, however, tend to persist over time (e.g. the Supreme Court’s tie vote on
blocking implementation of the Obama administration’s executive actions on immigration).
When legislative bills are the primary tool of immigration policymaking, immigration
policy does not react to short-term changes but is more likely to reflect domestic actors’
preferences over immigration, which may change from year to year.
As Congress dominates U.S. immigration policy making, legislative bills provide
us with an opportunity to test the theories of immigration policy based on domestic
interests. Since the Supreme Court ruled in 1849 that immigration policy was the federal
government’s exclusive domain by striking down Northern states’ efforts to impose
a head tax on incoming immigrants, Congress became the de facto rule-maker of U.S.
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immigration policy (Chacon, 2014). Since the late 19th century, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly cited Congress’s absolute authority in making immigration policy to uphold
federal immigration regulations against constitutional challenge (Chacon, 2014). As the
Supreme Court decided that U.S. immigration policy is a matter of foreign affairs, the
U.S. Senate has voted on immigration bills almost every year since the 1870s (Peters,
2017, Chapter 5). This frequency provides us with another dependent variable to test the
hypotheses in Chapter 3. In addition, senate roll call votes allow us to unpack the black
box of national immigration policymaking and to treat each senator as a policymaker.
Given the geo-economic implications of natural resource wealth as a potential diffusion
mechanism, it is important to look at the voting behavior of sub-national policymakers.
While Senate roll call votes provide us with more fine-grained outcomes of domestic
interests’ relative influence, we sacrifice some information by focusing on senators’ voting
behavior on bills rather than actual immigration policy outcomes. First, although we
know whether senators’ stances are pro- or anti-immigration by examining their votes
on individual bills, we cannot incorporate the intended policy consequences of each bill
in the analysis. As a result, increasing support for pro-immigration bills over time in
the Senate may not imply more senators are becoming pro-immigration. It is possible
that proposed immigration bills have become more anti-immigration recently as the
immigration issue has become more politically salient in the U.S. Prior to 1965, immigration
was a less contentious issue in the U.S. Only about five percent of the U.S. population
were foreign-born in 1965 (Fox, Bloemraad and Kesler, 2013). About a decade after
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 lifted bans on immigration inflows from
the non-European developing countries, immigration flows increased. This increasing
political saliency of immigration during the past several decades may have changed U.S.
immigration bills’ content. Second, an exclusive focus on senators’ voting behavior ignores
the strategic interaction within and between the House, the Senate, and the President while
overlooking the potential effect of this strategic interaction on agenda control with respect
60
to immigration bills.1
Nonetheless, examining individual senators’ voting behavior on immigration bills
mitigates the endogeneity concern between immigration policy and independent variables.
In Chapter 3, I addressed and refuted reverse-causality claims although the regression spec-
ification without an instrument cannot test reverse causality statistically. Using senators’
voting behavior establishes the causal direction more clearly for two reasons. First, the
dependent variable no longer has direct policy consequences on independent variables. As
individual senators’ votes are not always decisive in passing immigration bills in Congress,
senators’ voting behavior only manifests their preferred policy outcomes rather than actual
policy outcomes. Second, given the time lag between the date of roll call votes and the
date of policy implementation, it is highly unlikely that even ratified immigration bills
drive independent variables of our interest in a given year.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
I use the data from Peters (2017, Chapter 5) to examine Senate voting on immigration from
1964–2008. In the dataset, each vote is coded as zero (restrictive) or one (expansive) while
accounting for whether a bill is pro- or anti-immigration.2 The dependent variable is a
senator’s voting behavior on immigration bills in a given year, Pro-Immigration Vote Shares
at the senator level. For instance, if a senator votes in favor of immigration two times
on 10 bills in a year, then his or her pro-immigration score is .2 for that year. Pooling a
senator’s multiple votes in a given year allows us to look at general patterns of immigration
policymaking as many bills tend to differ in terms of scope and type. Moreover, pooling
votes is suitable given that many independent variables can be retrieved only for annual
observations.
1For agenda setting, see Cox and McCubbins (2005). See Binder (1999); Epstein and O’Halloran (2001);
Mayhew (2005) for the implications of separation of powers for lawmaking. For the effects of institutions on
lawmaking, see Krehbiel (1998); Wawro and Schickler (2007).
2Data on votes come from Vote View (Poole, 2009; Poole and Lewis, 2009; Poole and McCarty, 2009).
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I regress Pro-Immigration Vote Shares on two key independent variables and the
interaction term of the two variables. The first variable is a state-level variable, Import
Penetration constructed by Peters (2017, Chapter 5) using Bernard, Jensen and Schott
(2006)’s data on industry-level import penetration from low-wage trading economies. The
data are then weighted by the percent employed in each industry in a given state.3 This
variable varies across states and over time. The second variable includes a set of state-level
data on real natural resource income per capita. For instance, Petroleum Income is the
logged sum of a state’s real oil and natural gas income divided by the state’s population in
a given year.4 I use this measure of resource income to assess its effect on senators’ voting
behavior.
Throughout the analysis, I include year fixed effects to capture common yearly shocks.
The time dummies also capture the general trend of trade liberalization as well as tech-
nological innovation in the U.S.5 While all states in the U.S. face the same common tariff
rates, their exposure to international trade varies because states produce different goods.
Import Penetration captures these differences of exposure to international trade among
the 50 states. I also control for state-level GDP per capita, GDP growth, population and
the estimated population share of foreign-born individuals.6 In Model 5, I include an
additional set of controls, Agricultural Sector, Value Added, Welfare Per Capita, and % Union.7
Table 4.1 examines the determinants of senators’ pro-immigration stance, proxied by
the share of each senator’s pro-immigration votes on immigration bills in a given year. For
3The employment data come from Ruggles et al. (2010).
4To compute this variable, I retrieved the energy production data from U.S. Energy Information Admin-
istration (2015) to be multiplied by nominal commodity prices, adjusted for inflation, and divided by the
state’s population.
5See Peters (2014, 2015, 2017) for the role of technology on firms’ incentive for lobbying for immigration
policy.
6Data on these variables come from U.S. Census Bureau and aggregated data of Adler (N.d.)’s congres-
sional district-level data. See Peters (2017, Chapter 5) for more information.
7Agricultural Sector is the logged real value of agriculture in the state from Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Value Added is the logged real value added per worker from Census Bureau measuring the labor productivity.
Welfare Per Capita is the logged real cash welfare spending per capita in the state from Census Bureau. %
Union is the percent of workers represented by a union from Adler (N.d.).
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Table 4.1: Determinants of Pro-Immigration Vote Shares in the U.S. Senate, 1964–2008
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First Observation Year 1964 1972 1972 1972 1972
Coal Income 0.017+
(0.008)
Gas Income -0.024∗ -0.011
(0.012) (0.010)
Oil Income 0.006 -0.006
(0.009) (0.008)
Petroleum Income -0.000 -0.003
(0.008) (0.009)
Import Penetration 0.428∗ 0.437∗∗ 0.445∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.139) (0.147) (0.122)
Import Penetration×Gas Income -0.032∗∗∗
(0.005)
Import Penetration×Oil Income -0.027∗∗∗
(0.006)
Import Penetration×Petroleum Income -0.028∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
ln(GDP Per Capita) 0.000 0.024 0.025 0.015 -0.028
(0.075) (0.028) (0.036) (0.031) (0.034)
GDP Growth -0.104 -0.130 -0.133 -0.128 -0.120
(0.159) (0.122) (0.119) (0.120) (0.128)
ln(Population) 0.136∗ 0.068 0.063 0.063 -0.014
(0.050) (0.086) (0.082) (0.079) (0.073)
% Foreign Born -0.183 -0.065 -0.042 -0.047 0.249
(0.345) (0.647) (0.652) (0.658) (0.647)
Agricultural Sector 0.085∗∗∗
(0.015)
Value Added -0.014∗∗
(0.004)
Welfare Per Capita -0.029+
(0.015)
% Union 0.000
(0.002)
Observations 3690 3152 3152 3152 3152
Senators 391 340 340 340 340
R2 0.299 0.319 0.318 0.319 0.323
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of U.S. senators’ proportion of pro-immigration votes in year t. All independent
variables are taken from year t unless otherwise noted. Standard errors clustered on Congress
are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10
percent, respectively. Year and senator fixed effects are included in all models.
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instance, if a senator voted “Yea” on two anti-immigration and two pro-immigration bills
in a given year, the share of his or her immigration votes would be 50 percent or .5.
Model 1 in Table 4.1 tests the unconditional correlation between three types of resource
income per capita. There is some evidence that senators from coal-producing states tend to
support pro-immigration bills because the American coal industry has historically relied
on immigrant labor. In contrast, senators from gas-producing states tend to oppose pro-
immigration bills. Lastly, there is no unconditional relationship between oil income and
senators’ voting behavior on immigration bills.
Figure 4.1: Marginal Effects on Pro-Immigration Vote Shares with 95% CIs (Model 4)
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(b) Conditional Effect of Import Penetration
Models 2 and 3 test the interactive effects of gas or oil income and import penetration
on senators’ voting behavior in immigration. Consistent with the theories and findings
in Chapter 3, increasing import penetration is positively associated with senators’ pro-
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immigration stance in resource-scarce states.
Gas and oil income are negatively correlated with pro-immigration votes in states that
face high levels of import penetration. Models 4 and 5 repeat the analysis by pooling gas
and oil income into a single variable, Petroleum Income and find similar results. In Model 5,
both welfare spending per capita and the level of productivity measured by Value Added
are negatively correlated with pro-immigration votes. Senators from states with a large
agricultural sector, however, tend to vote in favor of pro-immigration bills.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the average marginal effects of Petroleum Income and Import
Penetration while holding the other variable at constant levels. The conditional effect of
Petroleum Income (Figure 4.1a) is consistent with the marginal effects graph in Figure 3.3a
in Chapter 3. However, the conditional effect of Import Penetration (Figure 4.1b) does
not lend support for the hypothesis that increasing import penetration induces senators
from petroleum-rich states to oppose pro-immigration bills. This null result may be due
to the possibility that senators from petroleum-rich states do not respond to changes in
import penetration because they rely exclusively on tax contributions from the petroleum
industry.
For robustness, I repeat the analysis by altering the model in two ways. First, I use
senator fixed effects but cluster standard errors by senators instead of Congress. The results
remain largely the same, as shown in Table C.3 of Appendix C. Second, I use state fixed
effects instead of senator fixed effects and cluster standard errors by state instead of senator
or Congress while controlling for a partisanship dummy variable indicating whether a
senator is Republican (i.e. Republican). The results reported in Table C.4 demonstrate
that the interactive effects of Petroleum Income and Import Penetration remain important
factors in explaining senators’ stances on immigration.
Finally, Table 4.2 reports the results of models that test the spillover effects of resource
wealth from neighboring states. For instance, Oil Income Diffusion measures the logged
sum of real oil income per capita from contiguous states. There is some evidence that
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Table 4.2: Diffusion of Resource Income on U.S. Senate Immigration Bills, 1972–2008
Model (16) (17) (18)
Years Included 1972–2008 1972–2008 1972–2008
Import Penetration 0.508∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗ 0.357∗
(0.129) (0.158) (0.155)
Petroleum Income -0.011 -0.011 -0.005
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
Import Penetration×Petroleum Income -0.026∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.019∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007)
Oil Income Diffusion 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035+ 0.006
(0.008) (0.019) (0.012)
Gas Income Diffusion -0.016+ -0.016 0.001
(0.008) (0.023) (0.018)
ln(GDP Per Capita) -0.005 -0.005 0.049
(0.038) (0.071) (0.049)
GDP Growth -0.111 -0.111 -0.165
(0.129) (0.139) (0.125)
ln(Population) -0.014 -0.014 0.081+
(0.073) (0.122) (0.046)
Agricultural Sector 0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.015) (0.025) (0.024)
Value Added -0.014∗∗ -0.014∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Welfare Per Capita -0.031+ -0.031+ -0.037∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
% Foreign Born 0.245 0.245 -0.815∗
(0.591) (0.702) (0.319)
% Union -0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Republican -0.057∗∗∗
(0.013)
Observations 3152 3152 3139
Senators/States 340 340 50
Clustered S.E. Congress Senator State
R2 0.323 0.323 0.314
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis
of U.S. senators’ voting behavior on immigration in year t. All independent variables are taken
from year t unless otherwise noted. Standard errors clustered on Congress, senators, or states are
shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent,
respectively. Year and senator fixed effects are included in all models.
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senators from states that share borders with oil-rich states tend to support pro-immigration
bills possibly because these states often lose young low-skill workers to neighboring oil-
producing states. Yet, there is not much empirical support for the diffusion effect related to
natural gas. Modeling the geo-economic diffusion mechanisms, however, does not change
the central findings of the original models in Table 4.1.
4.4 Discussion
The LSIP dataset and the senate immigration votes reveal two seemingly conflicting
observations. First, U.S. immigration policy became much more restrictive after the 1970s.
Second, senators have become more pro-immigration on average although Republican
senators became much more anti-immigration since the 1970s. While the argument of this
Chapter does not dismiss the role of polarization in increasing partisan divergence on
immigration bills, it is important to note that Republican senators tend to represent the
majority of petroleum-rich states, who have become much more anti-immigrant due to
their increasing reliance on petroleum income and their states’ exposure to imports from
low-wage countries.8 This dramatic decrease in support for pro-immigration bills among
Republicans may explain why the Senate has not proposed bills that would increase U.S.
immigration policy openness significantly.
Firm lobbying in favor of low-skill immigration in the U.S. is largely driven by agri-
cultural and textile sectors as well as other manufacturing firms that face more foreign
competition. In contrast, firms in the U.S. chemical industry generally do not lobby for
low-skill immigration as shown in Table 3.4. These firms and their contractors in construc-
tion and services rather rely on low-skill native workers from neighboring states instead of
spending political resources in persuading policymakers to open their borders to low-skill
immigrants from the developing world.
8See Figure C.1 for a map of the 50 American states by petroleum income.
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Technological advancements and industrial innovation also have important impli-
cations for the future of U.S. immigration policy. As the agricultural sector and other
manufacturing sectors adopt new measures to become less labor-intensive, the political
influence of pro-immigration firms will eventually decline. It is unclear whether there
are other organized pro-immigrant interest groups to change the current path of U.S.
immigration policy without pro-immigration firms’ support.
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CHAPTER 5
Immigration Policy of the Netherlands and Scandinavia
Abstract
This chapter illustrates some of the observable implications in Chapter 3 through qualita-
tive research in the Netherlands and Scandinavia. First, I elaborate on the current positions
and concerns of the domestic actors through in-depth interviews. Since lobbying data
and other evidence of firms’ policy preferences are extremely scarce in these countries,
interviews with relevant actors provide more useful information regarding how firms
and organized labor view immigration. Second, I use primary and secondary sources to
investigate public debates surrounding the 1970s immigration restrictions. Then, I illus-
trate how Norway’s oil wealth led to its 1975 ban on labor immigration . Throughout this
chapter, I also explore other factors that shape the politics of immigration and immigration
policy outcomes, including the rise of right-wing populism and the recent refugee crisis in
Europe.
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5.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 demonstrates that firms in the tradable sector are an important interest group in
immigration policy formation across 20 wealthy labor-scarce democracies. Table 3.4 also
provides confirmatory evidence that firms in the tradable sector are more likely to lobby
on low-skill immigration issues in the U.S. Even though the lobbying data provide some
direct evidence on which firms have more pro-immigration preferences and a possible
channel of influence in actual policymaking, firms have other channels of influence as
noted in Chapter 3. First, firms are tax payers whose fiscal contributions allow incumbents
to provide public and private goods to their constituencies. In this respect, policymakers
seek to help firms make profit in exchange for the taxes they pay. Second, policymakers
and firms may have close government-business relations through which policymakers
internalize the policy preferences of firms. Third, negotiations on economic policies
may take place through an institutionalized setting, involving policymakers, employers’
organizations, and trade unions on a regular basis.
Economic and political institutions determine how pro-immigration firms formulate
their strategies to promote their preferred immigration policies. For instance, firms in the
Netherlands and Scandinavia do not have the option of making campaign contributions to
political parties. The lack of business-driven political funding, however, does not imply
that firms have less influence in policymaking. Firms simply invest in and make use of
other strategies to steer immigration policy in their preferred direction. In this section, I
seek to uncover how business interests communicate their immigration-related concerns
to policymakers and how policymakers accommodate the preferences of pro-immigration
firms in non-U.S. political contexts. Given the theoretical focus on natural resource wealth
and generalizability in Chapter 3, I have selected the Netherlands and Scandinavia for
field research.
Firms are not the only interest group who influences immigration policy formation in
the Netherlands and Scandinavia. Generally, immigration policy is a tripartite outcome
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negotiated among governments, business organizations, and trade unions. In addition,
political parties keep close watch on voter preferences over immigration while individual
members of parliament accommodate the preferences of their constituencies. Policymak-
ers’ constraints in the Netherlands and Scandinavia are indeed similar to those of U.S.
policymakers. Yet firms in the Netherlands and Scandinavia have access to different means
of communication and influence compared to their counterparts in the U.S.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide an overview of the field research
including the characteristics of interviewees, relevant organizations, and the general struc-
ture of interviews as well as expectations. Second, I describe how governments of these
countries formulate immigration policies and the roles played by business organizations
and trade unions. Third, I present a case study of Norway that illustrates how Norway’s
oil wealth contributed to its 1975 ban on labor immigration and the development of its
immigration policy toward low-skilled workers from the developing world. I also consider
alternative hypotheses for Norway’s immigration ban. Finally, I conclude the chapter with
a summary of findings from field research.
5.2 Field Research Design
The objective of the field research is two-fold. First, I seek to investigate the ways through
which pro-immigration firms reveal their preferences to policymakers and how policymak-
ers accommodate business preferences subject to their political and electoral constraints.
Second, I use some of the information retrieved from the interviews to test whether the
Norwegian oil boom in the 1970s had a hypothesized effect on its 1975 ban on labor
immigration. To accomplish the objective of the field research, I have designed open-ended
interview questions for three groups: political parties, employers’ organizations, and
confederations of labor unions. For all of the four countries, I contacted all major political
parties both in government and opposition, employers’ organizations that primarily repre-
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sent labor-intensive sectors, and confederations of labor unions. In the Netherlands and
Scandinavia, labor unions’ views toward low-skilled immigration vary widely, depending
on the industry. Instead of contacting individual labor unions, I contacted their umbrella
organizations, confederations of labor unions, to uncover their general preferences toward
low-skilled immigration and government policies that regulate the inflows of low-skilled
workers. For political parties, it was important to get information from both governing
and opposition parties to see whether opposition parties have intrinsically different views
from parties that make up coalition governments.
From February to June, 2016, I conducted a total of 10 interviews in Denmark, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. In Denmark, I met with a political consultant repre-
senting an opposition party and an official from a Danish employers’ organization. In
Sweden, I met with a member of parliament (MP) from an opposition party who is also
the party’s spokesperson on migration and refugee issues. I also talked to an official from
a Swedish labor union confederation representing blue-collar workers. In Norway, I met
with two MPs, one in the coalition government and another in an opposition party. I also
met with an official from a Norwegian trade union confederation, and an official from a
Norwegian business organization. In addition, I met with an academic with expertise in
the history of immigration in Norway and Norwegian immigration policy. Finally, I was
able to meet with an MP from a governing party in the Netherlands.
The interview questions can be classified into three broad categories. First, I asked
about the preferences of interviewees about low-skill immigration. When interviewees
revealed their views toward low-skilled workers and immigration policy, they also talked
about other migrant groups, primarily refugees and sometimes high-skilled workers.
Second, I asked several questions about inter-group dynamics, more specifically how
they communicate or negotiate with other domestic interests over immigration policy.
Generally, labor unions and employers’ organizations reveal their preferences to policy-
makers individually with occasional tripartite discussion on immigration issues. Due to
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the recent refugee crisis, governments have also asked employers’ organizations to come
up with measures to train newly arrived refugees and incorporate them into the labor
market. Lastly, I asked questions about the implications of the EU-wide labor market
integration and the rise of right-wing populism for their organizations. Almost all MPs
from mainstream parties, employers’ organizations, and confederations of labor unions
hold generally negative views toward right-wing populist parties while their opinions on
the EU-wide labor market integration vary significantly.
5.3 Immigration Policymaking in a Nutshell
5.3.1 Dual Immigration Policy
The current immigration policies of the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries target
two distinct groups of immigrants. First, nationals from the European Economic Area
(EEA) and Switzerland enjoy the freedom to move another EEA country and Switzerland.
Although Switzerland is neither an EU nor an EEA member, the EU-Switzerland agreement
on the free movement allows Swiss nationals to work in an EEA country and EEA nationals
to work in Switzerland. While nationals of recent EU members (e.g. Croatia) generally face
some restrictions, most EEA nationals are relatively free to move to and work in another
EEA country. Although EEA countries and Switzerland do not impose employment
restrictions on most EEA and Swiss nationals, they maintain national autonomy on EEA
and Swiss nationals’ social security rights.
Second, EEA members still maintain complete policy autonomy in regulating immi-
gration inflows from non-EEA countries. These immigrants include both high-skilled
workers and low-skilled workers as well as refugees and asylum seekers. The recent
inflows of refugees, however, placed some constraint on national policy autonomy through
the Dublin Regulation, a EU law that establishes the Member State responsible for the ex-
amination of the asylum application. This system of dual migrant groups constrains many
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EEA members in regulating immigration inflows from other EEA member countries. For
instance, a Danish politician said it is easier to set up policies for non-EU workers because
Denmark is not bound by international conventions with respect to non-EU migrants,
“making it more of a Danish issue and less of an EU issue.”1 Similarly, a Norwegian MP
said that Norway has its duties as part of the agreement with the EU to welcome people
coming from the EEA area.2
5.3.2 Employers’ Organizations
Employers’ organizations represent firms’ interests on issues ranging “from legal concerns
to disputes about properties and political issues.”3 For instance, a Danish employers’
organization represents almost 10,000 members, all kinds of businesses of various sizes,
including ones in service, trade, and manufacturing.4 In Norway, the biggest employers’
organization represents about 30 percent of Norwegian businesses and industries. The
ultimate goal of these employers’ organizations is to address firms’ general concerns about
their day-to-day operations and to lower business taxes to a competitive level. Firms in
Scandinavia are especially concerned about attracting foreign investors.5
These employers’ organizations have clear preferences for immigration. The Norwegian
employers’ organization has almost exclusively focused on high-skill immigration due
to its heavy reliance on the oil industry with 421 out of 422 Norwegian municipalities
having oil-related jobs.6 During the 1970s oil boom, Statoil and other business that were
involved in the oil industry were in desperate need for skilled labor, especially engineers.
These Norwegian firms implemented two initiatives to address a skilled-labor shortage.
1A Political Consultant of a Danish Opposition Party. Personal Interview in the Danish Parliament.
February 22, 2016.
2A Senior MP of a Norwegian Governing Party. Personal Interview in the Norwegian Parliament. April
26, 2016.
3A Representative of a Norwegian Employers’ Organization. Personal Interview in Oslo. April 22, 2016.
4A Representative of a Danish Employers’ Organization. Personal Interview in Copenhagen. February
22, 2016.
5A Representative of a Norwegian Employers’ Organization. Personal Interview in Oslo. April 22, 2016.
6A Representative of a Norwegian Employers’ Organization. Personal Interview in Oslo. April 22, 2016.
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First, they recruited and brought skilled workers from other parts of the globe to Norway.
Second, many Norwegian companies set up call centers in places like Mumbai, India.
More recently, Statoil has been entertaining the idea of moving several of their service
divisions to the Baltic states in order to cut production costs.7 While Norway still relies on
low-skill immigration for its hospitality and construction sectors, the majority of foreign
workers come from other EEA countries, most notably Swedes, and Poles and Spaniards
for hospitality and construction, respectively.8 There has been very little public discontent
with immigrants from these countries perhaps due to relatively low cultural dissimilarity
between these immigrants and native Norwegians.9
In contrast, the Danish employers’ organization has a stronger preference for low-
skill immigration although the main issue has not been the cost of labor but the lack of
labor. Denmark has generally been a high-wage country. After the 2008 financial crisis,
Danish businesses have become much more interested in finding workers with specific
skills, mainly high-skilled workers. However, the representative of the organization
has mentioned that Danish businesses would like to see some more liberalization of
immigration policy at all skills levels as the current Danish immigration policy remains
quite restrictive.10 Both the Norwegian and Danish employers’ organizations mentioned
that firms in the tradable sector as well as construction companies are the main proponents
of low-skill immigration.
Firms in these countries have both formal and informal contact with politicians, includ-
ing all kinds of government ministries. For instance, the Danish employers’ organization
maintains connections with different parties, including opposition parties. In addition,
the Danish employers’ organization uses the press, the media, and its daily newsletters
7A Representative of a Norwegian Employers’ Organization. Personal Interview in Oslo. April 22, 2016.
8The representative of a Norwegian employers’ organization also mentioned that Spanish construction
workers are technologically extremely skilled with expertise in building tunnels fast with a rate of 25 meters
a day.
9A Norwegian Historian. Personal Interview in Oslo, Norway. April 21, 2016.
10A Representative of a Danish Employers’ Organization. Personal Interview in Copenhagen. February
22, 2016.
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to address various concerns of its members.11 The Norwegian employers’ organization
also communicates its members’ concerns on a day-to-day basis with the Norwegian
government, mostly administrative units, including trade, finance, and transportation. In
addition, there is an annual industry conference in Oslo, during which the Norwegian
employers’ organization invites leaders from all political parties and connects them with
their member companies.12 On a more formal side, the issue of immigration is on the
agenda when wage negotiations between employers’ organizations, labor union confeder-
ations, and governments take place every two or three years. This preliminary evidence
from the interviews with the representatives from the Danish and Norwegian employers’
organizations suggests that firms in Denmark and Norway have no less influence in immi-
gration policymaking than their counterparts in the U.S. Based on the conversations with
the representatives, firms in Denmark and Norway seem well-organized and have close
relationships with whoever is in power.
5.3.3 Labor Union Confederations
A confederation of labor unions (LO) represents the interests of labor unions on collective
bargaining agreements in Sweden and Norway. In Norway, the LO represents about 24
unions on issues ranging from labor market, income policy, and other economic matters.13
The Swedish LO represents about 14 different affiliates or organizations mobilizing blue-
collar workers on the minimum wage issue, working conditions, and other central issues
concerning the Swedish labor market.14 Although the LOs do not have clear preferences
over the entry criteria for low-skilled workers, their central concern on immigration is the
pervasiveness of social dumping and employers’ mistreatment of foreign workers.
As political interest groups, the LOs maintain relationships with all political parties
11A Representative of a Danish Employers’ Organization. Personal Interview in Copenhagen. February
22, 2016.
12A Representative of a Norwegian Employers’ Organization. Personal Interview in Oslo. April 22, 2016.
13A Representative of a Norwegian Confederation of Unions. Personal Interview in Oslo. April 22, 2016.
14A Representative of a Swedish Confederation of Unions. Personal Interview in Stockholm. May 16, 2016.
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and employers’ organizations. Labor parties are their closest allies while right-wing
populist parties have created some tension with the LOs. For instance, the Norwegian
right-wing populist party, FrP, in the coalition government supports a more free-market
approach that has not been so friendly toward labor unions. In Sweden, the right-wing
populist movement has been a bigger issue for the Swedish LO as the right-wing populist
party envisions a model of society radically different from what the LO and the Swedish
Social Democratic Party have worked to achieve in the past. The xenophobic nature of
the Swedish right-wing populist movement also harms the ability of the LO to mobilize
workers from different ethnic backgrounds because it hurts the solidarity among blue-
collar workers.
The most pressing concern for the LOs, however, is the issue of social dumping. Since
December 15, 2008, Sweden started implementing more liberal immigration policies
toward migrant workers from the Third World. While Swedish unions can provide some
opinions about the quality of an offer and working conditions within a specific sector,
they cannot deny the employment of foreign workers. For instance, if a foreign worker
secures an offer from a Swedish employer in the construction sector, the contract is then
sent to the construction labor union who in turn provides an assessment of the offer in
reference to the Swedish collective bargaining agreement. As employers are the ones who
issue work permits, and migrants from the Third World are not necessarily informed of
the Swedish labor standards, there is some possibility of social dumping by employers
who may offer lower working conditions or even renege on the initial terms of an offer.
In Norway, the issue social dumping primarily concerns low-wage workers from Eastern
Europe (e.g. Poland and Lithuania) because many Third-World migrants cannot find entry
into Norway due to its restrictive immigration policy since 1975. As most migrants do not
join unions, the LOs face some difficulties in preventing social dumping and incorporating
migrant workers into their organizations.
While LOs in Norway and Sweden have preferences over immigration, their concerns
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are not about how many immigrant workers should get into their countries. They said that
they want to prevent employers from engaging in social dumping and seek to incorporate
migrant workers into their member unions. LOs can use the institutionalized collective
bargaining to exert some influence on policymaking, specifically laws that regulate labor
standards and administrative procedures that punish employers for social dumping, but
they do not have clear stances on entry-related immigration policy in Norway and Sweden.
5.3.4 Members of Parliament
All of the MPs conveyed very clear policy stances on immigration with center-right parties
favoring more liberal immigration policy than center-left parties. While the refugee crisis
is the most pressing immigration issue among the MPs and their constituents, they also
receive constant feedback from business interests and voters on the labor immigration
issue and the status of current immigration policy. Scandinavian MPs emphasized that it
is relatively easy for both businesses and citizen groups to meet with parliamentarians.
Political parties also hold regular meetings with employers’ organizations as well as
confederations of trade unions. While some parties have a closer connection with business
organizations or trade unions, they communicate with a diverse set of interest groups on
immigration policymaking.
Between 2015 and 2016, Sweden received about 250,000 refugees. The most immediate
questions for the Swedish MP were where to house refugees and whether to continue
the border control that was introduced on January 4, 2016.15 The Danish and Norwegian
parliamentarians also expressed a similar concern over the refugee crisis with more em-
phasis on the role of local municipalities in integrating refugees into society. A Dutch MP
also mentioned that it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish policies governing
labor migrants from the Third World and refugees due to the increasing issue saliency
of refugees. Moreover, the refugee crisis is inherently linked to policymakers’ concern
15An MP of a Swedish Opposition Party. Personal Interview in the Swedish Parliament. May 17, 2016.
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over the welfare state.16 MPs want to integrate refugees into the labor market as soon as
possible through language and skill training so that the majority of refugees do not become
net consumers of social welfare.
MPs expressed confidence in knowing public attitudes on immigration and refugees as
well as business preferences for foreign labor. Instead of relying on the mass media and
polls, MPs seem to have a good sense of where the public stands on the immigration issue
by maintaining local contacts with their constituencies.17 MPs also meet with employers’
organizations to understand their labor-market concerns and need for foreign labor if
there is any. A Dutch MP mentioned that there is an increasing demand from labor-
intensive firms for subsidies to innovate production technologies to become less reliant on
manual labor.18 A Norwegian MP’s opinion about employers’ organizations indicates the
importance of business preferences in policymaking:19
“Of course, there is a lot of lobbying. I take a lot of meetings with
lobbyists from different organizations and especially the main em-
ployers’ union. You know, they’re important. If you get on edge with
the businesses, the main employers, that’s difficult. It’s not going to
make it easy to get reelected. They do tend to have valid opinions as
well and interesting contributions to policy. I feel they’re fairly happy
with their level of influence.”
Another relevant concern for MPs is the rise of right-wing populism. With an exception
of the Norwegian MP in the coalition government, all MPs expressed concerns about
the changing political climate moving toward the radical right. The Swedish MP said
it was a mistake to ignore the right-wing populist party because a lot of voters who felt
neglected by mainstream parties have supported right-wing populism. In contrast, the
Dutch MP said it was a mistake to respond to the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the Dutch
right-wing populist party because it increased the issue saliency of the right-populist
16An MP of a Dutch Governing Party. Personal Interview in the Dutch Parliament. June 6, 2016.
17Some MPs said that they look at the polling results to understand the public sentiment regarding the
refugee crisis.
18An MP of a Dutch Governing Party. Personal Interview in the Dutch Parliament. June 6, 2016.
19An MP of a Norwegian Opposition Party. Personal Interview in the Norwegian Parliament. April 20,
2016.
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agenda in Dutch politics, which in turn helped the Dutch right-wing populist party, the
Party for Freedom (PVV), gain more legislative influence. The Norwegian MP said that
the Norwegian right-wing populist party, FrP has become more responsible as a member
of the coalition government.20 This more positive view of FrP is also expressed by other
interest groups in Norway, most notably the Norwegian employers’ organization.
5.4 The Case of Norway
Why did Norway place a ban on labor immigration in 1975 and since then why has it
remained relatively closed toward low-skilled workers from the developing world? In
Chapter 3, I argue that Norway’s first oil boom in the early 1970s and particularly its
peak in 1975 were responsible for its ban on immigration in the same year. I further argue
that this is not necessarily due to the oil boom’s effect on policymakers’ expectation of
future immigration inflows, but because pro-immigration firms abandoned their labor-
intensive businesses. Without Norwegian firms’ support for low-skill labor, policymakers
accommodated the preferences of anti-immigrant interest groups and voters’ implicit anti-
immigration attitudes by placing a ban on labor immigration. Many neighboring countries
of Norway, some of which are petroleum-rich, however, adopted similar measures in
the 1970s. Sweden, a petroleum-scarce country also placed significant restrictions on
immigration inflows in 1972.
One of the alternative hypotheses for these restrictive policies is that these countries
became much more dependent on taxation for social welfare provisions since the 1960s. It is
possible that voters and trade unions demanded more restrictions on low-skill immigration
in exchange for their taxes that would fund social welfare. In Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in Chapter
3, I find a statistically significant negative association between welfare/personal taxation
and immigration policy openness. Another possibility is that Norway placed a ban on
20A Senior MP of a Norwegian Governing Party. Personal Interview in the Norwegian Parliament. April
26, 2016.
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immigration not because of its oil boom but because of the 1973 oil crisis when major
oil producers in the Middle East proclaimed an embargo. One possible mechanism is
that Norwegian pro-immigration firms that relied heavily on oil as an input went out of
business during the oil crisis, leading to a high unemployment rate. Policymakers may
have closed their borders to protect Norwegian workers from labor-market competition
with foreign workers. Another mechanism is that Norway decided to limit immigration in
response to a global economic shock caused by the oil crisis. And Norway sought its own
supply of oil in the North Sea as a response to the oil crisis. Finally, policymakers justified
the ban because “[they] had to be able to solve the integration problems for immigrants
already present in the country before letting new ones in“ (Østby, 2013, pp. 11).
As noted before, it is possible that Norway’s oil boom was not exogenous. Given the
1973 oil embargo placed by many Arab petroleum producers, Norway may have increased
its production of oil to meet the domestic energy demand and also to take advantage of
the high oil price. In the meantime, energy-intensive companies facing high fuel costs may
have gone out of business, causing growth to slow down and leaving many Norwegian
workers unemployed. As a response to these economic changes, Norway’s governing
party, the Labor Party may have decided to ban labor immigration. In other words, it is
possible that the 1973 oil crisis was responsible for both Norway’s decision to produce oil
and its decision to put a stop on labor immigration.
This alternative hypothesis is difficult to rule out in regression analysis because this
hypothesis and Hypothesis 1 of Chapter 3 imply the observationally equivalent outcome,
a negative statistical association between natural resource wealth and immigration restric-
tions. While year fixed effects and growth rate capture annual changes in the world oil
price and economic climate, respectively, they do not completely rule out the possibility
that both oil production and immigration policies respond to exogenous oil shocks in the
global economy. To demonstrate the plausibility of Hypothesis 1 of Chapter 3, I rule out
this alternative hypothesis by identifying and examining its necessary condition.
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For the causal story of the alternative hypothesis to be true, we need evidence that
the Norwegian economy was dealing with slow growth and high unemployment in the
1970s. Although it is true that most developed nations went into a period of prolonged
recession after the 1973 oil shock, Norway was able to use its immense petroleum wealth
to devise counter-cyclical financial policy, resulting in higher economic growth and lower
unemployment. Philips Petroleum discovered petroleum resources at the Ekofisk field in
1969 well in advance of the oil shock in the 1970s (Grytten, 2016). While it may be the case
that Norway expedited its oil production in response to the oil shock, it is not the case that
the oil shock led to a recession in Norway. In fact, Norway experienced an economic boom
and became one of the wealthiest countries in the world by the 1970s with a sharp increase
in female labor market participation rate in the mid-1970s (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik,
2012). Together, these pieces of evidence indicate that the alternative hypothesis based on
the 1973 oil shock cannot explain Norway’s ban on immigration.
Instead, the history of the Norwegian economy in the 1970s lends support for Hypothe-
sis 1. In Chapters 3 and 4, I have argued and shown that firms in the tradable sector are
more pro-immigration. The following excerpt from the Economic History Association
indicates that many Norwegian firms in labor-intensive industries went out of business in
the 1970s (Grytten, 2016).21
21Grytten (2016) also mentions that Norway’s countercyclical financial policy focused on subsidies to
firms, decreasing the productivity, competitiveness, and innovation in the Norwegian industrial sector.
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“Norway lost significant competitive power, and large-scale deindus-
trialization took place, despite efforts to save manufacturing industry.
Another reason for deindustrialization was the huge growth in the
profitable petroleum sector. Persistently high oil prices from the au-
tumn [of] 1973 to the end of 1985 pushed labor costs upward, through
spillover effects from high wages in the petroleum sector. High la-
bor costs made the Norwegian foreign sector less competitive. Thus,
Norway saw deindustrialization at a more rapid pace than most of
her largest trading partners. Due to the petroleum sector, however,
Norway experienced high growth rates in all the three last decades of
the twentieth century, bringing Norway to the top of the world GDP
per capita list at the dawn of the new millennium.”
It was the manufacturing sector that went out of business from 1973 and 1985. Norway
has always maintained relatively open trade policy as a small European economy. What
caused this sudden decline of the pro-immigration industrial sector was not necessarily an
increase in foreign competition but “spillover effects from high wages in the petroleum
sector.” In the absence of pro-immigration firms, Bratteli’s Labor government had no
reason to keep their borders open. It is clear that the oil crisis did not dampen the growth
rates in Norway and that Norwegian workers sought new work opportunities in the rising
service economy. As most service industries in the non-tradable sector, such as retail and
construction, do not require specialized skills, it was easy for Norwegian workers to start
working in the new sectors.22
The evidence lends support for the chain of events in which Norway’s oil boom led to
the decline of labor-intensive industrial sectors in the absence of a higher unemployment
rate–a necessary combination of key steps for the 1975 immigration ban according to Hy-
pothesis 1. A natural resource boom is unusual in creating adverse economic conditions for
labor-intensive pro-immigration firms while providing workers with ample employment
opportunities. This uncommon condition provides more empirical support for Hypothesis
1.
22For instance, see Iversen and Rosenbluth (2010, pp. 35)
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The plausibility of Hypothesis 1 depends on the validity of the assumption that Nor-
way’s new firms in the service sector and the petroleum industry care less about the cost of
low-skilled labor. Table 3.4 in Chapter 3 supports this assumption in the U.S. context with
a theoretical justification that non-tradable sectors care less about immigration because
they do not face foreign competition and can raise their output prices when wages increase.
Since lobbying reports are not publicly available in Norway, I primarily use information
retrieved from the interviews with an MP from an opposition party and a representative
from a Norwegian employers’ organization to support this assumption. Although the
interviews do not illustrate the historical preferences of Norwegian firms, they are still
relevant as Norway remains a major producer of oil.
The Norwegian MP’s party is “very much in favor of [the free movement of labor within
the entire EEA].”23 While the MP was clear that “[t]he access to [EEA] labor has been
very good for the employers,” the MP’s party “[has not] really felt that much of pressure
from businesses to open up more.”24 More specifically, the MP has not felt business
pressure to open the Norwegian borders more toward nationals from non-EU countries.
To be clear, the MP mentioned that this lack of business support for foreign workers from
the Third World may be due to the influx of Eastern and Central European countries
under the freedom of movement. Yet, this explanation cannot account for Norway’s 1975
immigration ban when the freedom of movement into Norway was generally restricted
to other Nordic countries. In addition, the representative from a Norwegian employers’
organization said that sectors that compete on a global scale, such as shipbuilders and
furniture manufacturers, are the ones that are most susceptible to wage fluctuations.25 As
labor-intensive industries have either perished or innovated to become less dependent on
low-skilled labor, Norway’s immigration policy shifted toward attracting engineers and
23An MP of a Norwegian Opposition Party. Personal Interview in the Norwegian Parliament. April 20,
2016.
24An MP of a Norwegian Opposition Party. Personal Interview in the Norwegian Parliament. April 20,
2016.
25A representative of a Norwegian employers’ organization. Personal Interview in Oslo. April 22, 2016.
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scientists from non-EU countries, who would make contributions to the development of
the oil industry.26 In addition, there is historical evidence that the Employers’ Organization
did not oppose more restrictive immigration policy during the 1970s immigration debate
(Brochmann and Kjeldstadli, 2008, pp. 198).
The decline of pro-immigration firms due to an oil boom is a sufficient condition
for Norway’s restrictive immigration policy. However, Norway may have restricted
labor immigration for other reasons. In other words, changes in the pro-immigration
business coalition’s relative strength are not a necessary condition for changes in Norway’s
immigration policy. Immigration policies also change when the anti-immigrant groups’
opinions gain or lose influence in immigration policymaking. I now consider the two
independent variables–the continued development of the Norwegian welfare state and
the public debate on integration issues–as possible explanations for the labor ban.
Chapters 3 and 4 show that welfare taxation and welfare spending are important deter-
minants of immigration policy. While this may not be a surprise, the mechanisms through
which welfare states restrict low-skill immigration are not sufficiently elaborated in the
existing literature. As I have argued so far, policymakers rarely act as social planners in
immigration policymaking. Policymakers’ concerns for welfare depletion by incoming
immigrants should not drive their immigration policy decisions as long as welfare de-
velopments do not shape interest groups’ preferences over low-skill immigration policy.
It is possible that increases in welfare taxation or spending lead to an increase in voters’
anti-immigration sentiment. For native voters, it does not matter whether low-skill immi-
grants actually consume more welfare than natives. It is rather their perception of higher
welfare consumption by immigrants that drives their opposition to low-skill immigration
in welfare states. To assess whether the further development of the Norwegian welfare
state was responsible for the 1975 immigration ban, I present historical evidence on the
public debate surrounding the ban and explore the signs of increasing nativism in the
26A senior MP of a Norwegian Governing Party. Personal Interview in the Norwegian Parliament. April
26, 2016.
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1970s. In sum, I do not find evidence that welfare was particularly responsible for the ban
although these factors may have shaped Norway’s restrictive immigration policies that
followed the 1975 ban.
I use two pieces of evidence to examine whether the continued development of the
Norwegian welfare state was responsible for the 1975 immigration ban. As mentioned
earlier, an intervening variable for this causal process between welfare and restrictive
immigration policy is a mechanism through which voters seek to exclude immigrants from
welfare consumption, also known as “welfare chauvinism.”27 As a way to measure the
influence of this group of voters, I examine the rise of the populist right-wing party, the
Progress Party (FrP). In addition, I examine social security provisions introduced in the
1970s to see if these additional welfare provisions to the Norwegian public were relevant
to the immigration debate in the 1970s.
The Norwegian welfare system took off with “the programmatic foundations of wel-
fare capitalism that had been extended by socialist-led governments in the 1930s” (Hicks,
1999, pp. 98). Norway experienced a golden age of universalism in the 1960s when the
Norwegian government introduced a national insurance scheme with various pensions
followed by unemployment benefits, health insurance, and insurance for occupational
injuries in 1971 (Kuhnle, 1986). During the oil crisis, Trygve Bratteli’s Labor govern-
ment’s countercyclical economic strategy included several new welfare programs such as
government-subsidized housing loans, a decrease in the official retirement age from 70 to
67, more expansive disability benefits, and a reformed sick-pay program (Sørvoll, 2015).
Even though the Norwegian welfare system continued to develop in the 1970s with
these new minor programs, it is unclear whether Norwegian voters were becoming more
welfare-chauvinistic toward immigrants due to this development. The right-wing populist
party, FrP gained four seats in the Norwegian parliament in 1973 with a platform, “We
27Kitschelt (1997, pp. 262) conceptualizes “welfare chauvinism” as an ideology “not necessarily rooted in
cultural patterns of xenophobia and racism but in a ’rational’ consideration of alternative options to preserve
social club goods in efficient ways.”
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are tired of being exploited by state capitalism” while criticizing the Norwegian gov-
ernment’s transfer of welfare to unworthy recipients who could be Norwegians living
on social security or development aid receivers in the Third World (Hagelund, 2005, pp.
149). Immigration was not even mentioned in FrP’s fourteen “we-are-tired-of” points in
their 1973 platform, showing no signs of xenophobia or nativism toward immigrants.28
However, FrP was the only party supporting a permanent immigration ban although their
legislative influence was negligible in 1975 (Brochmann and Kjeldstadli, 2008, pp. 200).
There is some evidence that a small fraction of the Norwegian population supported FrP
(a 5-percent vote share) based on welfare chauvinism and that the Labor Party offered
additional welfare provisions prior to the immigration ban. Yet, neither the policy scope
of these additional welfare programs nor the emergence of FrP (a 2.6-percent seat share)
was significant enough to explain the drastic turn of Norwegian immigration policy in
1975. The increasing importance of these factors in Norwegian politics, however, certainly
contributed to the persistence of restrictive immigration policy in Norway.
Finally, I examine the issue of integration as a cause of the immigration ban. This is
particularly important because the Norwegian public debate mentioned “integration” for
the first time in a report delivered by the Labor Director Reidar Danielsen in 1972, also
known as the Danielsen Report (Brochmann and Kjeldstadli, 2008, pp. 198–199). The
content of the report suggests that integration was a relevant issue, but Norwegian parties’
different motivations for supporting the temporary ban reveal that integration was more of
political rhetoric than a legitimate concern. First, the leftist parties, such as the Socialist Left
Party (SV), opposed immigration due to its potential consequence of social dumping.29
These parties also pushed for high labor standards and believed that immigration would
undermine their political efforts in the Norwegian labor market. Second, the Norwegian
Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) was also in favor of more restrictive policy, to improve
the working conditions of industries in which immigrants were heavily present. Yet, the
28A Norwegian Historian. Personal Interview in Oslo, Norway. April 21, 2016.
29A Norwegian Historian. Personal Interview in Oslo, Norway. April 21, 2016.
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proposed policy had stipulated some exemptions for specific types of labor sought by the
oil industry (Brochmann and Kjeldstadli, 2008, pp. 198–199).
In addition to the labor-market issue of integration, there was some concern about
cultural differences between Norwegians and immigrants from the Third-World coun-
tries, such as Pakistan and Morocco, especially because there was growing anxiety about
immigration inflows from these countries.30 Yet, this cultural concern did not dominate
the debate, as the integration policy introduced in the Danielsen Report was more of a
suggestion than a mandate. Although integration was the Labor Party’s public justification
for the immigration ban, the report introduced a new “optional” inclusion policy under
which immigrants were given the choice of assimilating or keeping “their own culture”
(Brochmann and Kjeldstadli, 2008, pp. 199).
Norwegian parties showed overwhelming support for the temporary immigration ban,
a policy that continued to shape Norway’s modern immigration policy toward immigrants
from the Third World over several decades. Parties across the left-right spectrum were in
favor of the temporary ban although parties on the right were, in principle, more in favor
of immigration. The only party that wanted a permanent stop and a mandatory integration
policy was FrP, which had almost no legislative influence during the debate (Brochmann
and Kjeldstadli, 2008, pp. 198–199). In conclusion, the issue of integration was relevant
during the 1970s immigration debate, but there is no evidence that this issue alone was
responsible for the immigration ban. The anti-immigration camp focused on integration to
legitimize their support for the ban while the Norwegian Employers’ Organization and
parties to the right did not oppose the ban. The decline of the pro-immigration coalition
in oil-rich Norway may have given birth to the Danielsen Report in the first place and
induced policymakers to accommodate voters’ anti-immigrant interests.
30A Norwegian Historian. Personal Interview in Oslo, Norway. April 21, 2016.
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5.5 Conclusion
Coalition governments in the Netherlands and Scandinavia accommodate a diverse set of
domestic interests in immigration policymaking. Immigration policy is for sale and is often
sold to the highest political bidder in these countries. In terms of politics, immigration
policymaking in the Netherlands and Scandinavia is not fundamentally different from U.S.
immigration policymaking. It involves political parties, firms, labor unions, and voters’
implicit or explicit opposition to immigration. Firms communicate their preferences and
concerns to governments on a daily basis, and policymakers in “small open economies”
are keenly aware of the importance of firms for economic growth and public finance. Based
on the information I gathered from the interviews with MPs, I conclude that policymakers
in the Netherlands and Scandinavia maintain close relationships with firms, which I found
more collaborative and intimate than the government-business relations in the U.S.
The in-depth case study on Norway carefully traces the necessary causal steps leading
from the early 1970s oil boom to the 1975 immigration ban. While the 1973 oil crisis was
responsible for a wave of immigration policy restrictions in other Western democracies,
the oil crisis itself did not play an important role in oil-rich Norway as the Bratteli govern-
ment used oil wealth to engage in counter-cyclical economic measures.31 The unintended
consequence of Norway’s first oil boom, however, was the demise of pro-immigration
firms and subsequent restrictions on immigration inflows. In the absence of an influential
pro-immigration coalition, Norwegian firms began to take advantage of technological in-
novation which was often spilled over from the oil industry. In the post-oil era, Norwegian
firms became much more technologically advanced and efficient.
The case of Norway also reveals that the anti-immigration rhetoric began to emerge
around the time many pro-immigration firms were no longer in business. Employers’
organizations, labor unions, and all political parties supported the 1975 immigration ban
31Another country that performed relatively well during the oil crisis is the Netherlands thanks to its
natural gas wealth.
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for various reasons. The Norwegian society showed an overwhelming level of unity on
the issue of immigration. Perhaps, political parties started responding to some of their
constituencies’ concerns over immigration when they became no longer accountable to
pro-immigration interests. Since the late 1970s, the political ascension of FrP and welfare
chauvinism have been the main driving forces behind Norway’s restrictive immigration
policy toward low-skilled workers from the Third World.
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CHAPTER 6
Tyrants and Migrants
Abstract
This chapter examines the effects of natural resource rents on LSIP across 13 relatively
wealthy autocracies after World War II. In contrast to Chapters 3 and 4, I argue that the
natural resource wealth is positively associated with more open immigration policy in au-
tocracies. Authoritarian immigration policy is a consequence of an autocrat’s redistributive
policy. As the distribution of resource rents in rentier autocracies reduces the incentive of
domestic labor to enter the labor force, rentier states rely on migrant workers to meet the
demand for low-skilled labor. Autocrats without resource rents, however, lack capacity for
redistribution, so they use policies that provide people with wages in exchange for their
labor while restricting immigration. Using the LSIP dataset, I find strong evidence for this
argument across 13 autocracies in the post-WWII era.
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6.1 Introduction
Much of the existing literature on the politics of immigration focuses on developed democ-
racies. Foreign nationals seeking liberal political institutions and better economic opportu-
nities are drawn to wealthy democracies around the world. Given the political, economic
and demographic significance of immigration in developed democracies as well as the
emergence of right-wing populism and fiscal crises in Europe, political scientists have
explored the roles of party systems, welfare policy, xenophobia and special interests in
shaping immigration policy developments under democratic institutions.1 Only a handful
of studies ask questions about the causes and consequences of immigration in autocra-
cies while even fewer studies attempt to explain immigration policy variation in wealthy
autocracies, such as Saudi Arabia and Singapore.2
A number of factors explain why the literature has done little to fill this gap. First, the
literature on the politics of immigration evolved in isolation from the literature on the
politics of authoritarianism. The political science literature on immigration is based on
decades of research spearheaded by economists and demographers focusing on advanced
democracies. Many of the assumptions and theories are not applicable to institutional
settings of authoritarian regimes. Second, the lack of data on authoritarian governments’
immigration policies has been a significant setback to any quantitative attempt to identify
determinants of immigration policy in autocracies.3 Finally, few studies have considered
1See Freeman (1995) for his seminal piece on the client politics of immigration in liberal democratic states.
See Givens and Luedtke (2005) for a discussion of European party systems and immigrant rights. For the
link between inequality and immigration policy in the New World, see Hatton and Williamson (2005, 2007);
Timmer and Williamson (1998).
2An exception is the Low-Skill Immigration Policy Dataset collected by Peters (2015), which includes
autocracies in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia.
3For instance, Mirilovic (2010) uses actual immigration inflows as an indicator of immigration policy
openness. This is problematic for several reasons. First, immigration flows are consequences of both push
and pull factors. Using immigration inflows as a policy indicator requires accounting for all push factors
from sending countries, such as natural disaster, civil war, and other social conditions that compel people to
move abroad. Second, migration patterns tend to follow linear trends. As more co-ethnics reside abroad,
migration increases even in the presence of restrictive immigration policy. Finally, open immigration policy
does not necessarily coincide with an increase in migration inflows especially when host countries’ economic
conditions are less attractive than other destinations. Actual policy indicators, however, measure what
policymakers intend to do in controlling immigration flows.
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immigration policies of autocracies in comparative perspective. While scholars of the
Middle East and the students of the rentier state note the importance of immigration in the
Persian Gulf, their analysis of immigration is often descriptive or limited to the region.
In this chapter, I diverge from much of the literature on the politics of immigration in
advanced democracies, including Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Instead, I explore how natural re-
source wealth shapes immigration policy when policymakers exercise exclusive ownership
over revenues from capital-intensive natural resources.
Autocracies’ divergent immigration policies have resulted in different population
shares of immigrants. The presence of mass immigration or lack thereof in wealthy
autocracies suggests a new venue of research in our understanding of the politics of
authoritarian regimes and autocratic survival. More precisely, does immigration help
authoritarian governments tighten their grip on power? And given the possible political
and economic effects of immigration on authoritarian persistence, why do some autocracies
have more restrictive immigration policy than others? This paper primarily addresses the
latter question by looking at a number of high-growth, relatively wealthy authoritarian
countries.
Economic growth increases the demand for labor, especially low-skilled workers. Given
the high labor demand, why do some authoritarian governments seek foreign labor while
others meet the labor demand by encouraging more native citizens to participate in the
labor force? I primarily focus on relatively wealthy autocracies because one of the most
important causes of cross-border migration is the wage differential between migrant-
receiving and migrant-sending states (Abella, 1995; Breunig, Cao and Luedtke, 2012;
Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999; Massey et al., 1993; Ortega and Peri, 2013).4 As poor
autocracies do not face significant immigration pressure, they can set up immigration
policy that lacks enforcement and effectiveness. Moreover, it would be difficult to code
4Focusing on 18 OECD countries, Leblang, Fitzgerald and Teets (2014) do not find that income differentials
between migrant-receiving and migrant-sending economies drive migration flows. Instead, they find that
shared border, common colonial origin, and common official language increase bilateral migration flows.
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and make inferences about poor economies’ immigration policies. High economic growth
and economic prosperity of some autocracies suggest that immigration policies of these
authoritarian governments are relevant and deserve scholarly attention.
I argue that the immigration policy of an authoritarian regime is a consequence of
elites’ redistributive policy and their concern about the labor market. Even though elites
generally prefer immigrant labor, immigration policy depends on the extent to which
autocrats are able to redistribute to native citizens who would be underemployed in the
presence of substantial low-skill immigration. When governments rely solely on elites’
tax revenues, they lack capacity to redistribute. Without redistribution, autocrats provide
wages in exchange for native workers’ labor. Revenue-seeking governments encourage
labor market participation of domestic workers while restricting immigration. On the
other hand, governments with independent sources of income distribute rents to their
citizens while supplying migrant workers to elites who support the regime.
This chapter illustrates how autocratic elites use immigration policy to meet their
specific political goals, given their redistributive policies and political constraints. Hence,
it is helpful to understand why immigration policies differ across autocracies before one can
assess the consequences of immigration under authoritarian regimes. Using the existing
literatures on the political economy of authoritarianism, rentier state, and redistribution,
the chapter focuses on autocrats’ discretion over resource income as one of the key causes
of immigration policy in wealthy autocracies.5
This chapter continues as follows. First, I begin by theorizing how an autocracy’s
distribution of resource rents leads to open immigration policy through its effect on redis-
tribution and natives’ incentive to enter the labor force. Then, I provide an overview of
authoritarian immigration policy by comparing autocracies’ immigration policy dimen-
sions to those of democracies. Third, I provide evidence that differences in natural resource
income help explain why some autocrats open immigration while others do not make
5See Bearce and Laks Hutnick (2011) for the correlation between immigration and authoritarian persis-
tence.
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policy changes to attract immigrants or even discourage immigration. Fourth, I use an
alternative measure of immigration policy openness and conduct additional robustness
checks. Finally, I conclude and discuss the implications of immigration within the broader
political science literature of authoritarianism and introduce new areas of research in the
field.
6.1.1 Domestic Interests over Redistribution and Labor Demand
This section illustrates the policy preferences of autocratic elites and native citizens over
redistribution and immigration policy. For simplicity, I do not make a distinction between
elites and autocratic rulers. I instead assume that both elites and autocratic rulers have
vested interets in regime stability through an intimate government-business alliance. I relax
this assumption later to see how economic elites’ distinct preferences for redistribution
and immigration shape autocrats’ immigration policy. I discuss two interrelated channels
through which an increase in autocrats’ resource rents leads to more open immigration
policy, (a) the effect of non-tax revenue on the labor market, and (b) the effect of non-tax
revenue on autocrats’ vulnerability to native citizens’ anti-immigrant attitudes.
Autocratic elites and native citizens have opposing preferences for redistribution and
immigrant labor. While elites seek to limit redistribution and have a strong preference
for foreign labor, native citizens favor redistribution and oppose foreign labor.6 The core
motivation behind elites’ opposition to redistribution is based on the assumption that
elites have to pay for native citizens’ welfare. On the other hand, native workers oppose
foreign labor because competition with immigrant workers decreases their income and on
other non-material grounds (Freeman, 1995; Hatton and Williamson, 2005, 2007; Zolberg,
1989).7 However, substantial redistribution can keep domestic labor quiescent about open
6For elites’ fear of redistribution, see Acemog˘lu and Robinson (2001, 2006); Boix (2003). For the societal
cleavage between economic elites and citizens over immigration policy, see Freeman (1995).
7See Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) for an excellent review of the literature on public opinions toward
immigration.
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immigration policy because income transfers decrease native citizens’ incentive to enter
the labor force and the extent to which governments are susceptible to their citizens’
anti-immigrant attitudes. Even though elites in autocracies are relatively insulated from
popular opposition to foreign labor, immigration policy outcomes depend on the extent
to which they can use redistribution and the effect of redistribution on native citizens’
incentive to work and to oppose immigration.
Autocrats can rely on various tools to consolidate their power, both coercive (i.e.,
repression) and persuasive (i.e., cooptation) (Wintrobe, 1998). Elites who depend on
native labor must master difficult strategies of wage repression and seek ways to prevent
and counteract collective actions by domestic labor for economic and political reforms.8
Moreover, elites’ economic dependence on domestic labor increases labor’s influence in
policymaking. Furthermore, labor may demand more policy concessions when autocrats
tax labor. On the other hand, if autocrats can rely on temporary migrant workers from
poorer countries, they can prevent political complication arising from native workers’
employment opportunities. Since temporary migrant workers have a short time horizon
in host autocracies and are primarily attracted by the wage differential between sending
and receiving economies, they are less likely to protest and risk repression for labor and
political reforms.9
While elites have a strong preference for access to foreign labor, they face different
domestic constraints when making labor-market and immigration policies. The extent
to which elites open immigration depends on two factors. First, the greater the extent to
which elites can send direct income transfers to native citizens, the more foreign labor
they can bring. Second, the source of income transfer matters. When elites have to
carve out their earned income for redistribution, they are less likely to redistribute. In
contrast, elites with access to natural resource rents have the means to send government
8See Crystal (1994) for the long-run viability of repression for autocratic survival.
9See Czaika and Varela (2015) for a detailed discussion on why Indian migrants return home from
wealthier host autocracies.
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transfers in exchange for loyalty.10 Indeed, Morrison (2009) finds that an increase in non-tax
revenue is associated with more social spending in autocracies. Without redistribution to
underemployed domestic labor, autocrats who open immigration, however, face increasing
popular pressure for regime change.11
To summarize the argument, elites’ distribution of natural resource windfalls to their
citizens decreases citizens’ incentives to take low-skilled jobs and to stage opposition
toward temporary migrant workers. The transfer of rents to citizens, therefore, increases
both elites’ incentive and ability to open immigration. As native citizens become more
expensive to hire as a consequence of redistribution, autocrats bring foreign labor to
meet the labor demand. Elites who lack capacity to redistribute, however, use native
labor to meet the labor demand while engaging in other labor-market policies to increase
their profit and to stay in power. The combination of immigration and redistribution
exempts elites from engaging in repressive labor-market policies toward domestic labor
and becoming accountable to citizens’ immigration policy preferences. Therefore, I argue
that natural resource income is positively correlated with immigration policy openness.
By contrast, the lack of resource income characterized by the East Asian Tigers under
authoritarianism should lead to restrictions on immigration. Thus, I hypothesize the
following:
Hypothesis 1: As the size of an autocrat’s resource income increases, the openness of immigration
policy increases.
6.1.2 Autocrats, Elites and Economic Policies
For certain autocracies with few state-owned enterprises, it may be more useful to think of
economic elites and autocratic rulers as separate entities with different goals. According
10See Yom (2011) for the role of a generous welfare system in maintaining regime stability in rentier states.
11See Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) for the link between democratization and revolutionary threat by
the masses excluded from policymaking.
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to this framework, autocratic rulers only care about staying in power while economic
elites are primarily concerned about maximizing profit. Revenue-seeking governments in
non-rentier states depend on taxes generated from economic activities of both capital and
labor (Bates and Lien, 1985). Without redistribution, autocrats of growing economies must
provide work opportunities for native citizens in order to prevent popular dissent.
Knowing the policy constraints of autocrats, economic elites seek two policy conces-
sions from authoritarian regimes. First, elites oppose redistribution of their profit to labor.
Second, instead of foreign labor, elites seek government-sponsored wage repression and
other policies that discourage strikes and the mobilization of workers. Although the cost of
repression is high when citizens have workplaces to overcome collective action problems
(Boix, 2003, pp. 26), capitalists pass on the cost of repression to autocrats. Revenue-seeking
governments relying on capital’s tax contribution reflect capital’s preferences in their social
spending and labor-market policies. The East Asian welfare model in 1980 exemplifies
this framework in a non-rentier economy. The flexible labor market and limited public
provision of social insurance outside of state sector workers in East Asia are examples of
wage repression and limited redistribution (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008, pp. 5). On the
other hand, governments in East Asia emphasized the importance of basic health services
and education since public health and education increase the productivity of labor.
The presence of non-tax revenue, however, blurs the distinction between autocrats
and economic elites because authoritarian governments in rentier states collect revenues
from state-owned enterprises (Beblawi, 1987; Mahdavy, 1970). According to this view,
autocrats are economic elites who are primarily interested in maintaining regime stability.
Autocrats’ ability to generate profit (e.g. resource rents) also translates into their ability
to buy off opposition and disperse popular dissent through direct income transfers. As
the distribution of resource rents makes native citizens wealthier and less opposed to
immigration, autocrats rely on foreign labor to meet the labor demand.
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6.2 Overview of Authoritarian Immigration Policy
For immigration policy, I use the LSIP dataset described in Chapter 2. In this section,
I compare and contrast immigration policies between democracies and autocracies by
presenting descriptive statistics on the 12 immigration policy dimensions and 3 provisions
by regime type.
Table 6.1: Autocracies Included in the Sample
Group Country Years of Autocracy
Settler States
Argentina 1955–1982
Brazil 1964–1978
Chile 1973–1989
South Africa 1950–1993
Venezuela 1950–1958, 2009–2012
Asian Tigers
Singapore 1960–2010
South Korea 1948–1987
Taiwan 1951–1995
Hong Kong 1966–2010
Oil-rich Monarchies Saudi Arabia 1950–2010Kuwait 1963–2010
Other Autocracies Spain 1950–1976Botswana 1966–2013
Note: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Venezuela have
democratized in various years. The sample only includes country-year observations under
authoritarian regimes. Some countries are included after 1950 due to missing data on
immigration policy, explanatory variables, or controls.
6.2.1 Immigration Policies by Regime Type
I present descriptive statistics on immigration policies across different political institutions
after WWII. I make a distinction between democracies and autocracies by using the regime
dataset assembled by Przeworski et al. (2000) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).12
Although the authors do not identify Hong Kong’s regime type, it can be considered
a liberal autocracy during its time as a British colony with civil freedom but without
12This binary indicator of democracy is only available up to 2008, so I have filled in the missing data for
years beyond 2008.
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representation (Ma, 2007). The same can be said about Hong Kong as a Chinese territory.
With Hong Kong, Table 6.1 lists 13 autocracies.
Although one can expand the dataset by coding the immigration policies of other
autocracies that are popular destinations of international migrants, such as Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, it is extremely difficult to obtain primary and secondary
sources on immigration policies of these countries. In addition, adding more rentier states
to the dataset will also make the sample imbalanced. In such a sample, any empirical
support from the dataset may arise from the dataset’s heavy reliance on oil-rich Monarchies.
Since the sample includes at least two countries from South America, Africa, Asia and the
Middle East, the dataset represents a variety of autocracies around the world.
Table 6.2: Immigration Policy Dimensions by Regime Type, 1946–2013
Democracies Autocracies
Dimension Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Universality by Nationality 4.014 1.275 1318 4.318 0.911 504
Universality by Skill or Income 3.043 1.05 1318 3.106 1.15 504
Citizenship 3.815 0.866 1318 3.197 1.027 504
Rights 3.887 0.883 1318 3.176 1.01 504
Refugee 2.507 1.24 1318 1.236 0.626 504
Asylum 2.715 0.989 1318 1.333 0.842 504
Recruitment 3.192 1.035 1318 2.873 1.103 504
Work Prohibitions 4.134 0.959 1318 3.849 1.098 504
Deportation 2.889 0.855 1318 2.389 0.942 504
Enforcement 3.135 0.882 1318 3.712 0.847 504
Family 2.643 1.15 1315 2.045 0.828 504
Quota 4.225 1.435 1318 4.776 0.767 504
Refugee Provision 0.780 0.414 1318 0.367 0.482 504
Asylum Provision 0.869 0.337 1318 0.353 0.478 504
Family Provision 0.937 0.243 1318 0.940 0.237 504
Immigration Policy -0.856 0.75 1315 -0.387 0.44 504
In general, autocracies place fewer restrictions on immigration inflows than democra-
cies.13 This is evident in Universality by Nationality, Quota, and Enforcement in Table 6.2.
13The following list is the group of democracies included in descriptive statistics: the United States,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland,
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Autocracies’ high scores in these dimensions mean that immigrants are better able to find
entry into autocracies. Autocracies, however, limit foreigners’ access to citizenship and
rights as well as family reunion, specifically the extent to which migrant workers can
bring family members. This is consistent with a recent finding that autocracies can absorb
more immigration than democracies (Breunig, Cao and Luedtke, 2012). The trade-off
between entry policies and rights provisions also resonates with a notion that high-income
countries cannot increase both immigration openness regarding entry and the extent to
which migrant workers are granted rights after admission (Ruhs, 2013).
The most striking policy divergence between democracies and autocracies, however,
is shown in refugee and asylum policies. If provisions regarding refugees and asylees
exist, Refugee Provision and Asylum Provision are coded as “1” (“0” otherwise). While most
democracies and autocracies have family provisions, autocracies are much more restrictive
toward refugees and asylees. Autocracies’s hostility toward refugees and aslyees is also
evident in Refugee and Asylum. Since the score of 1 means almost no refugees or asylees
are allowed in host states, autocracies’ average scores of 1.236 and 1.333 for Refugee and
Asylum, respectively indicate that autocracies have extremely restrictive policies toward
refugees and asylees. However, democracies’ policy scores toward refugees and asylees are
close to 3 meaning that democracies allow a moderate number of refugees while following
the United Nations’ definition of a refugee and procedures.
Another notable policy difference between democracies and autocracies is that auto-
crats’ deportation policies are designed to expedite migrant worker deportation. The score
of 2 for Deportation means that there are relatively many deportable offenses for migrant
workers and that authorities can use a simple administrative process to deport a migrant
worker. Autocrats relying on foreign workers tend to use deportation as a convenient
tool to manage the labor market. This sharply contrasts with autocracies’ more liberal
entry criteria. Overall, the Immigration Policy factor score–measuring the extent to which
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Venezuela.
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migrant workers can gain entry into host states–is much higher for autocracies. Using the
Polity IV data series with 6 as the lowest score for democracies and scores lower than 6 as
autocracies shows very similar differences in immigration policies between democracies
and autocracies.14
6.2.2 International Migration and Regime Type
Research on international migration and regime type shows that there are four patterns in
the post-WWII age of migration (Breunig, Cao and Luedtke, 2012, p. 827). First, migrants
tend to seek better economic opportunities, not civil and political freedom. Second,
migrants tend to come from relatively poor democracies. Since democracies allow the
freedom of cross-border emigration, citizens from democracies have a greater degree of
cross-border mobility in terms of exit. Third, autocracies absorb more migrants because
they are less constrained by domestic demand for anti-immigration policies. Finally, a
recent work shows that autocracies’ emigration policies also vary because autocracies face
different trade-offs between the costs of emigration (e.g. mass exit and foreign influence)
and the benefits of emigration (e.g. expelling dissidents and receiving remittances) (Miller
and Peters, 2015).
The existing research on international migration and regime type makes inferences
about autocracies’ immigration policies based on actual immigration inflows. The descrip-
tive statistics of the 13 autocracies’ immigration policies in this paper confirm some of the
findings of the existing research, particularly the finding that autocracies implement more
open immigration policy while granting few rights to migrant workers. Table 6.3 portrays
the differences in population shares of foreign-born individuals between democracies and
autocracies included in the Low-Skill Immigration Policy Dataset.
14The Polity IV Project classifies countries with polity scores equal to or greater than 6 as democracies.
See Table D.5 for the differences in immigration policies between democracies and autocracies based on the
Polity IV data’s definition of democracy.
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Table 6.3: Migrant Shares (percent) by Regime Type, 1946–2013
Regime Type Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Democracies 8.467 6.004 0.352 22.528 1016
Autocracies 21.876 23.052 0.542 81.42 370
Autocracies except K&SA 15.044 16.383 0.542 52.916 276
Data on immigration are retrieved from the online World Development Indicators
database of the World Bank (2014), measuring foreign-born population percentage
(international migrant stock as a percentage of population). The World Bank does not
provide annual observations on immigration but in increments of five years starting
in 1960. Since migration stocks tend to be stable and follow linear trends, linear
interpolation is used between time points to fill in missing observations.
Consistent with the existing literature on international migration and regime type,
autocracies have larger population shares of migrant workers. The row, Autocracies except
K&SA shows that excluding the oil-rich monarchies, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, from the
pool of autocracies does not change the central finding that autocracies have more capacity
to absorb foreign workers than democracies. Moreover, autocracies’ population shares of
foreign labor exhibit a much higher standard deviation than those of democracies. On the
other hand, democracies show a clear limitation in such variation relative to autocracies.
6.3 Empirical Analysis
6.3.1 Data
To assess the relationship between immigration policy openness and natural resource
income, I have considered several measures of natural resource rents. The literature on the
resource curse has used revenues from natural resource exports as a share of GDP as the
standard measure of resource dependence (Morrison, 2009; Ross, 2001; Smith, 2004). While
this measure roughly captures the fiscal dependency of governments on natural resource
rents, it ignores the actual size of resource income which governments can use for regime
stability. Since the main theoretical premise of the hypothesis is that autocratic elites
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of rentier states distribute income to silence dissent among people, a more appropriate
measure of resource income is the total revenue from natural resource production divided
by population. Natural resources include fuel (oil, gas, and coal) as well as valuable
minerals (i.e. gold, diamonds, silver, and copper). To measure the value of natural resource
production, the production quantity of each resource is multiplied by its real world price,
expressed in thousands of 2007 U.S. dollars. The total income from all natural resources is
then divided by population in a given year. Starting with the dataset provided in Haber
and Menaldo (2011), I have expanded the data on resource income for years up to 2013 by
using growth rates of resource income from World Bank (2014).15
A remaining issue with the natural log of resource income per capita is that it underes-
timates the extent to which autocrats can provide patronage to citizens. Since rentier states
such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia host large population shares of migrant workers, using
resource income divided by the entire population does not precisely capture autocrats’
capacity to redistribute. Most autocrats do not generally distribute their resource income
to temporary migrant workers, so I use the interpolated data of international migration
stocks to compute resource income per citizen.16 For the 13 autocracies after 1945, the
correlation between total resource income per capita and total resource income per citizen
is 0.925 and the correlation between the natural logs of the two values is 0.997. Since
some autocracies, notably Taiwan, lack migration data, I replace the missing values of the
natural log of resource income per citizen with the natural log of total resource income per
capita.
I select several key control variables that are critical in properly testing the relationship
between resource income and immigration policy. First, I control for the 1-year-lagged
value of the natural log of population. Natural resource abundance in autocracies may
15Haber and Menaldo (2011) used the Penn World Table to retrieve data on resource income and macroeco-
nomic indicators. To be consistent with the data, I used growth rates of the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators to fill in missing data for most recent years in the dataset.
16See Johnston (2015) for the scope conditions under which autocrats distribute private goods to migrant
workers.
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attract immigrants or discourage emigration, raising population which in turn has poten-
tial consequences for immigration policy. I lag population by a year to partially address
the endogeneity of population to immigration policy. Second, since many resource-rich
countries tend to be wealthy, I include the natural log of gross domestic product per
capita. Theoretically, differences in immigration policy between wealthy and less wealthy
autocracies are plausible. Third, the amount of resource income can positively or nega-
tively affect growth rates through its effect on the economy and on manufacturing sectors.
As growth rates may change autocrats’ stance on immigration policy, I control for eco-
nomic growth. Controlling for growth rates and economic wealth allows the regression
to compare immigration policies of resource-rich and resource-poor economies across
observations with comparable economic characteristics. Finally, when I exclude Hong
Kong from the sample, I include the polity score from Marshall and Gurr (2014) to control
for the level of political development.17 The rentier state literature consistently finds that
resource income is negatively correlated with the quality of institutions, which in turn may
affect autocrats’ ability to influence immigration policy.18
6.3.2 Sample Selection
An underlying assumption behind the theoretical expectation of the relationship between
natural resource rents and immigration policy openness is autocrats’ discretion over
resource revenues. In the mid-1970s, many governments of rentier states nationalized
their natural resource industries. As autocrats placed resource industries under their full
control, their capacity to distribute rents to citizens increased as well. For instance, there
17The Polity Project does not code Hong Kong’s political regime.
18Authoritarian rulers of oil-rich countries from the Arabian Peninsula to Africa have succeeded in
consolidating their power by using super-normal wealth from natural resource extraction (Barro, 1999; Ross,
2001, 2012; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2006; Wantchekon, 2002). The causal link traditionally drawn between
resource wealth and authoritarianism is deceptively simple. Natural resources produce enormous profits,
rents that tend to fill the fiscal coffers of authoritarian leaders, displacing taxation as a necessary component
of government revenue (Beblawi, 1987; Mahdavy, 1970). Without taxation, citizens often do not demand a
more democratic regime through which they can set their own tax policy.
105
is more compelling evidence for the political resource curse after 1975 (Andersen and
Ross, 2013; Ross, 2012). The resource curse literature emphasizes the important role of
ownership in conditioning the extent to which natural resource rents empower autocrats
(Jones Luong and Weinthal, 2006, 2010).
An ideal way to select a sample is to drop all observations under which autocracies do
not have ownership over natural resource industries. While Kobrin (1980) provides some
information regarding when and how many firms autocracies in rentier states nationalized,
two problems still remain. First, the nationalization data do not cover all the years and
countries in the sample of autocracies. Second, some autocrats nationalized their natural
resource industries at different times during the 1970s. For instance, Argentina nationalized
nine firms in the petroleum industry in 1963, followed by two more firms nationalized in
1974.19 It is difficult to operationalize the role of ownership due to the incomplete data
and the complexity in the nationalization process of natural resource industries. Instead, I
divide the sample in to two different time periods: 1946–2013 and 1975–2013.20
Another issue is the classification of regime type. Using the regime classification by
Przeworski et al. (2000) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) classifies Botswana and
Venezuela as an autocracy and a democracy, respectively, for most time periods. The quality
of Venezuela’s democratic institutions started deteriorating when Hugo Cha´vez came into
power in 1999. The polity score of Venezuela between 2006 and 2013 is below 6, placing
Venezuela in a group of open anocracies according to the Polity IV Project. Botswana’s
polity score, however, ranges from 6 to 8 while it is still considered an autocracy by the
binary regime classification due to the lack of electoral competition. Therefore, as an
alternative measure of democracy, I restrict the sample to countries with polity scores
below 6.
19I thank Stephen Kobrin for providing the nationalization information.
20I borrow this approach from Andersen and Ross (2013); Ross (2012).
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6.3.3 Empirical Strategy
I regress immigration policy on the natural log of resource income per citizen,
ln (Resource Income per Citizen + 1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) model with stan-
dard errors clustered on countries. Each model includes country fixed effects to capture
country-specific, time-invariant variables that may drive immigration policy, such as cul-
ture, religion, geography, and climate. Country fixed effects also account for unchanging
autocratic regime types, such as military regimes, single-party, and dynastic monarchy.
Year fixed effects are included to account for common shocks every year. In addition, a
lagged value (one-year) of immigration policy is included to properly model the dynamic
process as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995). Since immigration policy is a set of laws
and practices, the best predictor of today’s policy is yesterday’s policy. Policymakers often
make amendments to existing laws and tweak existing practices to meet their goals. While
some policy shifts are dramatic, past policies are the most important predictor of a coun-
try’s current immigration policy. The following model summarizes the aforementioned
empirical strategy.
Immigration Policyit = β0 + β1Immigration Policyit−1
+β2Natural Log of Resource Income per Citizenit
+∑Kk=3
(
βkControl Variable(k−2),it
)
+ αi + µt + eit,
where αi and µt indicate country fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively.
I estimate two sets of models with two different samples of autocracies. The first set of
models pools autocracies based on the binary indicator of autocracy. The second set pools
countries that score lower than 6 in the Polity IV Project. Each set contains four models,
(a) all autocracies since 1945, (b) all autocracies without Hong Kong after 1945 and the
addition of Polity Score as a covariate, (c) all autocracies since 1975, and (d) countries in
(b) since 1975 with the addition of Polity Score as a covariate. Table 6.4 summarizes the
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specifications of eight models.
Table 6.4: Model Specifications
Model Autocracy Years Hong Kong Included? Polity Included?
1 Binary 1945– Yes No
2 Binary 1945– No Yes
3 Binary 1975– Yes No
4 Binary 1975– No Yes
5 Polity<6 1945– Yes No
6 Polity<6 1945– No Yes
7 Polity<6 1975– Yes No
8 Polity<6 1975– No Yes
6.3.4 Results
Table 6.5 reports the regression results for the two time periods by pooling autocracies
using the binary regime classification. Across the four models, the coefficients of resource
income are positive. In Models 3 and 4, there is overwhelming evidence for the hypothesis.
For instance, a 100-percent increase in resource income is correlated with a .012-unit
increase in immigration policy openness in Model 3. Compared with Models 1 and 2,
this correlation in Model 3 is significantly higher and highly statistically significant. The
correlation between immigration policy and resource income is weaker substantively and
statistically when all years since 1946 are pooled together.
It is difficult to interpret what this correlation really means in terms of policy impact
due to the arbitrary nature of factor analysis. As an example, a .2-unit decrease in U.S.
immigration policy score from 1923 to 1924 reflects the Immigration Act of 1924, also known
as Johnson-Reed Act, that limited the annual inflows of immigrants from any country to 2
percent (from 3 percent) of the existing U.S. residents from that country, recorded in the
1890 census (Hatton, 2010, p. 964). The act aimed to cut annual immigration flows by more
than 30 percent. Thus, it is plausible to assume that a 100-percent increase in resource
income is associated with more than a 1.5 percent increase in annual immigration flows.
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Table 6.5: Authoritarian Immigration Policy Regressed on Resource Income
(Autocracy= 1)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Years Included 1946–2013 1946–2013 1975–2013 1975–2013
Immigration Policyt−1 0.838∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.033) (0.046) (0.056)
ln(Resource Income/Citizen) 0.004 0.001 0.012∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
ln(Population)t−1 -0.119∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗ -0.340∗ -0.272+
(0.027) (0.034) (0.142) (0.145)
ln(GDP Per Capita) -0.027∗ -0.031∗ -0.061 -0.060
(0.012) (0.011) (0.053) (0.043)
GDP Growth -0.043 0.003 -0.059 -0.030
(0.056) (0.031) (0.079) (0.085)
Polity Score 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
Observations 461 413 268 231
Countries 13 12 13 12
R2 0.876 0.878 0.806 0.817
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of immigration policy in year t. All independent variables are taken from year t unless
otherwise noted. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and +
indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year
fixed effects are included in all models.
Since ln(Resource Income Per Citizen) ranges from 0 to 12.2 across autocracies, this is a
sizable correlation.
As expected, population shows a negative correlation with immigration policy, im-
plying that autocracies take population into account when making immigration policy.
Wealthy autocracies also tend to restrict immigration, but the relationship is not statistically
significant since 1975. In addition, we cannot reject the null correlation between the level
of political development and immigration policy openness. Polity scores often show very
little temporal variation within each country. Including fixed effects is likely to absorb any
correlation between polity scores and immigration policy openness.
Table 6.6 reports the results for the same models shown in Table 6.5 by pooling any
country-year observations with polity scores lower than 6. Consistent with the results
in Models 1 through 4, the correlation between resource income and immigration policy
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Table 6.6: Authoritarian Immigration Policy Regressed on Resource Income (Polity<6)
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Years Included 1946–2013 1946–2013 1975–2013 1975–2013
Immigration Policyt−1 0.865∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.033) (0.051) (0.063)
ln(Resource Income/Citizen) 0.011∗ 0.008∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.012∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(Population)t−1 -0.058+ -0.065+ -0.214∗ -0.207∗
(0.029) (0.033) (0.088) (0.074)
ln(GDP Per Capita) 0.012 0.009 -0.011 -0.024
(0.014) (0.016) (0.047) (0.044)
GDP Growth 0.019 0.075 0.038 0.122
(0.072) (0.048) (0.142) (0.144)
Polity Score 0.003 -0.005
(0.002) (0.007)
Observations 462 418 232 196
Countries 13 12 12 11
R2 0.827 0.825 0.745 0.754
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of immigration policy in year t. All independent variables are taken from year t unless
otherwise noted. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and +
indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year
fixed effects are included in all models.
openness after 1974 (Models 7 and 8) is substantively higher with smaller standard errors
compared to the results in Models 5 and 6 in which all years are included. The coefficients
are also all statistically significant in Models 5 through 8. The differences between Models
1 and 2 and Models 5 and 6 show that using different classifications of autocracy matters
when all years since 1946 are pooled together. Using this alternative classification of
autocracy lends stronger empirical support for the hypothesis.
6.3.5 Robustness Checks
The stronger results in samples in Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 may be driven by dropping
observations that do not lend support for the hypothesis. Many countries in South America
and East Asia democratized after the mid-1970s. Since restricting the empirical analysis to
years after 1974 runs the risk of letting Kuwait and Saudi Arabia drive the results, I drop
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both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from the analysis and reevaluate the relationship between
resource income and immigration policy openness. I use the binary regime classification
in Models 9 through 12.
Table 6.7: Authoritarian Immigration Policy Regressed on Resource Income
(Autocracy= 1) without Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Years Included 1946–2013 1946–2013 1975–2013 1975–2013
Immigration Policyt−1 0.841∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.031) (0.070)
ln(Resource Income/Citizen) 0.004∗ 0.002 0.010∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Population)t−1 -0.228∗∗ -0.280+ -0.628∗∗∗ -1.108∗
(0.063) (0.130) (0.105) (0.416)
ln(GDP Per Capita) -0.040∗ -0.050∗ -0.126+ -0.141+
(0.018) (0.019) (0.065) (0.065)
GDP Growth -0.065 0.009 -0.063 -0.081
(0.082) (0.045) (0.138) (0.192)
Polity Score 0.001 -0.006
(0.001) (0.004)
Observations 354 308 196 160
Countries 11 10 11 10
R2 0.882 0.885 0.816 0.834
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of immigration policy in year t. All independent variables are taken from year t unless
otherwise noted. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and +
indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year
fixed effects are included in all models.
Table 6.7 shows results similar to those in Table 6.5. Compared to Model 1, the coef-
ficient of resource income in Model 9 is more statistically significant. Dropping Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia does not reduce empirical support for the hypothesis. The correlation
between resource income and immigration policy openness remains robust with similar
coefficients across Models 3, 4, 11, and 12 that test the hypothesis for years after 1974.
Finally, I use an alternative measure of immigration policy openness to reevaluate
the empirical validity of the hypothesis for autocracies after 1974. Instead of the factor
score, I use a standardized average of seven entry and labor-market criteria: nationality,
skill, quota, recruitment, labor prohibitions, deportation and enforcement. The correlation
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between the immigration policy factor score and the standardized average is .76 for the
13 autocracies from 1946 to 2013. I use both the binary indicator of autocracy and polity
scores (< 6) to pool autocracies into two samples.
Table 6.8: Authoritarian Immigration Policy (Standardized Average) Regressed on
Resource Income
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Regime Classification Polity< 6 Polity< 6 Autocracy=
1
Autocracy=
1
Years Included 1975–2013 1975–2013 1975–2013 1975–2013
Immigration Policy Averaget−1 0.831∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.041) (0.024) (0.030)
ln(Resource Income/Citizen) 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Population)t−1 -0.085 -0.005 -0.138 -0.108
(0.096) (0.111) (0.079) (0.121)
ln(GDP Per Capita) -0.007 0.015 -0.027 -0.024
(0.036) (0.036) (0.031) (0.033)
GDP Growth -0.129 -0.087 -0.186∗ -0.199∗
(0.162) (0.186) (0.071) (0.076)
Polity Score 0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002)
Observations 232 196 268 231
Countries 12 11 13 12
R2 0.766 0.764 0.830 0.831
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of immigration policy in year t. All independent variables are taken from year t unless
otherwise noted. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * and +
indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. Country and year
fixed effects are included in all models.
Table 6.8 shows that the results remain robust to the use of an alternative measure of
immigration policy openness and different coding rules for autocracy. These additional
tests illustrate the robust relationship between autocrats’ immigration policy choices and
the extent to which they can use natural resource rents to keep native citizens quiescent.
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6.4 Conclusion
This chapter was empirically and theoretically motivated by the wide variation in au-
thoritarian immigration policy. The theoretical prediction and the rigorous empirical
analyses emphasize the importance of natural resource rents, as well as the effect of its
subsequent distribution in shaping autocratic elites’ incentive and ability to bring in low-
skilled workers. While the majority of migrant workers living in wealthy autocracies are
low-skilled, some immigrant workers pose direct labor-market competition to a subset of
native citizens. In Saudi Arabia, immigrants tend to fill young natives’ positions, depriving
them of social places to coordinate on political actions and to overcome collective action
problems. Only after the Arab Spring and protests by young Saudis did the Saudi Arabian
government begin to give in to popular pressure for more employment opportunities in
the private sector by reducing its addiction to foreign labor, which in turn ironically led to
a series of human rights violations toward migrant workers.
Another implication for government-sponsored injection of foreign labor into the econ-
omy is the role of working women and gender equality. While the literature notes the
role of natural resource rents in diminishing employment opportunities for women (Ross,
2008), the mechanism through which resource rents lead to gender inequality is unclear.
The distribution of resource rents may promote patriarchy by reducing the work incentive
of native women. In the meantime, rentier governments rely on temporary immigration to
meet the labor demand, depriving women of work opportunities. In contrast, the state
monitors and controls male citizens by employing them under government branches even
when they are often underqualified (Crystal, 1990, p. 11). Male citizens’ dependence on au-
tocrats’ provision of welfare and employment opportunities increases their loyalty. In turn,
rentier governments promote patriarchy to exercise control over individual households.
In rentier economies, temporary migrant workers also provide inexpensive services to
native citizens who demand more services and goods due to an increase in redistribution.
Immigration reduces the labor cost of domestic services, construction, and retail businesses.
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In an economy with lower prices, autocrats’ real income from resource revenues is higher.
In other words, autocrats can provide a smaller paycheck to each citizen when the overall
price level of a bundle of goods and services is lower.
The cases of oil-rich autocracies in the GCC area illustrate how natural resource wealth
encourages and allows autocrats to rely on low-skill immigration, which in turn increases
the chance of autocratic survival through their reliance on resource rents and temporary
immigration. The political consequences of mass immigration in resource-rich autocracies
pose a challenge to our understanding of why some autocracies persist while others fade
into history. In the new age of migration, future research should focus on the mechanisms
through which temporary migration can consolidate autocratic survival.
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CHAPTER 7
Concluding Remarks
7.1 Contributions
The dissertation makes several contributions to our understanding of immigration policy
formation and suggests new venues of research within broader political science literatures.
First, I have shown that immigration policy reflects the relative power of pro-immigration
firms vis-a`-vis native voters in advanced democracies. I have found little empirical support
for the conventional claim that macroeconomic variables and demographic changes shape
immigration policy outcomes. Instead, policymakers of democracies design immigration
policies for interest groups who help them maximize their re-election chance. When pro-
immigration firms thrive, borders become more open. In the absence of pro-immigration
firms, policymakers accommodate native voters’ opposition to immigration by erecting
entry barriers. To a large extent, immigration policy outcomes are observable reflections of
pro-immigration firms’ relative power in democracies. In contrast, autocrats are relatively
free from popular pressure for immigrant restrictions. More importantly, I have shown
that autocrats with access to natural resource windfalls have much more policy autonomy
over immigration as they face little opposition from the masses.
Second, I have shown that natural resource wealth produces differential effects on
immigration policy under different political institutions. On the one hand, the theories
and findings in Chapter 3 show that international political economy (IPE) scholars have
115
ignored the role of natural resource wealth in the politics of foreign economic policies.
Resource booms have unintended consequences on the labor market, which in turn shapes
the politics of globalization in various ways. On the other hand, the argument in Chapter 6
emphasizes an important role of temporary migration in rentier autocracies in reference to
the resource curse literature. In sum, political institutions condition how natural resource
wealth shapes the political economy of immigration policy with political and economic
ramifications resulting from different levels of immigration.
Third, the dissertation features a comprehensive report of field research conducted
in four different European countries over the course of five months during my visiting
fellowship at Maastricht University. Interviews with MPs, labor union representatives, and
business organizations reveal their preferences over immigration, especially low-skilled
or blue-collar foreign workers and how various interest groups try to steer policymakers
in the region. The field research improves our understanding of how European parlia-
mentary democracies make immigration policies and administer integration policies in
collaboration with local governments. Moreover, it reveals the importance of firms in
the immigration policymaking process. Furthermore, the field research shows that labor
immigration policy, the rise of right-wing populism, and the recent refugee crisis are all
intertwined in shaping the domestic politics of Western European democracies. Immigra-
tion has become one of the most pressing concerns in Europe as well as in other parts of
the developed world.
Finally, the dissertation introduces an updated dataset on immigration policy with an
emphasis on LSIP. Immigration policies shape the socio-economic outcomes of immigrants
and native voters’ perceptions about economic globalization. Scholars interested in this
venue of research can take advantage of this new dataset to explore domestic or interna-
tional outcomes of immigration policy variation. The dataset also allows researchers to
compare countries’ immigration policies over time, especially in relatively new immigrant
destinations in Scandinavia.
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To sum up, the dissertation offers novel theoretical predictions of the argument and
examines the empirical plausibility of these predictions with two different datasets, a
newly expanded dataset on cross-national LSIP and the data on senate roll call votes.
Many of the findings and implications in the dissertation also speak to a number of topics
in the existing political science literature.
7.2 Key Implications
One of the major debates in the public opinion literature on immigration is whether native
voters oppose immigration on material grounds.1 While the chapters in the dissertation
have not directly examined survey or experimental data on attitudes toward low-skill
immigration, we can infer why voters oppose low-skill immigration and why policymakers
close their borders without the support of firms for open immigration. First, policymakers
close their doors in response to a large resource boom in democracies. As mentioned in
Chapter 3, a resource boom increases the domestic wage and provides workers with more
employment opportunities. During a resource boom, workers should be less opposed
to low-skill immigration based on the labor-market competition model. Nonetheless,
policymakers close their borders as the pro-immigration coalition declines. This implies
that non-material concerns such as sociotropy and xenophobia among voters drive their
opposition to immigration more than their concerns for labor-market competition. This
is consistent with the recent findings in the public opinion literature concerning native
attitudes toward low-skilled immigrants.
Second, policymakers in resource-scarce countries open immigration in response to
increasing trade liberalization in Chapter 3. While trade liberalization and more open
immigration can generate economic anxiety among workers employed in the tradable
sector, policymakers still relax restrictions on immigration when firms ask for foreign labor.
1For instance, see Scheve and Slaughter (2001a); Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007, 2010).
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As mentioned earlier, firms are likely to assign more skill-intensive or communication-
oriented tasks to native workers while hiring foreign workers for routine tasks. In turn,
policymakers are able to open immigration without facing electoral punishment from
native voters working in the tradable sector. Based on the labor-market consideration
alone, medium-skilled native workers may welcome foreign labor in response to increasing
competitive pressure because (a) migrant workers help their employers who provide native
workers with jobs and (b) workers in the tradable sector are more likely to have industry-
specific skills while being tied to their employers.
In Chapter 3, we also find little evidence of policymakers taking the role of a social
planner in immigration policymaking. For instance, many industrialized countries in the
West and East Asia face low birth rates and aging populations. However, the project has
shown that a declining population is not a concern for policymakers. Immigration policy
is simply a tool for policymakers to appease a diverse set of interest groups, and ultimately
to increase their chance of staying in office. Some liberal democracies may have to face the
long-run consequences of restrictive immigration policies for the stability of their welfare
systems and the labor market.
As shown in Chapter 6, the GCC countries relatively “open” immigration entry criteria
are contigent upon their immense oil wealth. The GCC economies’ heavy reliance is coming
to an end once these countries exhaust their petroleum reserves. The end of the fossil-fuel
era is going to have consequences within the GCC countries as well as for other migrant-
receiving states. As the autocrats of the GCC economies lose their independent sources
of income, popular preferences will have more influence in immigration policymaking,
leading to more restrictions. As migrant workers currently occupy every sector in the GCC
member states, the GCC economies will experience drastic changes in the labor market,
possibly with more native workers coming into the labor force. Relatively resource-poor
Bahrain exemplifies this possible future path. In addition, other wealthy countries, mostly
wealthy democracies in the West and East Asia, will receive even more migration pressure
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due to the GCC’s immigrant restrictions.
7.3 Directions for Future Research
The political science literatures on IPE and authoritarianism have largely ignored the
significance of international migration and the role of capital-intensive natural resource
wealth in the political economy of immigration policy formation. Although we have
recently seen much more discussion on international migration in the discipline, our
understanding of immigration policy and the consequences of international migration
remains limited. Factors and policies that influence the cross-border mobility of labor
have important implications for politics at both domestic and international levels. Future
research should focus on whether international migration has shaped economic variables,
such as inequality and technological innovation, as well as how migration has played a
role in the development of political institutions, including fiscal and redistributive policy
instruments.
In addition, the political economy literature has overlooked the labor-market implica-
tions of the Dutch Disease in resource-rich economies. The existing literature has almost
exclusively focused on one consequence of resource wealth, exchange rate appreciation.
As I have demonstrated throughout this project, this often leads scholars to neglect other
consequences of natural resource abundance. The two-sector model of the Dutch Disease
shows that new employment opportunities in the non-tradable sector during a resource
boom break intra-industry coalitions between capital and labor in the politics of trade.2
In other words, the labor-market impact of high-value, capital-intensive resource wealth
transforms industry cleavages into class cleavages as labor is relatively free to move to and
within the non-tradable sector in a resource-rich economy. Future research should examine
2See Schattschneider (1935) for inter-industry conflicts in the policymaking process. See Rogowski (1989)
for a class-based framework highlighting the political conflicts between owners of different factors. See
Hiscox (2001) for a theory outlining the conditions under which political conflicts occur between industries
or between classes.
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how this tranformation of societal cleavages leads to different policy consequences in other
policy areas.
7.4 Globalization and Immigration
The recent scapegoating of immigrants in developed democracies brings our attention to
the lively debate on whether increasing economic globalization has been responsible for
growing economic anxiety among native voters, resulting in immigration policy restric-
tions. While policymakers tend to restrict immigration in the absence of pro-immigration
firms, they also restrict immigration when anti-immigrant voters are politically organized.
For instance, Chapter 3 shows that policymakers restrict immigration in response to a
rising right-wing populist vote share. There is some evidence that immigration inflows
from the developing world, more specifically refugees and asylum seekers, explain the
variation in right-wing populism while there is no independent effect of trade liberaliza-
tion and capital mobility on the success of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe
(Swank and Betz, 2003). In the public opinion literature, the labor-market competition
hypothesis–opposition to immigration based on concerns about immigrants taking native
workers’ jobs–has failed to garner much empirical support.3 Instead, considerations of
national identity and group cues triggering emotions, in particular, anxiety tend to drive
opposition to immigration.4
There is no evidence that economic globalization in trade and capital has led to restric-
tive immigration policy in post-WWII liberal democracies.5 Increasing global economic
integration can generate anxiety among some individuals, and some politicians may take
3See Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) for a brief review of the literature.
4For instance, see Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior (2004)’s study in the Netherlands for the role of
national identity and Brader, Valentino and Suhay (2008) for the role of emotions induced by elite discourse.
5This central point of the dissertation directly contradicts the findings in Peters (2014, 2015, 2017) that
increasing trade liberalization and capital mobility lead to restrictive immigration policy. This is not
necessarily due to the different samples but because Peters (2015)’s operationalization of increasing capital
mobility during the collapse the Bretton Woods system captures petroleum booms in countries like the
Netherlands and the impact of the 1973 oil crisis on immigration policy.
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advantage of this opportunity to gain electoral success. Yet, as long as pro-immigration
firms exist, economic globalization does not necessarily lead to immigration policy restric-
tions. In a world of increasing capital mobility, policymakers who rely on pro-immigration
firms’ tax contributions provide them with a variety of incentives to keep them from
moving abroad. Immigration is one of policymakers’ many tools to make their location
attractive. National immigration policies, however, will likely be more restrictive as pro-
immigration firms innovate technologically to become less labor-intensive (Peters, 2014,
2015, 2017).
Another important phenomenon of the current globalization is the rise of service
industry in post-industrial economies. In high-income countries, individuals demand
more services such as healthcare, education, and entertainment, leading to growth of
the service sector. As firms and individuals in the service sector do not face foreign
competition, opposition to trade integration and capital mobility decreases. The Dutch
Disease literature shows that windfalls from capital-intensive, high-value natural resources
expedite this process of deindustrialization although increasing non-resource wealth also
leads to incremental deindustrialization, resulting in the decline of pro-immigration firms
under some conditions.6 The rise of the service economy during the current globalization
has optimistic implications for continued liberalization in the goods and capital markets but
suggests that policymakers will restrict immigration as more firms leave the tradable sector
in high-income countries. The global economy is moving toward a deeper integration in
trade and capital but is accompanied by more restrictive immigration policy due to further
deindustrialization. In the meantime, these “protected” service sectors will continue
to receive more immigration pressure from the developing world as the non-tradable
sector offers higher wages. The developed world is on path to another age of migration
while governments of high-income economies will place more restrictions in response to
deindustrialization.
6See Peters and Shin (2016) for how inequality between capital and labor conditions the relationship
between GDP per capita and immigration policy openness.
121
APPENDIX A
Data on Immigration Policy
A.1 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Summary Statistics of LSIP in Peters (2015) (19 Countries)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Nationality 4.318 0.862 1 5 2979
Skill 3.78 1.115 1 5 2979
Citizenship 3.643 1.085 1 5 2979
Other Rights 3.955 0.831 1.25 4.95 2979
Refugees 1.356 0.832 1 4.8 2979
Refugee Provisions 0.269 0.444 0 1 2979
Asylum 1.638 0.917 1 4.75 2979
Asylum Provisions 0.432 0.495 0 1 2979
Recruitment 3.714 0.831 1 5 2979
Work Prohibitions 4.388 0.796 1.5 5 2979
Deportation 3.525 1.146 1 5 2979
Enforcement 4.046 0.933 1.6 5 2979
Family Reunification 1.707 0.994 1 5 2979
Family Provisions 0.49 0.5 0 1 2979
Quota 4.761 0.873 1 5 2979
122
Table A.2: Summary Statistics of the Expanded LSIP (29 Countries)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Nationality 4.248 1.019 1 5 3603
Skill 3.682 1.177 1 5 3603
Citizenship 3.677 1.067 1 5 3603
Other Rights 3.894 0.897 1 5 3603
Refugees 1.602 1.047 1 4.8 3603
Refugee Provisions 0.354 0.478 0 1 3603
Asylum 1.823 1.039 1 4.75 3603
Asylum Provisions 0.487 0.5 0 1 3603
Recruitment 3.507 1.023 1 5 3603
Work Prohibitions 4.302 0.91 1.5 5 3603
Deportation 3.386 1.146 1 5 3603
Enforcement 3.898 0.977 1.2 5 3603
Family 1.853 1.09 1 5 3600
Family Provisions 0.553 0.497 0 1 3603
Quota 4.574 1.15 1 5 3603
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A.2 Immigration Policy Codebook
The following codebook comes from Peters (2015).
Universality by Nationality: How selective is the state about letting immigrants
in based on their national origin? Does nationality matter at all? Are there few national
groups or many allowed in? A score of 1 represents that few or no nationalities are
allowed in. A score of 5 represents that all nationalities are treated equally. One issue
that this brings up is that in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, states often gave some
groups preferential access to their labor market while having an overall policy of equality.
For example, New Zealand uses a point system with no national origin criteria but also
has a special program with the island nations of the South Pacific for seasonal workers. In
this case, these preferential access programs – because they are almost always for low-skill
workers – are coded in the universality by skill category. This coding rule is used because
the policy is to increase, and not deny, access to the state.
1. Only descendants of natives allowed in.
2. A few nationalities allowed entrance but not many. Example: if a European country
only allowed immigrants from other EU countries.
3. Many nationalities allowed in but not all or migrants from some regions excluded.
Example: Between 1924–1965, the US quota system allowed in many Northern Euro-
peans, some Southern and Eastern Europeans, anyone from the Western Hemisphere
and no one from Asia.
4. Almost all nationalities allowed in. Example: In the late 19th century, only Chinese
were excluded from the US. Additionally, numerical limits by country but not differ-
entiated by country. Example: Current US law restricts migration from each country
to 20,000.
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5. No exclusions based on nationality
Universality by Skill or Income: Does the state restrict by the skills or income an immi-
grant possesses? Does it use a point system with points given for education or special
skills? Are people excluded based on profession (e.g. no prostitutes), illness (e.g. no
epileptics), or likelihood of becoming a public charge? A score of 5 on this scale indicates
that the country has no restrictions by skill and a score of 1 means only the very highest
skilled workers (executives, high-level intracompany transfers) are allowed in. Again,
when states exempt one group from these restrictions - either by nationality in the case of
the New Zealand sea- sonal workers program for Polynesians or by a general category
like the seasonal agricultural workers program in Britain - the score increases.
1. Only highly educated, high income earners allowed in; many excludable classes.
2. Mostly high educated, high earners, but some allowances for low-skilled workers;
some excludable classes.
3. Preference for high-skill workers but many opportunities for low-skilled workers;
some excludable classes.
4. Few slots reserved for high-skill workers (i.e like the H1B visa in the US); most visas
open for anyone; few excludable classes (e.g. only criminals, those likely to become a
public charge).
5. No skill restrictions for any visas; no excludable classes.
Quota: Is there a quota and how restrictive is it? Quotas are only coded when the quota is
a numerical limit on a large portion of immigrants, not when it is a target for the number of
immigrants. Targets, like policy statements or development plans, are not coded because
they are not changes in legislation but usually administrative policies. The quota does not
need to be binding on all immigrants. This is because it is rare to have a quota that binds on
all immigrants. Usually at least wives and minor children of citizens are allowed in above
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the quota; this policy is denoted in the family immigration policy coding. Sometimes,
the quota is only on one class of immigrants, such as the Hong Kong quota on Chinese
immigrants, but this class makes up the majority of immigrants entering the country.
Again, high-skill workers from other countries could enter above the quota; although,
interestingly, wives and minor children of Hong Kong belongers (equivalent to citizens)
cannot. This is denoted in the other categories.
1. Less than 0.25% of population can enter annually
2. 0.25-0.5% of population can enter annually
3. 0.5-1% of the population can enter annually
4. Over 1% of population can enter annually
5. No quota
Recruitment: Are there special visas or procedures to recruit labor or settlers? To recruit
workers, do employers have to advertise first or otherwise seek approval from a govern-
ment ministry? How many industries can recruit? Do firms have to pay levies or other
taxes for foreign workers? Does the government pay for passage or give settlers or workers
other benefits to induce them to come? A score of 1 denotes that all workers have to follow
the same requirements as all other immigrants and that firms cannot recruit from overseas.
An example of this is the US Contract Labor Law. A 5 denotes that the government will
pay for passage of any immigrant and will give the immigrant money, land, or other goods
to help him to settled.
1. No special procedure or visa, come in under the same system of regulation as
everyone else; labor recruitment prohibited.
2. Small set of visas for special groups of workers (i.e. agricultural workers); trigger
to reduce numbers based on employment data; employers are not allowed to pay
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for moving expenses; many restrictions including no unemployed natives in the
industry.
3. Moderate number of visas for all groups or many groups obtain visas; employers
allowed to pay for moving expenses; some procedures for recruiting workers.
4. Few or no restrictions on visas for any type of worker, employers are allowed to pay
moving expenses; few restrictions or procedures for obtaining work visas.
5. Government program to recruit workers or settlers, government pays for the workers’
transportation cost and helps pay for firms or government officials to recruit workers.
Work Prohibitions: How many occupations can the immigrant work in? Are there require-
ments to have a certain number of native workers in an occupation/firm or that foreign
workers can only make up a certain percentage of workers? How many occupations do
the rules cover? All? Just certain industries? Are there racially based policies? A score
of 1 means that immigrants are not allowed to work in any industry. This is not the case
for any of the states in this sample. A score of 5 means that there are no restrictions or in
modern times, that the only restrictions are in highly sensitive national security positions.
1. Immigrants completely blocked from the labor market.
2. Immigrants restricted from many occupations; less than 30% of the workers in a
given occupation/firm can be immigrants (covering most or all of occupations).
3. Immigrants restricted from some occupations; 30-50% of workers in given occupa-
tion/firm can be immigrants (covers some occupations).
4. Immigrants cannot hold public sector positions; 50% or more of the workers in a
given occupation/firm can be immigrants (covers some occupations).
5. Immigrants can hold any position (except for highly sensitive national security
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positions); no restrictions on the number of immigrant workers in a given occupa-
tion/firm.
Family: Do family members get special treatment? Can they immigrate more easily than
others? Are there racial or skill distinctions? A score of 1 indicates that no family members
are given special treatment and a score of 5 indicates that many family members are given
special treatment. Most states fall somewhere between a 2 – special treatment for wives
and minor children only and a 4 – wives and minor children and sometimes parents can
enter without difficulty and all other relatives can be sponsored with some occupational or
skill requirements. One issue with family migration is that states did not seem to consider
it a necessary policy to have when there were few restrictions by nationality or skill. Family
reunification policies only came into being once other restrictions were put in place. Given
that the states have no policy on family migration during these times, these years are
scored as a 1.
1. No special provisions for family reunification; family members must enter under the
same procedures as others.
2. Only wives and minor children of citizens or legal permanent residents can be
sponsored, but are free from other controls.
3. Increased number of relatives can be sponsored (e.g. adult children or dependent
parents) but only by citizens and/or relatives (except minor children and wives) need
to possess same characteristics as non-family immigration (i.e. if there is a literacy
test, relatives must pass the test); relative in the country has to pay bond or otherwise
be responsible.
4. Many categories of relatives can be sponsored by citizens or residents (e.g. siblings,
parents not dependent on migrant) but still must possess same characteristics as
non-family immigrants (except minor children and wives); relative in the country
has to be responsible for immigrant.
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5. Many categories of relatives can be sponsored by citizens or residents and they do
not need to possess the characteristics of non-family immigrants (exemption from
literacy exams, etc.); no bond required or responsibility for relative in the country.
Family Provisions: Coded 0 before first mention of special provisions for families; 1 after.
Refugee: Does the state have a resettlement policy or does it just resettle refugees on
an ad hoc basis? How selective is their refugee policy? Do they let in many refugees?
Are refugees only defined as those who meet the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol or is
there are more expansive definition? Refugee policy is coded as a 1 if the country has no
special policy and a 5 if the country is willing to resettle large numbers of refugees without
taking into consideration the refugees’ qualifications. This last criteria is to distinguish
the more generous refugee policies of the current day with those after World War II when
most receiving countries placed occupational restrictions on refugees, selecting for higher
skilled migrants. Ad hoc refugee programs for one group during the crises are coded as
relaxing refugee restrictions and the magnitude of the change is based on the number of
refugees the state was willing to allow in. The change in coding only lasts as long as the
refugee program was in place; for example, when New Zealand took in Ugandan refugees
in 1973, but no other years, the increase in the refugee score is only calculated for 1973.
1. Almost no refugees allowed in; those that are allowed in must follow normal immi-
gration procedures.
2. Some refugees allowed in; special refugee visas but refugees chosen by some sort
of preference or must be able to pass tests that non-refugee immigrants take; few
reasons for being a refugee or ad hoc policy.
3. Special refugee visa, preference system but not overly burdensome; moderate number
of refugees allowed in; must follow some of the requirements that a non-refugee
immigrant would have to pass; the UN definition of a refugee is followed.
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4. Large number of refugees allowed in; no preference system or very weak system;
easy to obtain refugee visa; exemption from requirements of non-refugee immigrant;
at least the UN definition of a refugee is followed.
5. Large number of refugees; no preference system or requirements; very easy to obtain
refugee visa; many categories of refugees included not just the UN definition.
Refugee Provisions: Coded 0 before first mention of refugee; 1 after.
Asylum: How easy is it to gain asylum? What rights do asylum seekers and asylees have?
Are they kept in detention centers? Are they repatriated? Is there only one asylum status
or is there temporary protected status as well? What are the procedures and are there legal
safeguards?
1. No asylum.
2. Extremely difficult process; asylum granted only in a few cases; little ability to work
or access to welfare state while awaiting determination; little recourse if not granted
asylum; no temporary protected status; limited access for political refugees.
3. Difficult process; asylum granted for more cases; some access to the welfare state
or labor market, more recourse including ability to access courts if denied; some
temporary protected status allowed.
4. Fairly easy process; asylum granted to many groups; access to labor market and
welfare system; access to courts and other procedures if denied; temporary protected
status given to many groups.
5. Easy process; asylum granted for most cases; access to labor markets and welfare
state; constitutionally protected procedure; no need for temporary protected status
because almost everyone gets asylum.
Asylum Provisions: Coded 0 before first mention of asylum; 1 after.
Citizenship: How easy is it to obtain citizenship? What determines citizenship for children
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born in the country (jus sanguinis, jus soli, double jus soli)? Are there racial discriminations
in citizenship? How easy is it for the government to denaturalize citizens? A score of 1
denotes states where citizenship is only given through birth through one parent (usually
the father). A score of 5 denotes jus soli citizenship (citizenship given to all children born in
the state) and an easy naturalization process. Racial discrimination in citizenship policies
leads to a lower score as well.
1. Only by birth from a native father or mother.
2. Only by birth through either native parent and/or grandparent.
3. Very difficult process to obtain citizenship (language requirements, difficult test)
and/or many years to citizenship (more than 10 years) and/or children receive
citizenship through either parent or grandparent.
4. Moderately difficult process (relatively easy language requirements and/or an easy
test) and/or moderate time to citizenship (more than 5 but less than ten years) and/or
children born in state automatically get citizenship.
5. Fairly easy process (e.g. no language requirements) and short time to citizenship (5
or less years) and children born in state automatically get citizenship.
Immigrant Rights: What rights do immigrants have once in the state? Are there
racial/national origin discriminations? Does the government try to integrate immigrants
or does it just expect them to assimilate? How easy is it to get permanent residency?
A score of 1 indicates few legal rights: immigrants had to be registered; they had to go
through invasive health checks; they do not have the right to marry nationals; they could
only live in specific locations; they could only work for specific employers; they have
no access to the welfare state; they cannot own land; they are discriminated against and
they cannot gain 16 permanent residency. In states coded as 1, immigrants can basically
only work the job in which they were hired for and cannot leave the housing provided for
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them by their employer. A score of 5 indicates parity to citizens: complete access to the
welfare state; voting rights; no restrictions in where they can live or work; no restrictions
in property rights and a robust anti-discrimination program.
1. Almost no legal rights; immigrants must leave state if they leave their job; cannot
own property; cannot access the welfare state; they have to register, no freedom of
religion, no permanent residency, etc.
2. Some rights but land ownership and ownership of companies restricted; limited
access to the welfare state.
3. Ability to change jobs freely, some ownership of real property or companies; some
access to the welfare state, some racial discrimination in laws.
4. Access to most welfare policies; few restrictions on ownership of property or firms.
5. Total access to welfare state, voting rights without citizenship, no restrictions in
property ownership, integration policies, no racial discrimination, few years to
permanent residency.
Deportation: How easy is it to deport an immigrant? What safeguards exist? Does the
state engage in mass expulsions or pay people to leave the country? A score of 1 denotes
that there are many deportable offenses, including losing one’s job and there are few
administrative or judicial safeguards. A score of 5 is given if there are few deportable
offenses (usually deportation is limited to criminals) and/or clear judicial checks.
1. No appeals process; many deportable offenses, including losing one’s job.
2. Administrative process with few checks; fewer deportable offenses.
3. More checks on the process and even fewer deportable offenses.
4. Judicial checks on process including going to the highest court in the land and/or
very few deportable offenses.
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5. Almost no deportable offenses (conviction for an criminal offense, but not for an
immigration offense) and clear judicial checks.
Enforcement: How strongly does the state enforce its borders? Are there employer
sanctions, fines or prison time for illegal immigrants? Are there amnesties? During an
amnesty are immigrants allowed to stay or just leave without paying a fine? A score of 1
denotes a high spending country, with severe employer sanctions, sanctions on those who
are in the country legally including fines and prison time, bonds to ensure that immigrants
leave and identification papers that are hard to forge. A score of 5 denotes no enforcement
beyond basic police enforcement.
1. High spending, employer raids or hard to forge national work IDs, strong employer
sanctions, bonds placed by employers to ensure that migrants go home, large number
of enforcement officials.
2. Slightly less spending, fewer raids or easier to forge national work id, border enforce-
ment is strong but not impossible to over come.
3. Even less money, no raids, easy to forge IDs, some border enforcement.
4. Very little enforcement, screening at points of entry, little enforcement on employers.
5. Basically no enforcement.
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APPENDIX B
Primary Resources, Secondary Labor
B.1 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Summary Statistics for 15 Democracies, 1950–1995
Variable Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max. N
Immigration Policy -0.881 0.775 -2.858 0.417 648
Tariff Level 4.302 2.923 0.700 31.2 631
Natural Log of Resource
Income Per Capita
4.821 1.964 0 8.693 648
Natural Log of Non-coal
Resource Income Per
Capita
4.085 2.365 0 8.692 648
Natural Log of
Population/Areat−1
4.057 1.712 0.181 5.914 598
GDP Growth 0.037 0.027 -0.07 0.191 645
Natural Log of GDP Per
Capita
9.569 0.411 7.901 10.3 648
Polity Score 9.847 0.723 5 10 648
Inequalityt−1 0.519 0.093 0.332 0.784 610
Welfare Taxation/GDP 7.850 5.456 0 21.27 648
Personal Taxation/GDP 10.49 4.669 2.768 27.818 639
Net Union Density 40.845 15.88 8.569 82.803 638
Right-wing Populist
Vote Share
1.309 3.431 0 23 648
Schengen 0.008 0.088 0 1 648
OECD 0.752 0.432 0 1 648
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics for 20 Democracies, 1946–2013
Variable Source Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max. N
Immigration Policy Peters (2015); Author -0.899 0.752 -2.858 0.417 1053
Tariff Level Clemens and
Williamson (2004);
World Bank (2014);
Johansen (1985)
3.907 3.933 0.147 38.1 1006
Natural Log of
Resource Income Per
Capita
Haber and Menaldo
(2011); World Bank
(2014)
4.852 2.083 0 10.045 1053
Natural Log of
Non-coal Resource
Income Per Capita
Haber and Menaldo
(2011); World Bank
(2014)
4.199 2.428 0 10.038 1053
Natural Log of
Population/Areat−1
Haber and Menaldo
(2011); World Bank
(2014)
4.085 1.672 0.181 6.505 963
GDP Growth Haber and Menaldo
(2011); World Bank
(2014)
0.035 0.038 -0.121 0.701 1047
Natural Log of GDP
Per Capita
Haber and Menaldo
(2011); World Bank
(2014)
9.688 0.49 7.2 10.541 1053
Polity Score Marshall and Gurr
(2014)
9.802 0.738 5 10 1048
Inequalityt−1 Ortega and Rodriguez
(2006); Houle (2009)
0.523 0.102 0.332 0.784 897
Welfare Taxation/GDP Cusack (2000); Cusack
and Beramendi (2006)
7.850 5.456 0 21.27 648
Personal
Taxation/GDP
Cusack (2000); Cusack
and Beramendi (2006)
10.49 4.669 2.768 27.818 639
Net Union Density Golden, Lange and
Wallerstein (2000)
40.14 16.466 8.497 82.803 712
Right-wing Populist
Vote Share
Swank (2014) 2.625 5.433 0 28 947
Schengen 0.133 0.34 0 1 1053
OECD 0.746 0.435 0 1 1053
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B.2 Endogenous Trade Liberalization
For theoretical simplicity, I have treated trade openness as an exogenous factor. It is possi-
ble, however, that revenues from natural resource production expedite trade liberalization
through the deindustrialization of labor-intensive sectors.1 When firms that oppose trade
liberalization exit the tradable market due to the Dutch Disease, it becomes easier for
policymakers to open trade. In addition, capital-intensive firms that face exchange rate
appreciation may seek to lower tariffs of foreign markets by supporting bilateral or multi-
lateral free trade agreements. As the Dutch Disease induces capital-intensive exporters
to mobilize themselves for trade liberalization, labor-intensive firms may decide to leave
the tradable sector. Policymakers then close immigration in the absence of the support of
labor-intensive firms for more immigration. Treating trade liberalization as an endogenous
consequence of resource wealth does not change the central results of the argument.
Another possibility is that policymakers restrict immigration for other reasons. Such
restrictions on labor inflows cause labor-intensive firms to exit the market due to a higher
domestic wage. Proponents of free trade gain more political influence in trade politics as
labor-intensive firms exit due to restrictive immigration policy. Then trade liberalization
is a consequence of restrictive immigration policy, implying a negative policy correlation
between trade and immigration openness. While this alternative explanation seems plausi-
ble, my theory suggests that this negative policy correlation only occurs in resource-rich
countries. If immigration restrictions cause trade liberalization by raising the domestic
wage, this should be observable in resource-scarce countries as well. The argument of the
paper, however, predicts a positive policy correlation only in resource-scarce countries.
The argument of reverse causality does not elaborate on how restrictions on immigration
policy can lead to different trade policy outcomes in resource-rich and resource-scarce
1Resource extraction requires abundant capital. Upon the discovery of capital-intensive natural resources,
foreign capital flows into the domestic economy to facilitate exploration, extraction and refinement. This
massive influx of capital changes the factor endowment of the economy, causing a decrease in the output of
labor-intensive goods according to the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade (Rybczynski, 1955).
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economies.
The history of trade policy in labor-scarce democracies suggests that the possibility of
immigration policy influencing trade policy is indeed unlikely, especially in the post-World
War II era. Although the role of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) in promoting
free trade has been questioned in the literature,2 the institutional features of the RTAA,
once put in place, facilitated the movement toward free trade in the U.S. Furthermore,
the post-World War II multilateral trade integration within Europe and the rise of the
European Union as a supranational institution encouraged many labor-scarce European
countries to open up their goods markets through reciprocity, giving birth to the Common
Customs Tariff (CCT) through the EUCU.3 Yet we observe quite divergent immigration
policies among Western European countries during this period of trade liberalization. It
is implausible to speculate that different immigration policies have led to the EU-wide
economic integration in the goods market.
B.3 Firms, Asset Mobility, and Immigration
The argument of this article does not make an explicit assumption about the degree of
international capital mobility. If most firms are able to move abroad in response to trade
liberalization, policymakers no longer have an incentive to bring foreign low-skilled
workers regardless of the level of an economy’s resource dependency. Since increasing
capital mobility has characterized the post-WWII era, it is plausible to assume that some
firms have exit options abroad. The “new” new trade theory, however, demonstrates that
only the most productive firms engage in foreign activities (Melitz, 2003). More strikingly,
2See Hiscox (1999) for how party politics and parties’ relationships with different trade coalitions actually
promoted both the RTAA and trade liberalization in the U.S.
3Since European economies produce different products, domestic interests of each country seek to protect
what they actually produce while supporting liberalization on goods they mostly import. See Ehrlich (2009).
Regardless, EUCU has virtually eliminated internal tariffs within the European Community and has greatly
reduced CCT since the 1990s. Trade liberalization and market integration within the EU have increased
trade openness in all member states with some cross-national variation of openness.
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only a small proportion of those firms serving foreign markets engage in horizontal foreign
direct investment (FDI) (Doms and Jensen, 1998; Girma, Thompson and Wright, 2002;
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004). Given that labor-intensive firms in wealthy economies
are neither exporters nor productive, it is unlikely that increasing international capital
mobility provides existing pro-immigration firms with foreign exit options. It is, however,
plausible that domestic capital that would have invested in domestic labor-intensive firms
in the absence of capital mobility now has attractive investment opportunities abroad
under capital mobility. The owners of this mobile capital would not lobby for liberal
immigration policy.
Even if some pro-immigration firms are able to move abroad via various forms of
FDI, policymakers in resource-deficient and resource-rich economies face vastly different
political constraints. Resource-rich economies with a booming non-tradable sector provide
jobs to native workers even when firms in the tradable sector perish or move abroad.
Therefore, policymakers in resource-rich economies do not help domestic firms that seek
to ship jobs abroad in response to increasing trade liberalization. On the other hand,
policymakers in resource-deficient economies must worry about job losses caused by trade
liberalization since native workers have fewer viable outside employment opportunities
than workers in resource-booming economies. Trade-related job losses impose more severe
electoral punishment on policymakers than other job losses (Margalit, 2011). Therefore,
policymakers in resource-scarce economies are more likely to be responsive to the policy
preferences of domestic firms in the tradable sector than their counterparts in resource-rich
economies.
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APPENDIX C
Petroleum Wealth and U.S. Senators
C.1 Additional Tables
Table C.1: Summary Statistics (1964–2008)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Pro-Immigration Vote Shares 0.461 0.327 0 1 3792
Weighted Low-Wage Import Penetration 0.058 0.128 0.001 0.954 3161
ln(Real Coal Income Per Capita) 2.461 2.865 0 9.746 4198
ln(Real Oil Income Per Capita) 2.961 3.143 0 12.134 4198
ln(Real Gas Income Per Capita) 2.461 2.886 0 9.722 4198
ln(Real Petroleum Income Per Capita) 3.331 3.313 0 12.15 4198
Oil Income Diffusion 5.049 3.275 0 11.105 4197
Gas Income Diffusion 4.853 3.048 0 10.035 4197
ln(Real GDP Per Capita) 9.663 0.289 8.782 11.262 4198
GDP Growth 0.028 0.042 -0.294 0.425 3798
ln(Population) 14.889 1.035 12.48 17.416 4198
Value Added 11.192 0.71 3.906 15.239 3797
ln(Real Agricultural Income) 20.582 1.197 13.049 23.4 3796
% Foreign Born 0.05 0.045 0.004 0.272 3707
% Union 20.336 9.273 3.335 46.8 3698
ln(Welfare Per Capita) -10.163 0.761 -15.146 -8.340 3798
Republican 0.472 0.499 0 1 3778
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Figure C.1: Petroleum Income Per Capita in the American States in 1975 and 2008
Note: This figure presents a map of the American states in terms of real petroleum income per capita in U.S.
dollars. Petroleum income includes revenues from oil and natural gas. Darker shades indicate higher values
of petroleum income per capita.
143
Table C.3: Determinants of Pro-Immigration Vote Shares in the U.S. Senate, 1964–2008
Model (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
First Observation Year 1964 1972 1972 1972 1972
Coal Income 0.017
(0.011)
Gas Income -0.024 -0.011
(0.020) (0.021)
Oil Income 0.006 -0.006
(0.014) (0.013)
Petroleum Income -0.000 -0.003
(0.013) (0.014)
Import Penetration 0.428∗∗ 0.437∗∗ 0.445∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.150) (0.149) (0.156)
Import Penetration×Gas Income -0.032∗∗
(0.010)
Import Penetration×Oil Income -0.027∗∗
(0.010)
Import Penetration×Petroleum Income -0.028∗∗ -0.027∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
ln(GDP Per Capita) 0.000 0.024 0.025 0.015 -0.028
(0.066) (0.066) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068)
GDP Growth -0.104 -0.130 -0.133 -0.128 -0.120
(0.147) (0.136) (0.136) (0.137) (0.139)
ln(Population) 0.136 0.068 0.063 0.063 -0.014
(0.107) (0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.121)
% Foreign Born -0.183 -0.065 -0.042 -0.047 0.249
(0.656) (0.746) (0.743) (0.745) (0.730)
Agricultural Sector 0.085∗∗∗
(0.025)
Value Added -0.014∗
(0.006)
Welfare Per Capita -0.029+
(0.016)
% Union 0.000
(0.003)
Observations 3690 3152 3152 3152 3152
Senators 391 340 340 340 340
R2 0.299 0.319 0.318 0.319 0.323
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of U.S. senators’ voting behavior on immigration in year t. All independent variables
are taken from year t unless otherwise noted. Standard errors clustered on senators are shown
in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent,
respectively. Year and senator fixed effects are included in all models.
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Table C.4: Determinants of Pro-Immigration Vote Shares in the U.S. Senate, 1964–2008
Model (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
First Observation Year 1964 1972 1972 1972 1972
Coal Income 0.015+
(0.008)
Gas Income 0.002 -0.002
(0.010) (0.013)
Oil Income -0.007 -0.011
(0.008) (0.010)
Petroleum Income -0.003 -0.003
(0.010) (0.010)
Import Penetration 0.230 0.262+ 0.237+ 0.367∗
(0.139) (0.140) (0.139) (0.157)
Import Penetration×Gas Income -0.019∗
(0.008)
Import Penetration×Oil Income -0.019∗
(0.008)
Import Penetration×Petroleum Income -0.016∗ -0.019∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
ln(GDP Per Capita) 0.027 0.087 0.111+ 0.091 0.047
(0.056) (0.053) (0.059) (0.057) (0.050)
GDP Growth -0.133 -0.216+ -0.226+ -0.219+ -0.167
(0.131) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.125)
ln(Population) 0.118∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.131∗ 0.131∗ 0.082+
(0.039) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.047)
% Foreign Born -0.590∗ -0.894∗∗ -0.927∗∗ -0.886∗∗ -0.831∗∗
(0.258) (0.320) (0.328) (0.321) (0.310)
Republican -0.062∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Agriculture Sector 0.071∗∗
(0.024)
Value Added -0.015∗∗
(0.006)
Welfare Per Capita -0.036∗
(0.014)
% Union 0.003
(0.002)
Observations 3676 3139 3139 3139 3139
States 50 50 50 50 50
R2 0.295 0.309 0.309 0.309 0.314
Note: This table portrays a pooled cross-sectional time-series ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis of U.S. senators’ voting behavior on immigration in year t. All independent variables
are taken from year t unless otherwise noted. Standard errors clustered on states are shown
in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate statistical significance levels of .1, 1, 5 and 10 percent,
respectively. Year and state fixed effects are included in all models.
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APPENDIX D
Tyrants and Migrants
D.1 Additional Tables
Table D.1: Summary Statistics, 1946–2013 (Autocracy= 1)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Immigration Policy -0.388 0.436 -1.453 0.812 503
Immigration Policy Average 3.573 0.343 2.507 4.236 503
ln(Resource Income Per Citizen) 5.022 3.336 0 12.231 503
ln(Population)t−1 15.876 1.264 12.635 18.543 463
ln(GDP Per Capita) 8.993 0.96 6.732 11.253 473
GDP Growth 0.064 0.066 -0.225 0.579 462
Polity Score -3.394 6.004 -10 8 429
Table D.2: Summary Statistics, 1946–2013 (Polity< 6)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Immigration Policy -0.407 0.467 -1.453 0.812 432
Immigration Policy Average 3.584 0.371 2.507 4.214 435
ln(Resource Income Per Citizen) 5.691 2.855 0 12.231 435
ln(Population)t−1 16.324 1.199 12.74 18.683 423
ln(GDP Per Capita) 8.941 0.938 6.732 11.253 429
GDP Growth 0.061 0.063 -0.206 0.579 421
Polity Score -4.087 5.246 -10 5 435
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Table D.3: Correlation Matrix, 1946–2013 (Autocracy= 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) 1
(2) 0.761∗∗∗ 1
(3) 0.0835 0.189∗∗ 1
(4) -0.0652 -0.116∗ -0.260∗∗∗ 1
(5) -0.0197 -0.0188 0.402∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ 1
(6) 0.0739 0.0183 -0.171∗∗∗ 1
(7) -0.245∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ 0.0384 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Variable List:
(1) Immigration Policy, (2) Immigration Policy Average, (3) ln(Resource Income Per Citizen), (4)
ln(Population)t−1, (5) ln(GDP Per Capita), (6) GDP Growth, (7) Polity Score
Table D.4: Correlation Matrix, 1946–2013 (Polity< 6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) 1
(2) 0.729∗∗∗ 1
(3) 0.135∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 1
(4) -0.156∗∗ -0.110∗ -0.529∗∗∗ 1
(5) 0.126∗∗ 0.111∗ 0.635∗∗∗ -0.553∗∗∗ 1
(6) 0.0647 -0.00856 -0.139∗∗ -0.0345 -0.101∗ 1
(7) -0.269∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.0179 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Variable List:
(1) Immigration Policy, (2) Immigration Policy Average, (3) ln(Resource Income Per Citizen), (4)
ln(Population)t−1, (5) ln(GDP Per Capita), (6) GDP Growth, (7) Polity Score
147
Table D.5: Descriptive Statistics of Immigration Policy Dimensions by Polity IV Data
Democracies≥6 Autocracies< 6
Dimension Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Universality by Nationality 3.99 1.267 1387 4.441 0.831 435
Universality by Skill or Income 3.009 1.039 1387 3.224 1.182 435
Citizenship 3.786 0.875 1387 3.193 1.052 435
Rights 3.836 0.901 1387 3.226 1.046 435
Refugee 2.439 1.238 1387 1.25 0.71 435
Asylum 2.616 1.049 1387 1.427 0.895 435
Recruitment 3.095 1.053 1387 3.132 1.096 435
Work Prohibitions 4.15 0.976 1387 3.75 1.043 435
Deportation 2.930 0.847 1387 2.177 0.857 435
Enforcement 3.180 0.901 1387 3.659 0.84 435
Family 2.568 1.069 1387 2.186 1.160 432
Quota 4.275 1.371 1387 4.706 1.023 435
Refugee Provision 0.746 0.435 1387 0.409 0.492 435
Asylum Provision 0.826 0.38 1387 0.411 0.493 435
Family Provision 0.939 0.24 1387 0.936 0.246 435
Immigration Policy -0.826 0.739 1387 -0.408 0.467 432
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